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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of political specialization in which some countries uphold the
rule of law while others consciously choose not to do so, even though they are ex ante identical.
This is borne out of two key insights: for incumbents in each country, (i) the first steps to
the rule of law have the greatest private cost, and (ii) steps taken by some countries in the
direction of the rule of law make it less attractive for others to follow the same path. The world
equilibrium features a symbiotic relationship between despotic and rule-of-law economies: by
producing technology-intensive goods that require protection of property rights, rule-of-law
economies raise the relative price of natural resources and increase incentives for despotism in
other countries; while the choice of despotism entails a positive externality because cheap oil
makes the rule of law more attractive elsewhere in the world.
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1 Introduction
It is a commonplace to claim that the world has become smaller and there are fewer and fewer
differences between formerly exotic places and the West. An unprecedented flow of goods and ideas
has allowed emulation of faraway countries, resulting in a large increase in conformity across the
globe. However, politics seem to be immune to this trend. While the rule of law can be taken for
granted in large parts of the world, authoritarianism prevails in far too many places, in spite of its
well-known negative consequences.
Figure 1 summarizes some key trends in governance around the world during the last two cen-
turies. The charts show time series for two indices from the Polity IV database: ‘autocracy’ (an
index from 0 to 10) on the left and ‘executive constraints’ (an index from 1 to 7) on the right. The
first variable measures the extent to which political power is concentrated in a narrow group, and
the second measures checks and balances on executive power. The top panels display population-
weighted cross-country means of the two Polity scores for each year. Clearly, the world as a whole
now features much less autocratic government and substantially more constraints on the executive
than two centuries ago.
Interestingly, Figure 1 highlights that this change has occurred largely on the extensive margin.
It is not that there has been a more or less uniform decline in autocracy across countries. Instead,
some countries have substantially reduced or eliminated autocratic government, while others have
seen little improvement. This is illustrated in the bottom panels of the figure which plot the
population-weighted cross-country standard deviations of the two Polity scores. To judge the size of
these standard deviations, consider a benchmark standard deviation where all countries are divided
into two blocs with the minimum and maximum scores respectively, and the fractions of countries
in each bloc are set so that the average score is equal to the observed global mean. The dashed lines
in the bottom panels show these maximum possible standard deviations in each particular year.
For both Polity scores, the standard deviation has remained closer to the limit of full divergence
rather than moving towards zero. Instead of political convergence, a persistent pattern of political
specialization is observed.
This paper presents a theory of political specialization to understand how an increasingly inter-
connected world can nonetheless sustain diametrically opposed systems of government. According
to the theory, some countries will uphold the rule of law with commitment to property rights, while
others will consciously choose not to do so. Moreover, the theory implies that political specialization
is to be expected even if all countries were ex ante identical. This political specialization is borne
out of two key insights of the theory: (i) there is a diminishing marginal benefit of good government
at the world level, but not at the country level; and (ii) there is a diminishing marginal cost of
good government at the country level. ‘Good government’ is taken to mean the extent to which
individuals appropriate the benefits of their own production.
The first key insight is due to the impact of good government on economic activity varying
between different types of goods. Some production can occur even in despotic countries where
individuals have no protection against expropriation, for example, extraction of natural resources.
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Figure 1: Means and standard deviations of political regime characteristics in the world
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Notes: Annual data (1800–2013) on ‘Institutionalized Autocracy’ (autoc, score between 0 and 10) and
‘Executive Constraints’ (xconst, score between 1 and 7), with the means and standard deviations calcu-
lated from the population-weighted cross-section of countries. The spikes in the graphs are due to missing
observations for large countries (mainly China) in some years. The series labelled ‘largest possible’ in the
lower panels are the maximum possible standard deviations for distributions where the mean matches the
data (corresponding to distributions with two point masses at the extreme scores).
Source: Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html).
However, production of goods that require long-term investments in physical capital or research and
development (‘rule-of-law intensive goods’ hereafter) relies on investors expecting property rights to
be enforced. Hence, at the world level, the marginal benefit of good government is declining owing
to the diminishing marginal rate of substitution between rule-of-law intensive goods and other goods
less sensitive to a country’s political system. However, at the country level, access to world markets
means that the marginal benefit of good government is constant for a small open economy that does
not affect world prices.
The second key insight is that the marginal cost of good government is decreasing at the level of
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an individual country. What is meant by the marginal cost of good government is the marginal loss
of rents received by those who hold power as a consequence of marginally better government. The
idea is that while improvements in governance such as the rule of law will increase economic activity,
they will also curtail the rents that incumbents are able to extract. This cost is not a resource cost:
it is how much those in power stand to lose from better government in terms of the distribution of
income, which they will set against the marginal benefit when deciding whether to resist it. Those
in power in economies where the rule of law is pervasive will receive only little in rents, while those
in autocracies will extract a substantial amount. Consequently, better government is ‘cheap’ at the
margin to those in power in countries where the quality of governance is already high because they
have only small rents to lose, while better government is ‘expensive’ at the margin to those in power
in autocracies because they have a lot to lose.
Combined, these two insights lead to political specialization. Owing to the diminishing marginal
cost of good government combined with the constant marginal benefit at the level of an individual
country, countries will either fail to provide any security to investors, or will have full protection
of property rights. Starting from autocracy, the first steps to better government cost incumbents
more in terms of lost rents than they gain from increased economic activity. However, additional
steps in that direction lead to further improvements in economic activity and progressively smaller
losses of rents. If a tipping point is reached where the subsequent gains outweigh the initial losses
then a country can move from autocracy to the rule of law, but if not then it is in the interests of
incumbents not to take the first steps.
While this logic pushes individual countries to one of the extremes, the same reasoning does not
apply to the world as a whole. The diminishing marginal benefit of good government at the world
level means that the relative price of rule-of-law intensive goods is lower when good government is
more widespread around the world. As the price of rule-of-law intensive goods falls in world markets,
incumbents’ calculations of the gains and losses from the rule of law tip in favour of autocracy. This
leads to strategic substitutability in the choice of good government among countries, and implies
there will be a distribution of political regimes around the world in equilibrium.
The world equilibrium features a symbiotic relationship between rule-of-law economies and
despotic regimes. By producing goods requiring protection of property rights, rule-of-law economies
raise the relative price of other goods such as natural resources and thus increase incentives for
despotism in other countries. Conversely, despotic regimes generate a positive externality in other
countries because cheap oil makes the rule of law more attractive elsewhere in the world.
In equilibrium, those in power in ex-ante identical countries are indifferent between the choice
of the rule of law or despotism, and they always gain from trade with other countries. However,
the ensuing political specialization leads to economic divergence as well. The economies that adopt
the rule of law become substantially richer than the despotic regimes which produce no rule-of-law
intensive goods. International trade thus benefits some countries but harms others.
The theory provides a way of reconciling the claim that corruption, rent-seeking, and insecure
property rights create significant barriers to development in some countries with the fact that history
is replete with examples of other countries having overcome precisely these challenges. Without a
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theory of political specialization, one must rely on exogenous differences in countries’ ‘political
technologies’ to understand why bad regimes persist in a world where trade works to equalize the
marginal benefits of good government across countries. Such an approach is unappealing in light
of the widespread imitation of other successful ideas and technologies around the world. Instead,
the theory of political specialization presented here provides an account of how the same political
frictions can give rise to both winners and losers — and why not every country can be a winner.
While the theory predicts that political divergence arises even in a world of ex-ante identical
economies, the assumption of ex-ante identical countries is not essential to the argument. When ex-
ante heterogeneity across countries is considered, comparative advantage determines which countries
specialize in which political system, with good government emerging in countries with a comparative
advantage in rule-of-law intensive goods. A ‘natural resource curse’ arises owing to the effects
of a comparative advantage in natural resources on the incentives for those in power to resist
improvements in governance that would restrict their ability to extract rents.
The theory has some important lessons on how the problem of despotic regimes should be
addressed. One prediction is that exogenous improvements in one country’s political institutions,
perhaps brought about by well-intentioned international pressure or intervention, will tend to be
counteracted by an increase in incentives for despotism in other countries. However, this does
not preclude a role for international policy because the total number of despotic regimes in the
world is affected by the relative price of rule-of-law intensive goods, which is in turn influenced
by patterns of demand. The theory thus suggests that subsidies to rule-of-law intensive goods, for
example, channelling resources to the study and development of technology-intensive alternative
fuels, would be more effective in curbing despotism than efforts directed to affect the political
systems of particular countries.
Raising the relative price of rule-of-law intensive goods in world markets requires a degree of co-
operation among countries. Sadly, it is easier to find examples of international cooperation intended
to lower this relative price. A cartel of countries with large endowments of natural resources that
exploits its market power to push up the price of natural resources effectively imposes a tariff on
rule-of-law intensive goods, which results in fewer countries having the rule of law in equilibrium.
In modelling the ideas discussed above, although the diminishing marginal benefit of rule-of-law
intensive goods is a natural feature of any economic model, the diminishing marginal cost of good
government ought not to be a primitive in any formal model of politics. In order to understand the
nature and the properties of the costs of good government, it is essential to consider how questions
of distribution are resolved through the use of political power. Following from this, it is appropriate
to study the adoption of political institutions using a model where the distribution of power and
resources is jointly determined. Upholding the rule of law requires that those who hold power are
able to commit to pre-established rules and follow them even when that is not in their own interests
ex post. But how can such commitment be achieved and what costs are entailed?
An important implication of the model used in this paper is that power sharing enables com-
mitment to rules that would otherwise be time inconsistent. Power sharing supports the rule of law
because it increases the number of potential losers from changes to the status quo, and thus raises
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the number of people willing to defend the status quo against threats from both inside and outside
the group in power. However, sharing power requires sharing the rents associated with holding
positions of power, which goes against the interests of incumbents and drives a wedge between the
social return to investments and the return perceived by those in power.
For incumbents, the cost of improving governance through sharing power is related to the dif-
ference between incumbents’ own incomes and the incomes of those outside the group in power.
This difference is lower in economies with more power sharing because an additional member of the
ruling group is less important to the overall group of incumbents when power is already shared more
widely. That is why the first steps to the rule of law have the greatest private cost to incumbents,
or in other words, why the marginal cost of good government is decreasing.
Since the mechanism leading to political specialization relies on international trade, an implica-
tion of the model is that the possibility of trade drives countries apart, economically and politically.
Williamson (2011) shows that economic divergence did indeed follow the first wave of globalization
in the early 19th century, when the third world ‘fell behind’. While those countries with a com-
parative advantage in primary goods grew more than in previous centuries, the gap between rich
and poor countries widened. Here, using data from the Polity IV Project, this paper shows that
economic divergence was accompanied by political divergence. At the start of the 19th century, both
industrialization and constraints on the executive (a measure of power sharing) were rare all around
the world. In subsequent decades, industrialization and constraints on the executive appeared in
many European countries but, consistent with the theory, neither showed up in the periphery.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1.1 discusses the related literature. Section 2 de-
scribes the economic model and develops the theory of political specialization with the diminishing
marginal cost of good government taken as an assumption. Section 3 derives the policy implications
of the theory and extends the analysis to consider ex-ante heterogeneity between countries and the
possibility of cooperation among countries. Section 4 sets up the full political model, describes the
assumptions on the power struggle, and characterizes the equilibrium allocation of power and re-
sources. Section 5 documents the divergence in power sharing following the first wave of globalization
in the 19th century. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
The full political model of section 4 builds on the framework proposed by Guimaraes and Sheedy
(2015). That paper develops a model where an allocation of power and resources is established in the
interests of incumbents. An allocation needs to survive the threat of rebellions from both inside and
outside the group in power. The mechanism for contesting an allocation is the same no matter what
that allocation prescribes, and there are no special individuals in the model: everyone is ex ante
identical. The model assumes no exogenous technology to protect property rights, instead, power
sharing allows for the rule of law to emerge endogenously. Here, the environment is extended to a
world with two goods and many economies, and the equilibrium allocation of power and resources
is characterized, taking account of interactions between countries’ political systems. The two main
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theoretical results of this paper are the diminishing marginal cost of good government and the
strategic substitutability in political regimes when there is international trade.1
There is now a substantial body of research showing that institutional quality has an important
role in explaining international trade, as surveyed by Nunn and Trefler (2014). This is consistent
with the reason why countries trade with each other in the theory here. Much of that work takes
institutions as given. The literature studies how institutions affect trade flows (for example, An-
derson and Marcouiller, 2002), and the pattern of comparative advantage (Levchenko, 2007, Nunn,
2007) and its dynamic effects (Araujo, Mion and Ornelas, 2016).
The paper is also related to a literature on the effects of trade on political institutions. Milgrom,
North and Weingast (1990), Greif (1993), and Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) combine histori-
cal analysis and game theory to understand how institutions in medieval times allowed merchants to
solve the commitment problems that arise in large-scale (international) trade.2 Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2005) and Puga and Trefler (2014) study how international trade induced institu-
tional change by enriching and empowering merchant groups. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2005) argue that the Atlantic trade led to better institutions in European countries with good
initial conditions, while Puga and Trefler (2014) show how empowering merchants in Venice led to
important institutional innovations up to the 13th century, but also to political closure and reduced
competition thereafter. In a similar vein, special-interest groups play a key role in Levchenko’s
(2013) analysis of the impact of international trade on institutional quality.3 This paper takes
a different perspective. It looks at the world economy as a whole and studies how international
trade affects the distribution of good government around the world in a model with ex-ante iden-
tical individuals and ex-ante identical countries. The model predicts that the world equilibrium is
asymmetric, giving rise to winners and losers, a point that is absent from this literature.
In this sense, the paper is related to Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2015), who study special-
ization in economic systems and also find an asymmetric world equilibrium. However, the question
there is a very different one: understanding why different types of capitalism can co-exist, in partic-
ular, why we cannot all be like Scandinavians as opposed to Americans. Here, the question is why
examples of good government in some countries co-exist with examples of abject failure in others
— why some of us must be Venezuelans. In consequence, the model here is completely different
from Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2015). For example, the power struggle plays a central role
here but is absent from their analysis, while here the paper abstracts from changes in the world
technological frontier, which is central to their paper.
As in the ‘new trade theory’ models of Krugman (1979, 1980), the model here predicts a sub-
stantial amount of trade between ex-ante identical economies. Those papers assume production
technologies with increasing returns, so countries specialize in different varieties of goods to exploit
economies of scale, and trade benefits all countries. Here, there is a form of increasing returns to
1There are alternative models related to power sharing (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, Jack and Lagunoff, 2006,
Bai and Lagunoff, 2011), but power sharing in those papers is an extension of the democratic franchise. In contrast,
power sharing in Guimaraes and Sheedy (2015) is connected to the emergence of the rule of law.
2These ideas are developed further in Greif (2006).
3See also Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Do and Levchenko (2009).
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producing rule-of-law intensive goods (from the point of view of those in power) because a dimin-
ishing marginal cost of good government arises endogenously from the political environment. That
leads to political specialization, and trade benefits those in power anywhere in the world irrespective
of political system — but not all countries gain from trade.
The paper is also related to the large literature on the ‘natural resource curse’ working through
political institutions.4 Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006) and Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006)
study the role of institutions in understanding the natural resource curse. While in those papers the
curse is a consequence of bad institutions, here the key institutional variable (power sharing) is en-
dogenously determined and is a consequence of having a comparative advantage in natural resources.
There are models in which natural resources distort rulers’ choices (for example, Acemoglu, Verdier
and Robinson, 2004, Caselli and Cunningham, 2009, Caselli and Tesei, 2016), but the distinguishing
and important implication of this paper is that for the world as a whole, the number of despotic
regimes depends on the demand for natural resources, not on the supply.
There is also a large body of work based around the idea that trade hurts economies that
specialize in primary goods. One possibility is that some sectors give rise to positive externalities on
the whole economy (or within an industry) through knowledge creation.5 In this paper, trade harms
those economies that fail to establish institutions conductive to development, but not because of
any intrinsic disadvantage of producing primary goods.6
Last, the paper is broadly related to discussions of democratization in the social sciences.7
Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, Fukuyama
(1992) famously predicted the ‘end of history’, arguing that the days of autocratic regimes were
numbered. Reality, however, has not been so kind, and Fukuyama has since acknowledged that
autocratic regimes have been stubbornly persistent (Fukuyama, 2011).8 More systematically, using
the methods developed in the literature on testing for convergence in levels of GDP per person
across countries, the lack of cross-country convergence in Polity scores has been noted in work by
Goorha (2007).
2 A theory of political specialization
This section develops the theory of political specialization in a simple model that takes the dimin-
ishing marginal cost of good government as an assumption.
The world comprises a measure-one continuum of countries each containing a measure-one con-
tinuum of individuals. Individuals within a country are indexed by ı ∈ [0, 1], countries by  ∈ [0, 1].
4For a discussion of the empirical evidence on the natural resource curse, see Sachs and Warner (2001) and Van der
Ploeg (2011).
5See, for example, Krugman (1987), Rodrik (1996), and Melitz (2005).
6There is also a large literature in sociology that attempts to explain underdevelopment as the result of rich
countries exploiting poor ones, so-called ‘dependency theory’. See, for example, Cardoso and Faletto (1979).
7Huntington (1993) is an influential example.
8There is much work in political science on the survival of autocracies (for example, Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007),
but that literature focuses on individual countries, while this paper studies the political equilibrium of the world as
a whole.
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2.1 The economy
There are two goods in the world, an endowment good (E) and an investment good (I), the names
referring to how the goods are obtained. The only use of both goods is consumption. All individ-
uals throughout the world have preferences over consumption of the two goods represented by the
consumption aggregator:
C =
c1−αE c
α
I
(1− α)1−ααα , [2.1]
where cE and cI are respectively consumption of the endowment and investment goods. The param-
eter α, satisfying 0 < α < 1, indicates the relative importance of the investment good.
Suppose each individual ı ∈ [0, 1] is able to choose consumption levels cE(ı) and cI(ı) to maximize
C(ı) subject to the budget constraint:
cE(ı) + picI(ı) = Y (ı), [2.2]
where pi is the relative price of the investment good in terms of the endowment good. Individual ı’s
disposable income is Y (ı) (in terms of the endowment good as numeraire), which takes account of
the taxes and transfers specified by the political system.9 Maximizing the consumption aggregator
(2.1) subject to (2.2) implies the first-order condition:
cI(ı)
cE(ı)
=
α
(1− α)pi , [2.3]
and substituting this into the budget constraint (2.2) leads to the demand functions:
cE(ı) = (1− α)Y (ı), cI(ı) = αY (ı)
pi
, and C(ı) =
Y (ı)
piα
, [2.4]
where the final equation is the maximized value of the consumption aggregator (2.1).
When the countries of the world are in contact with each other, the endowment and investment
goods can be exchanged in perfectly competitive world markets (but individuals cannot move be-
tween countries). The relative price of the investment good in terms of the endowment good in those
markets is denoted by pi∗, which all countries take as given. A country must satisfy its international
budget constraint:
xE + pi
∗xI = 0, [2.5]
where xE and xI respectively denote the country’s net exports of the endowment and investment
goods.
In a given country, all individuals exogenously receive an amount q of the endowment good. Out-
put K of the investment good (the capital stock) is endogenous and is described below. Conditional
on K, the country’s resource constraints are:
cE + xE = q, and cI + xI = K, where cE =
∫ 1
0
cE(ı)dı and cI =
∫ 1
0
cI(ı)dı, [2.6]
9The budget equation implicitly assumes that no taxes or subsidies affect the relative price of the two goods. It
is shown in the model of section 4 that those in power would not want to distort relative prices.
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with cE(ı) and cI(ı) denoting the (non-negative) quantities of the endowment and investment goods
consumed by individual ı ∈ [0, 1], and cE and cI total consumption of the two goods.
With individuals choosing consumption of the two goods in perfectly competitive markets subject
to incomes Y (ı), the resource constraints (2.6) are market clearing conditions. Given the capital
stock K and net exports xE and xI, domestic markets clear at the following relative price of the
investment good:
p˜i =
α(q− xE)
(1− α)(K − xI) , [2.7]
with individual incomes Y (ı) summing to national income Y (in units of the endowment good):∫ 1
0
Y (ı)dı = Y, where Y = q + p˜iK + (pi∗ − p˜i)xI. [2.8]
These claims follow from (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4). The final term in the expression for national
income above accounts for the possibility that domestic prices could diverge from international
prices. Equations (2.4), (2.7), and (2.8) imply:∫ 1
0
C(ı)dı = C, where C =
Y
p˜iα
=
(q− xE)1−α(K − xI)α
(1− α)1−ααα , [2.9]
with C being real GDP, equal to the sum of all individuals’ maximized levels of consumption C(ı).
In each country, a positive fraction µ of individuals receives investment opportunities at random.
Each investment opportunity leads to the production of one unit (a normalization) of the investment
good if it is undertaken. Letting s denote the endogenous fraction of investment opportunities
undertaken, the capital stock is:
K = µs. [2.10]
Taking an investment opportunity is rational only if individuals expect property rights will be
protected when the investment comes to fruition. It is assumed that all investment would be
optimal if property rights were fully protected, so that s is equal to the fraction of those receiving
investment opportunities who expect their property rights to be protected. The strength of property
rights in a country, as measured by s ∈ [0, 1], is an endogenous variable determined by the country’s
political system. In what follows, the term ‘good government’ is used as a shorthand for the strength
of property rights s.
2.2 The political friction
A country’s political system affects both ‘good government’ s and the distribution {Y (ı)} of national
income Y among individuals. A basic assumption is that institutions providing credible protection
of property rights also affect the share of income taken by those individuals in power (referred to as
the incumbents). The idea is that institutions which uphold the rule of law, which are necessary to
guarantee individuals’ property rights against those in power, are also likely to place more general
limits on the amount of resources incumbents can appropriate for themselves. Mathematically, this
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political friction is represented by the equation:
Yp = φ(s)Y, where φ
′(s) < 0, [2.11]
with Yp denoting the income of individuals in power. The share of national income appropriated by
individuals in power is φ(s), which is assumed to be decreasing in the strength of property rights s.
The function φ(s) embeds the effect of all political constraints (de facto, not only de jure) on the
incomes of those in power, conditional on operating in a political system able to provide sufficiently
strong property rights for a fraction s of investors to take on investment opportunities.10 Here,
the negative relationship (2.11) between s and the share of income appropriated by incumbents is
simply taken as an assumption. In section 4, equation (2.11) arises as a result from a model based
on more primitive political frictions. Subject to the constraint (2.11), those in power choose the
quality of governance s to maximize their own consumption payoff Cp.
Using (2.4), (2.9), and (2.11), the payoff of those in power and the effect of a marginal improve-
ment in governance on the payoff are:
Cp = φ(s)C, and
∂Cp
∂s
= φ(s)
(
∂C
∂s
− γ(s)Cp
)
, [2.12]
where the function γ(s) is defined as follows:
γ(s) ≡ − φ
′(s)
φ(s)2
. [2.13]
According to (2.12), an increase in s has two effects on the payoff of those in power. First, better
government leads to a larger K (from 2.10) and an increase in real GDP C available for consumption
(from 2.9). The term ∂C/∂s is referred to as the marginal benefit of good government, which is
multiplied in (2.12) by the share φ(s) received by those in power.
However, as the quality of government improves, the share φ(s) of national income appropriated
by those in power will decline (see 2.11). This is the second effect of s on Cp in (2.12). Using the
function γ(s) defined in (2.13), the marginal loss to those in power from higher s reducing φ(s) is
expressed in terms comparable to the marginal benefit of good government (i.e. scaled to reflect
incumbents’ share of the total pie), which means that γ(s)Cp is subtracted from ∂C/∂s. The value
of γ(s) > 0 gives the marginal loss as a fraction of the consumption Cp received by those in power,
which is referred to as the marginal cost of good government. Note that the cost of good government
is not a resource cost, and hence not a social cost (it is not deducted in the expression for real GDP
in 2.9). It is a private cost borne by incumbents due to a less favourable distribution of income
when property rights are strengthened.
The key assumption underpinning the theory of political specialization is that the marginal cost
of good government is diminishing:11
γ′(s) < 0. [2.14]
10These constraints include avoiding being overthrown by a popular uprising or a coup d’e´tat, or being impeached
or voted out of office.
11Note that by assuming a particular marginal cost function γ(s), the differential equation in (4.12) defining the
10
This marginal cost is the marginal loss of rents extracted by those in power when the quality of
governance improves. The idea is that the first steps to better government are very costly for those
in power because they have substantial rents to lose when governance is initially poor. Where
government is already very good, those in power receive relatively little in rents, and thus do not
have much to lose by improving it further. Here, (2.14) is taken as an assumption, but in section 4,
it is derived as a result from a model based on more primitive political frictions.
The behaviour of the marginal cost of good government is important in determining the curvature
of the objective function of those in power. Differentiating (2.12) with respect to s again and
evaluating at a critical point:
∂2Cp
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ ∂Cp
∂s
=0
= φ(s)
(
∂2Cp
∂s2
− γ′(s)Cp
)
. [2.15]
The sign of this second derivative determines whether the incumbent payoff Cp is globally quasi-
concave or quasi-convex in good government s. The formula above shows that this depends on the
sign of ∂2C/∂s2, that is, whether the marginal benefit of good government ∂C/∂s is increasing or
decreasing, and on the sign of γ′(s), that is, whether the marginal cost of good government γ(s) is
increasing or decreasing. The assumption (2.14) of a diminishing marginal cost of good government
is one reason why Cp might be a quasi-convex function of s.
Finally, for the political frictions described above ever to be relevant, it is necessary that the
marginal cost of good government at the best quality of government is not too small:
γ(1) >
α
φ(1)
. [2.16]
This condition is assumed in what follows.
2.3 Benchmark case: An economy in autarky
First consider the case of an economy not in contact with other countries (autarky). With no access
to international markets, net exports of each good are equal to zero (xE = 0 and xI = 0, which
replace the international budget constraint 2.5). Using (2.9) and (2.10), real GDP is given by:
C =
q1−αµαsα
(1− α)1−ααα . [2.17]
The marginal benefit of good government is:
∂C
∂s
= µpˆi1−α, where pˆi =
αq
(1− α)µs, [2.18]
with pˆi being the market-clearing relative price (see 2.7) of the investment good in the absence
of international trade (ˆ· is used to denote a variable in the case of autarky). Improvements in
relationship between γ(s) and φ(s) can be solved to deduce the implied function φ(s) in equation (2.11):
φ(s) =
φ(0)
1 + φ(0)
∫ s
z=0
γ(z)dz
,
where φ(0) is a given positive constant. This is decreasing in s if γ(s) is positive.
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governance allow more of the investment good to be produced, but have no effect on the endowment
good. The marginal benefit of good government therefore depends positively on the equilibrium
relative price pˆi of the investment good. However, in autarky, greater output of the investment good
reduces its equilibrium price, so the marginal benefit of good government is diminishing.
Proposition 1 Let ε(s) denote the elasticity (in absolute value) of the marginal cost of good
government γ(s). Assuming that
ε(s) < 1− α, where ε(s) ≡ −sγ
′(s)
γ(s)
, [2.19]
for an economy in autarky:
(i) The payoff Cp of those in power is a strictly quasi-concave function of s.
(ii) The payoff-maximizing value of s is given by the unique solution of the following equation:
α = sˆγ(sˆ)φ(sˆ), [2.20]
which satisfies 0 < sˆ < 1.
Proof See appendix A.1 
Note the elasticity (in absolute value) of the marginal benefit of good government from (2.18) is:
−s∂
2C
∂s2
/
∂C
∂s
= 1− α,
which means that the marginal benefit declines by 1−α percent for every one-percent improvement
in the quality of governance. The rate of decline reflects the weight 1−α attached to the endowment
good, for which the level of output does not depend on good government. As shown by (2.15), the
diminishing marginal benefit of good government is one reason why the objective function of those in
power might be quasi-concave. This could be offset by a declining marginal cost of good government,
but under the assumption that the marginal cost does not decline at a faster rate than the marginal
benefit (condition 2.19), the objective function is globally quasi-concave. Note that (2.19) holds
automatically if the marginal cost of good government were constant or increasing.
When the objective function is globally quasi-concave, there is an interior solution for s reflecting
the optimal trade-off at the margin between the benefits and the costs of good government from
the perspective of those in power. The first improvements in governance have an extremely large
marginal benefit because the investment good is scarce. As government improves, the scarcity
of the investment good is reduced, implying a lower marginal benefit from further improvements.
Eventually a point is reached where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost, and this is the
optimal choice of governance for those in power.
The equilibrium quality of governance sˆ depends only on the parameter α and the function φ(s)
(from which the marginal cost function γ(s) is derived). The size of the endowment q and the
quantity of investment opportunities µ have no effect on governance because changes in quantities
would lead to opposite changes in prices, and total values are what matter to incumbents.
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2.4 Government in a small open economy
Now suppose a country can trade investment and endowment goods in international markets at
relative price pi∗. Those in power choose good government s as before to maximize their payoff Cp
subject to the political constraint (2.11). They also choose the country’s net exports xE and xI
subject to the international budget constraint (2.5), taking the world price pi∗ as given.
The choice of quantities of net exports by those in power can be interpreted equivalently, and
more naturally, as the choice of a tariff or subsidy on imports or exports of the investment good
that drives a wedge between the domestic market-clearing price p˜i and the world price pi∗:
p˜i = (1 + τ)pi∗, [2.21]
where τ denotes the tariff (if positive, or subsidy, if negative).12 Individuals can buy and sell goods
in international markets subject to the tariff or subsidy.
Given a tariff τ in (2.21) and the domestic supplies q and K of the endowment and investment
goods, the international budget constraint (2.5) and market clearing (2.7) imply net exports are:
xE =
αq− (1− α)(1 + τ)pi∗K
1 + (1− α)τ , and xI =
(1− α)(1 + τ)pi∗K − αq
(1 + (1− α)τ)pi∗ . [2.22]
These satisfy the international budget constraint (2.5) and take on the full range of values consistent
with the resource constraints (2.6) and non-negative consumption as τ varies over its maximum range
(−1 < τ <∞). The choice of xE and xI by those in power is therefore equivalent to a choice of τ .
Substituting net exports from (2.22) into (2.9) implies real GDP is given by:
C =
(1 + τ)1−α
1 + (1− α)τ
q + pi∗K
pi∗α
. [2.23]
The second term above is the real value of the country’s output calculated using international prices
(see 2.8 and 2.9), with the first term representing the distortions caused by any tariffs or subsidies.
The first term is a strictly quasi-concave function of τ with a critical point at τ = 0. Those in power
want to maximize Cp = φ(s)C, and since φ(s) depends only on s and not directly on net exports, it
follows that τ = 0 is chosen to minimize distortions.13 Free trade is therefore always in the interests
of those in power.
With no restrictions on the flow of goods between domestic and foreign markets (τ = 0), real
GDP and the marginal benefit of good government are obtained from (2.10) and (2.23):
C =
q + µpi∗s
pi∗α
, and
∂C
∂s
= µpi∗1−α. [2.24]
Since a small open economy takes the world price pi∗ as given, the marginal benefit of good govern-
ment is independent of s and is equalized across countries through trade. With ∂2C/∂s2 = 0 and
the assumption (2.13) of a diminishing marginal cost of good government, equation (2.15) implies
the payoff of those in power is a quasi-convex function of the quality of governance s.
12Since p˜i and pi∗ are relative prices in terms of the endowment good, the effects of a tariff on the endowment good
are equivalent here to subsidizing the investment good, and vice versa.
13Note that the independence of φ(s) from net exports and τ is an assumption here, but this property is a result
of the model of section 4 based on more primitive political frictions.
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Proposition 2 (Political specialization) For a small open economy:
(i) Free trade (τ = 0 in 2.21) is optimal for those in power.
(ii) The payoff Cp of those in power is a strictly quasi-convex function of the quality of governance
s. Hence, the payoff-maximizing choice is either s = 0 or s = 1.
(iii) The choice of s = 1 maximizes the payoff of those in power if:
µpi∗
q
≥ Φ, where Φ ≡ φ(0)
∫ 1
0
γ(s)ds. [2.25]
(iv) Irrespective of whether s = 0 or s = 1 is chosen, those in power are strictly better off compared
to the case of autarky (for any world price pi∗). Countries where s = 1 is chosen also have
higher real GDP than under autarky.
Proof See appendix A.2. 
As the objective function of those in power is a quasi-convex function of the strength of property
rights s, those in power will either choose to have property rights so weak that there is no investment
(s = 0) or property rights sufficiently strong so that all profitable investment opportunities are
taken (s = 1). These two extremes of governance are referred to as despotism and the rule of law
respectively.
Why do those in power favour one of the two extremes of governance? The first steps to the rule
of law have the greatest private cost to those in power (the assumption 2.14), but this was also true
in the case of autarky. Differently from autarky, the marginal benefit of progress towards the rule of
law is constant in a small open economy. The country can import investment goods that it cannot
produce if the rule of law is too weak, or alternatively, it can export a surplus of investment goods
to the rest of the world if its domestic market is too small. Consequently, the marginal benefit of
good government does not decline as governance improves. This means that it is never optimal to
choose a level of governance where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost: this is the point
at which marginal improvements in governance begin to pay off for those in power.
If the subsequent net gains from better government do not outweigh the initial net losses, it is
optimal for those in power to choose despotism (s = 0), while the rule of law (s = 1) is optimal if
overall the gains outweigh the losses. The total benefit of moving from a despotic regime to the rule
of law is adding µp˜i to national income. The total cost (to incumbents) sums the marginal losses
of rents, equivalent to a multiple Φ from (2.25) of the initial national income q. This explains the
condition for s = 1 to be payoff maximizing in (2.25).
The first panel of Figure 2 below shows the consumption of an incumbent in autarky and in a
small open economy as functions of the quality of governance s. The open economy case is shown
for both for an arbitrary world price pi∗ and a world price equal to the autarky market-clearing
price pˆi. For an open economy that happens to face the autarky price in world markets, net exports
would be zero, hence incumbents’ payoff (and everything else) would be the same as in autarky.
In both the open economy and in autarky, the marginal cost of good government (as perceived by
incumbents) equals its marginal benefit. In autarky, that is the point where the incumbent payoff
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is maximized, but in an open economy where the world price is taken as given, that is the point at
which improvements in governance begin to raise the incumbent payoff.
It can be seen from Figure 2 that incumbents will gain from international trade. Trade allows
those in power to exploit gains from political specialization that arise from the diminishing marginal
cost of good government. Since incumbents’ share of real GDP declines with good government, a
country where incumbents choose s = 1 must also have a higher real GDP than in autarky.
2.5 The world equilibrium
At the world level, net exports of both endowment and investment goods must sum to zero:∫ 1
0
xE()d = 0, and
∫ 1
0
xI()d = 0. [2.26]
The world relative price pi∗ adjusts to ensure that the market clearing conditions in (2.26) hold,
noting that either of the market clearing conditions implies the other because countries must satisfy
their international budget constraints (2.5) at all prices.
For small open economies, Proposition 2 shows that it is not in the interests of those in power
to impose tariffs or subsidies (τ = 0). Hence, using (2.22), a country ’s net exports are given by:
xE() = αq()− (1− α)pi∗K(), and xI() = (1− α)K()− αq()/pi∗, [2.27]
where q() and K() are the supplies of the endowment good and investment good in country . The
key result of Proposition 2 is that each country will choose either s = 0 or s = 1, implying K() = 0
or K() = µ respectively (see 2.10). Let ω denote the fraction of countries around the world choosing
s = 1. By integrating over countries in (2.27), world market clearing (2.26) is obtained at price:
pi∗ =
αq∗
(1− α)K∗ , where K
∗ = µω and q∗ =
∫ 1
0
q()d, [2.28]
with q∗ and K∗ denoting the world supplies of the two goods.
The baseline assumption in what follows is that there are no differences ex ante between countries.
This means all countries share a common supply q() = q = q∗ of the endowment good.
Proposition 3 The world equilibrium with ex-ante identical countries has the following features:
(i) Strategic substitutability: The world market clearing price (2.28) implies that condition (2.25)
for the optimality of s = 1 is equivalent to the fraction ω of other countries with s = 1 being
sufficiently low:
ω ≤ α
(1− α)Φ . [2.29]
(ii) The equilibrium fraction of economies with s = 1 and the equilibrium world price are:
ω˜ =
α
(1− α)Φ , and p˜i
∗ =
qΦ
µ
, [2.30]
and it is always the case that 0 < ω˜ < 1. Those in power receive the same payoff irrespective
of whether s = 0 or s = 1 is chosen, while countries with s = 1 have higher real GDP than
those with s = 0.
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Proof See appendix A.3. 
While the logic of Proposition 2 pushes individual countries to the extremes of governance, the
same reasoning does not apply to the world as a whole. At the global level, prices depend on how
much of the investment good is produced and hence on the number of economies with the rule of
law. If more economies adopt the rule of law, the price of the investment good pi∗ falls, and thus
the marginal benefit of good government is diminishing at the world level (see 2.24). This means
that choices of political systems are strategic substitutes across countries: an increase in the global
prevalence of the rule of law tilts the balance in favour of despotism for others.
In equilibrium, the world price adjusts in order to equate incumbent payoffs under the two
extreme political systems, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2. If the rule of law were
preferred by incumbents and adopted everywhere, the price pi∗ would fall, which raises incumbents’
payoff from despotism until a point of indifference is reached. The world equilibrium thus features
a bimodal distribution of political systems, with the extent of the rule of law limited by the size of
the global market for rule-of-law intensive goods (investment goods in the model). Even without
a predisposition to despotism, some economies will end up with a despotic political system, while
others will end up with the rule of law even in the absence of any cultural or technological advantage.
Figure 2: Comparison of autarky and open economies, and the world equilibrium
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While incumbents are indifferent between s = 0 and s = 1, these economies will be very different.
The rule-of-law economies will produce q + µpi∗, while the despotic economies will only produce q.
By engendering political specialization, international trade leads to economic divergence.
Underlying this political specialization is the symbiotic relationship between despots and in-
cumbents in rule-of-law economies through international trade. The existence of the rule of law
elsewhere in the world allows a despotic regime to import what its own political system precludes
it from producing, allowing incumbents to focus on maximizing their rents. The existence of despo-
tism elsewhere in the world allows an economy with the rule of law to capture a greater share of
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the global market for rule-of-law intensive goods, allowing incumbents to benefit from increasing
returns due to the diminishing marginal cost of good government they face.
There is an analogy here with the ‘new trade theory’ models of Krugman (1979, 1980) where
ex-ante identical economies specialize in producing different goods and thus trade with each in order
to exploit increasing returns in production. Here, countries that are ex-ante identical economically
and politically specialize in different political systems, which implies they become different ex post
and thus trade with each other. Comparative advantage in institutionally-intensive goods would
be seen to explain observed trade flows, consistent with the evidence in Nunn and Trefler (2014).
However, comparative advantage is endogenous here, and there is a fundamental difference from
‘new trade theory’ because there are no increasing returns in production itself. This means the
welfare implications of international trade are very different and the usual argument that there
are gains from exploiting comparative advantage does not apply. Those countries that have low
institutional quality in equilibrium actually lose by trading internationally.
The effect of international trade on global output is ambiguous. The fundamental friction is that
good government reduces the rents those in power are able to extract, so incumbents have too little
incentive to extend the reach of the rule of law. There are no distortions coming from trade itself,
but the possibility of international trade affects how the consequences of the fundamental political
friction are spread across countries. The usual reasons for international trade are absent from the
model and so are the usual gains from trade (in the absence of political frictions, no trade would
occur in equilibrium). This means that international trade is close to a zero-sum game because it
has little impact on world output, but strong distributional consequences.
3 Policy implications and extensions of the analysis
3.1 Policy implications
The theory of political specialization proposed here has some strong implications for how the problem
of despotic regimes ought to be addressed. Suppose that a benevolent global power uses its policy
instruments with the goal of improving political and economic outcomes around the world. The first
policy instrument considered is the use of military force to bring about regime change and directly
impose a particular quality of governance s on a country, rather than s being chosen by the country’s
own rulers. Offering aid payments conditional on the adoption of good governance to persuade rulers
to do what the benevolent power wants is another interpretation of this policy instrument (as carrot
rather than stick). The second policy instrument considered gives the benevolent power the ability
to insist a country imposes tariffs or subsidies on its trade with the rest of the world, that is,
the benevolent power can directly set τ in a country, rather than this being chosen by its own
rulers. Alternatively, this second instrument could be seen as a country or group of countries acting
benevolently in choosing τ .
Proposition 4 The two policy instruments have the following effects on the world equilibrium:
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(i) If a fraction ω0 of economies is forced to choose s = 1 then the equilibrium fraction ω˜ of
economies with s = 1 is unchanged as long as ω0 ≤ ω˜ for the initial ω˜ (if ω0 > ω˜ then only
those economies that are forced to will have s = 1).
(ii) If a fraction σ of economies (all with s = 1) implement a subsidy (τ < 0) on the investment
good then this raises the equilibrium fraction of economies with s = 1. If all countries were
to set a subsidy τ = −(1− α/(1− α)Φ) then all countries would have s = 1 in equilibrium.
Proof See appendix A.4. 
Surprisingly, direct intervention (even supposing it is feasible) turns out to have no effect whatsoever
on the equilibrium fraction of countries with the rule of law (unless a point is reached where every
country with good government has it imposed by external force). Owing to the strategic substi-
tutability of political systems, an exogenous shift of a country from despotism to the rule of law
must be counteracted in equilibrium by another country moving in the opposite direction. The key
point here is that localized interventions are bound to fail owing to the general equilibrium effects
on incumbents’ incentives in other countries.
This negative result shifts the focus from what might be thought of as ‘supply-side’ policies to
‘demand-side’ policies. If a group of benevolent countries were to subsidize consumption of rule-
of-law intensive goods then, all else equal, this would raise the world relative price of those goods
and reduce the incentives for incumbents in other countries to choose a despotic regime (the effects
would be analogous to an increase in the demand parameter α for rule-of-law intensive goods, see
equation 2.30). This policy can in principle be effective at curbing despotism. In practice, though,
it requires a sufficiently large number of countries to cooperate in implementing a policy that only
benefits others and adds distortions to their own economies. If all countries were to subsidize rule-of-
law intensive goods sufficiently then it would be possible to have an equilibrium where all countries
have the rule of law without any distortions to the global allocation of resources. However, rulers
of individual countries would still have an incentive to deviate from this policy.
3.2 Ex-ante heterogeneity between countries
It has been assumed up to this point that all countries are ex ante identical when analysing the
world equilibrium. The result that specialization arises without any ex-ante heterogeneity highlights
the strength of the mechanism pushing countries towards either despotism or the rule of law, but
leaves open the path any particular country would take.
This section presents a simple extension with one dimension of ex-ante heterogeneity that ex-
plains which countries become despotic and which uphold the rule of law. The assumption is that
countries differ in their endowments q().14 Specifically, given the world supply q∗ of the endow-
ment good, the distribution of relative endowments %() = q()/q∗ across countries has a continuous
probability distribution with cumulative distribution function F (%). This distribution has positive
support and a mean of one.
14The analysis is isomorphic to heterogeneity in political frictions (the function φ(s) in 2.11) across countries.
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In autarky, Proposition 1 has already shown that heterogeneity in endowments would have
no effect on either the quality of governance or output of the investment good across countries.
Differences in the supply of the endowment good are offset by opposite differences in its relative
price. This means that any effects of ex-ante heterogeneity in a world of open economies must be
due to its effects on specialization and trade.
In an open economy, the fundamental reason for specialization, as reflected in the quasi-convexity
of the incumbent payoff, remains unchanged (see Proposition 2). However, the selection of countries
that will be despotic and those that will establish the rule of law is no longer arbitrary. The criterion
in (2.25) for the optimality of s = 1 determines selection when there is ex-ante heterogeneity.
Proposition 5 Given a distribution function F (%) of relative endowments across countries:
(i) There is a threshold %˜ such that those countries with s = 1 have low relative endowments
% ≤ %˜.
(ii) There exists a unique equilibrium fraction ω˜ of countries with s = 1, which is the solution of
the equation ω˜ = F (α/(1− α)Φω˜) and satisfies 0 < ω˜ < 1.
(iii) The equilibrium ω˜ lies between the equilibrium with homogeneous endowments ω0 = α/(1−
α)Φ and the fraction ω∗ = F (1) of countries with an endowment below the global mean.
Proof See appendix A.5. 
Economies with relatively small supplies of the endowment good obtain the rule of law in equilibrium;
economies with large quantities of the endowment are condemned to despotism.15 As before, the
world equilibrium features a mixture of despotic and rule-of-law economies. Figure 3 depicts the
consumption of incumbents and the per-person average level of consumption in the cross-section of
economies. The consumption of incumbents is strictly increasing in the endowment q, especially
so for despots because the gradient reflects the share each incumbent receives, which is greater in
despotic countries (see 2.11). Consumption per person is also increasing in q, controlling for the
political system. However, there is a discrete step down at the threshold between the rule of law and
despotism. Crucially, at least some and possibly all economies with a large endowment are poorer
than those with endowments low enough to have the rule of law. The model thus gives rise to a
natural resource curse.
In general, the equilibrium fraction of rule-of-law economies could be larger or smaller than in
the case of ex-ante identical countries. However, the final result of the proposition indicates that
the rule of law will be more widespread when endowments are concentrated in a small group of
countries.
3.3 International market power: Cartels
The analysis so far has only considered zero-measure countries that are price takers in world markets.
This section considers a positive measure of countries with relatively large supplies of the endowment
15The output from an investment opportunity has been normalized to one unit of the investment good. This means
q can also be interpreted as the quantity of the endowment good relative to the potential production of the investment
good in a country.
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Figure 3: Ex-ante heterogeneity between countries
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good that can act together as a cartel.
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the cartel acts collectively, abstracting from its
internal dynamics. This means that the cartel is essentially one large country with a government
that maximizes the payoff of those in power as described earlier. Differently from before, the cartel
knows that its choices of net exports will affect world prices. Formally, the cartel is a Stackelberg
leader playing against an auctioneer who sets the world relative price, with all other countries being
price takers in world markets. The cartel moves first in choosing net exports of the endowment
good. Given this choice and the demand functions of the small open economies, the auctioneer
chooses the world relative price to ensure that world markets clear.
There is a continuous distribution of endowments across countries with cumulative distribution
function F (%) of the relative endowments % = q/q∗. A regularity condition is imposed to ensure
the world net demand for endowment goods is a well-behaved function: the distribution of log
endowments must have a non-increasing reversed hazard rate.16 Members of the cartel are drawn
from those countries that would have s = 0 if they were small open economies.
Proposition 6 As long as the cartel is not too large relative to the world and has a sufficiently
large relative endowment, it remains optimal for the cartel to choose s = 0.
(i) The cartel’s pricing strategy is isomorphic to a tariff on imports of rule-of-law intensive goods
(τ > 0), implying p˜i < pi∗. The equilibrium world price p˜i∗ of the investment good is lower
than when the countries of the cartel act as small open economies.
(ii) The equilibrium fraction ω˜ of countries with the rule of law is reduced by the presence of the
cartel compared to a world of small open economies.
Proof See appendix A.6. 
16This requires that %F ′(%)/F (%) is a weakly decreasing function of %. The condition is satisfied by most common
probability distributions, including the uniform, log Normal, exponential, and Pareto distributions.
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As long as the cartel has a sufficiently large relative endowment, but is not too large relative to
the world itself, it remains in the interests of those in power to have a despotic regime. In that
case, countries in the cartel do not produce any of the investment good and export some of the
endowment good. The cartel’s pricing strategy is standard: in order to exploit its market power,
the cartel exports less of the endowment good at a higher price. This can be implemented by a tariff
on imports of rule-of-law intensive goods. Trade theory points out that tariffs might be optimal for
large countries because part of the tax is effectively paid by foreigners. But from the perspective of
the world as a whole, tariffs create inefficiencies by inhibiting some mutually beneficial exchanges.
In equilibrium at the world level, the cartel’s actions make the endowment good more expensive
(pi∗ is smaller). The analysis yields a novel implication: by effectively reducing the relative price of
the rule-of-law intensive good, the presence of the cartel raises incentives for despotism, which leads
to a smaller fraction of countries with the rule of law in equilibrium. A cartel of countries with large
endowments is therefore the exact opposite of the policy implication for combating despotism from
Proposition 4.
4 A model of the costs of good government
The theory of political specialization presented in section 2 was built around the assumption of a
diminishing marginal cost of good government in protecting property rights (from the perspective
of those who hold power), an idea we find intuitively plausible. However, we also take the view
that matters such as the ability of those in power to create a system of government upholding the
rule of law and the nature of the distributional consequences of such a system ought not to be
assumptions, but should instead be analysed in terms of more fundamental political frictions. This
section provides a model of the costs of good government in this spirit.
The model adds two features to the environment described in section 2. First, a struggle for
political power whereby a group can establish an allocation of power and resources, but needs to
avoid triggering rebellions that would see an alternative allocation established. Second, an incentive
problem for investors whereby the technology for producing the investment good requires effort, but
there is a time lag between making the effort and the good becoming available for consumption (the
effort cost is sunk by this time). This time lag gives rise to a role for property rights and creates a
commitment problem for those in power.
All individuals ı ∈ [0, 1] in a country are ex-ante identical. Individuals have the same prefer-
ences defined over consumption C, investment I, and rebellion effort R, and these preferences are
represented by the utility function:
U = logC − I log(1 + θ)− log(1 +R). [4.1]
The utility function is logarithmic in consumption C, where C is the aggregator of the endowment
and investment goods defined in (2.1).
As in section 2, a fraction µ of individuals receives investment opportunities at random, each
allowing one unit of the investment good to be produced. Individuals must incur disutility log(1 +
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θ) if they take an investment opportunity (a binary choice, I ∈ {0, 1}), where θ is a positive
parameter.17 This effort cost is sunk by the time the investment good is produced (any discounting
of utility between investment and production is embedded in the parameter θ). Receiving an
investment opportunity is private information, but whether or not it has been taken (the variable
I) becomes common knowledge when the investment good is available for consumption.
Since an investment opportunity is private information, only the recipient can decide whether
to take it, and this decision must maximize utility (4.1). Before individuals know whether they will
receive an investment opportunity, their utility is given by the expected value of (4.1). The set of
all individuals who invest (I = 1) is denoted by I, and output of the investment good is given by
equation (2.10), where s = |I|/µ denotes the fraction of investment opportunities that are taken.
Individuals also receive disutility from any rebellion effort R, the role of which is explained
below. The substantive implication of the functional form in (4.1) is that if an individual could
obtain consumption C ′ instead of C by rebelling then the individual would be willing to exert no
more than R = (C ′ −C)/C units of rebellion effort. This means that the disutility from R units of
rebellion effort is exactly compensated by the gain of a fraction R of consumption.
4.1 Allocations and rebellions
There is an allocation of power and resources, which will be determined endogenously. Allocations
can be contested through rebellions, which lead to new allocations being established, a process
referred to as the power struggle. The modelling here follows Guimaraes and Sheedy (2015).
An allocation specifies the set P of individuals currently in power, referred to as the incumbents.
Each position of power confers an equal advantage on its holder in the event of any conflict, as
described below. Power sharing p = |P| is defined as the measure of the group P . The incum-
bent group P can have any size between 0% and 50% of the population (0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2). It is
assumed that investment opportunities cannot be received by those individuals currently in power,
but opportunities are otherwise randomly distributed among individuals.
An allocation also specifies how much individuals receive of each good, and how much of each
good is exported or imported. Each individual’s consumption of each good can depend on whether
the individual is in power, and (for some or all individuals) whether an individual has taken an
investment opportunity.18 Formally, an allocation specifies a set D of individuals whose consumption
is contingent on taking an investment opportunity (with D ∩ P = ∅, as those in power do not
receive investment opportunities). The set K of capitalists comprises those who have a consumption
allocation that is contingent on investing and who have received and taken an investment opportunity
(K = D ∩ I). The set W of workers comprises those individuals who are neither incumbents nor
capitalists (W = [0, 1]\(P ∪ K)). The amounts of the endowment good and the investment good
17The parameter θ can be interpreted as the cost of taking an investment opportunity expressed as a fraction of
consumption (see equation 4.2 below).
18It would be possible to extend the analysis so that an allocation would specify a fully individual-specific consump-
tion allocation, but that would add considerable complexity without necessarily affecting the results. In a related
setting, Guimaraes and Sheedy (2015) allow for fully individual-specific consumption allocations, but find that in
equilibrium, consumption is only contingent on being in power or investing.
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consumed by each incumbent are denoted by cpE and cpI, for each capitalist by ckE and ckI, and
for each worker by cwE and cwI. Note that an allocation directly specifies individuals’ quantities of
consumption of each good, which is different from section 2 where individuals were assumed to be
able to exchange goods in competitive markets. Since the objective here is to study how political
power interacts with private property, free exchange is not built in as an assumption.
Investment opportunities are private information, so an allocation cannot directly compel indi-
viduals to produce capital. Instead, by varying the investment-contingent consumption allocation,
an allocation can determine the amount of investment through its effect on the fraction of indi-
viduals for whom investing is incentive compatible.19 If investing leads to an individual receiving
consumption Ck while not investing leads to consumption Cw (in terms of the aggregator 2.1) then
the utility function (4.1) implies that investing is incentive compatible if:
Ck ≥ (1 + θ)Cw. [4.2]
The prevailing allocation implies the fraction of investment opportunities that are taken is:
s =
|D|/(1− p) if (4.2) holds0 otherwise , [4.3]
where the formula makes use of the random assignment of investment opportunities.
An allocation is formally defined as a collection A = {P ,D, cpE, cpI, ckE, ckI, cwE, cwI, xE, xI},
where the measure of P (power sharing p) is no more than 1/2, D ∩ P = ∅, net exports xE and
xI must satisfy (2.5) given the world price pi
∗, and the non-negative consumption allocation must
satisfy (2.6) given the capital stock K from (2.10). The fraction s of investment opportunities taken
is determined by the prevailing allocation according to (4.3).
The timing of events is depicted in Figure 4. An allocation is established, followed by oppor-
tunities for rebellions, with a new allocation established if a rebellion succeeds. Once there are
no rebellions, investment opportunities are received. After individuals make investments, there are
again opportunities for rebellions, with a new allocation established if a rebellion succeeds. Finally,
endowments are received, and any investment goods that have been produced become available for
consumption. The prevailing consumption allocation is then implemented.
Note that utility from consumption is received at the final stage of the sequence of events in
Figure 4, and there is no discounting of payoffs based on the number of rebellions that may have
occurred. Any disutility from rebellion effort is additively separable between different rebellions.20
At any stage of Figure 4, continuation payoffs are independent of any earlier investment effort
or rebellion effort (these effort costs are sunk). For new allocations established after investment
opportunities have been received, the fraction s and the capital stock K in (2.10) are state variables.
Rebellions are the only mechanism for changing an established allocation. A rebellion is described
19With heterogeneity in the effort cost of investing between different individuals, it would be possible for an
allocation to determine the number of individuals for whom investing is incentive compatible through an investment-
contingent consumption allocation that applies to everyone. See Guimaraes and Sheedy (2015) for an example of
how this could be done.
20In the utility function (4.1), an individual who exerts rebellion effort in several rebellions receives disutility∑
` log(1 +R`), where R` denotes effort in rebellion `.
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Figure 4: Sequence of events
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allocation
by a rebel faction R, an amount of (non-negative) rebellion effort R(ı) for each individual ı ∈ R
who belongs to the rebel faction, and a loyal faction L that defends the current allocation. A rebel
faction can comprise those outside or inside the group currently in power, or a mixture of both. The
loyal faction is drawn from those currently in power who do not join the rebel faction. Formally, a
rebellion is a collection {L,R, R(ı)}, where the sets L and R satisfy L ⊆ P and L ∩R = ∅.
A rebellion succeeds if∫
R
R(ı)dı >
∫
L
δdı, [4.4]
which requires that the strength of the rebel faction exceeds the strength of the loyal faction. Each
faction’s strength is the integral of the strengths of its members. The strength of individual ı ∈ R in
the rebel faction is the amount of rebellion effort R(ı) he exerts. Each individual ı ∈ L in the loyal
faction has strength measured by a positive parameter δ (the power parameter), which is obtained
at no utility cost to these individuals.
The investment opportunity parameters µ and θ are assumed to satisfy the following bounds
which depend on the power parameter δ:
µ ≤ δ
2(2 + δ)
, and θ ≤ δmin
{
2(1 + δ + δ2)
2 + δ2
,
4 + 5δ + 2δ2
2(1 + δ)2
}
. [4.5]
The interpretation of these restrictions is discussed later.
4.2 Equilibrium definition
In what follows, let U(ı) denote individual ı’s continuation utility under a particular allocation (that
is, utility excluding any sunk effort costs, and supposing the allocation prevails with no further
rebellion effort exerted). The notation ′ is used to signify any aspect of a new allocation that would
be established following a rebellion.
An equilibrium allocation must be optimal in the sense of maximizing the payoff of incumbents,
taking into account the threat of rebellions. Any rebellions must be rational in the sense defined
below.
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Definition 1 A rebellion {L,R, R(ı)} against the current allocation A is rational given the sub-
sequent allocation A ′ = {P ′,D′, c′pE, c′pI, c′kE, c′kI, c′wE, c′wI, x′E, x′I} if:
(i) All individuals in the rebel faction R receive a position of power under the subsequent allo-
cation yielding a payoff no lower than what the individual would receive under the current
allocation, and the disutility of each individual’s rebellion effort R(ı) does not exceed his utility
gain from rebelling:
R = {ı ∈ P ′ | U ′(ı) ≥ U(ı)}, and log(1 +R(ı)) ≤ U ′(ı)− U(ı). [4.6a]
(ii) The loyal faction L (drawn from those currently holding positions of power who do not rebel)
comprises those who would be worse off under the subsequent allocation:
L = {ı ∈ P\R | U(ı) > U ′(ı)}. [4.6b]
(iii) Condition (4.4) for a successful rebellion holds. 
In a rational rebellion, the rebel faction R includes only individuals who would be in power under
the subsequent allocation, which is an assumption designed to capture the incentive problems in
inducing individuals to exert effort.21 The maximum amount of rebellion effort exerted by an
individual in the rebel faction has disutility equal to his utility gain from changing the allocation
(see the utility function 4.1). Analogously, an individual in power will join the loyal faction L to
defend the current allocation if this is in his own interest. With no uncertainty about the outcome,
only those rebellions that would succeed can be rational.
The requirements for an allocation to be an equilibrium of the power struggle are now stated.
Definition 2 An allocation A = {P ,D, cpE, cpI, ckE, ckI, cwE, cwI, xE, xI} is an equilibrium of a stage
of the power struggle in Figure 4 if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Optimality for incumbents: The allocation A maximizes the utility of incumbents when
it is established, subject to:
(ii) Rationality of rebels: A rational rebellion occurs if according to Definition 1 there exists
any rational rebellion against the current allocation A for some subsequent allocation A ′,
subject to:
(iii) Threats of rebellion are credible: Any allocation A ′ established following a rebellion is
itself an equilibrium of that stage of the power struggle.
(iv) Independence of irrelevant history: Allocations A and A ′ established at any two stages
of the power struggle with the same continuation timeline and the same fundamental (payoff-
relevant) state variables are identical up to a permutation of identities. 
Definition 2 states that an equilibrium allocation must be established in the interests of incumbents
(first condition) subject to avoiding any opportunity for rational rebellion (second condition), where
the range of possible rational rebellions is itself limited by the set of equilibrium allocations that could
21See Guimaraes and Sheedy (2015) for a discussion of the rebellion mechanism used here.
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be established following a rebellion (third condition).22 Essentially, the third equilibrium condition
precludes the rebels making a binding commitment to an allocation that is not in their interests ex
post — for example, an allocation that would give rebels an incentive to exert more effort now, but
which would not be optimal once the rebellion is over. Of those allocations satisfying the first three
conditions, any that depend (apart from individual identities) on payoff-irrelevant histories are then
deleted to leave a set of equilibrium allocations (fourth condition). At the pre-investment stage in
Figure 4, there are no fundamental state variables, therefore equilibrium allocations in any round
of the power struggle must be the same apart from changes in the identities of those in power. At
the post-investment stage in Figure 4, the capital stock will be a fundamental state variable.
4.3 Properties of the equilibrium allocation
Allocations that trigger rebellions are not in the interests of incumbents. Hence, allocations are
chosen so that rebellions do not occur in equilibrium, but the threat of rebellions places limits on the
set of allocations that would survive the struggle for power. Effectively, incumbents face a myriad of
‘no-rebellion constraints’ from different subsets of the population, both before and after investment
decisions have been made. The proposition below demonstrates how these no-rebellion constraints
imply linkages in equilibrium between the fraction s of investment opportunities undertaken, the
amount of power sharing p, and the payoffs received by incumbents and workers.
Proposition 7 The equilibrium allocation must have the following properties:
(i) The allocation of consumption across individuals is consistent with perfectly competitive mar-
kets, that is, equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) hold for some levels of dispos-
able income Yp, Yk, and Yw for incumbents, capitalists, and workers.
(ii) Net exports must maximize real GDP subject to the international budget constraint (2.5).
(iii) The incentive compatibility constraint (4.2) for investors is binding: Ck = (1 + θ)Cw.
(iv) Any rebellion at the post-investment stage would lead to full expropriation of investors’ capital.
This entails a positive relationship s = λ(p) between power sharing p and the fraction s of
investment opportunities that are undertaken:
λ(p) =

δ(p−p†)
µθ
(
1 + δp
δp+(1−δ)p†
)
if δ < 1/2
δ(p−p†)
µθ
(
1 + p
2δp+p†
)
if δ ≥ 1/2
, [4.7]
where λ(p†) = 0 and λ(p¯) = 1 for p† and p¯ with p† < p¯ ≤ 1/2:
p† =
1
2 + δ
, and p¯ =

δ(δ+(2+δ)µθ)+
√
(δ(δ+(2+δ)µθ))2+δ(1+2δ)(δ+(2+δ)µθ)
δ(1+2δ)(2+δ)
if δ < 1/2
3δ−1+(2+δ)µθ+
√
(3δ−1+(2+δ)µθ)2+8(1−δ)(δ+(2+δ)µθ)
4δ(2+δ)
if δ ≥ 1/2
.
(v) The consumption levels of workers and incumbents as fractions of real GDP are given by
Cw = ψw(p)C and Cp = ψp(p)C, where the shares ψw(p) and ψp(p) are negatively related to
22The equilibrium concept is related to the notion of blocking in coalitions as studied in Ray (2007), but there are
two important differences here. First, an allocation must be optimal for incumbents. Second, changing the allocation
requires costly rebellion effort.
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power sharing p:
ψw(p) =
1
2(δp+ p†)
, and ψp(p) =
 12(δp+(1−δ)p†) if δ < 1/21+2δ
2(2δp+p†) if δ ≥ 1/2
. [4.8]
(vi) The quality of governance s must maximize incumbents’ consumption Cp subject to (4.7) and
(4.8). The first derivative of Cp with respect to s can be written in terms of a strictly positive
and strictly decreasing function χ(p) as follows:
∂Cp
∂s
=
µψp(p)
p˜iα
(p˜i − (1 + χ(p))θYw) . [4.9]
Proof See appendix A.7. 
The first two results are that the equilibrium allocation of resources can be implemented through
free trade both domestically and internationally, starting from some distribution of national income
(after taxes and transfers). Domestic free trade was implicitly assumed in the model of section 2
but here arises as a result. International free trade was shown earlier to be chosen by incumbents
subject to the ad hoc political friction (2.11), and this is confirmed here starting from more basic
political frictions. The reason the equilibrium features free trade is that no-rebellion constraints
effectively place lower bounds on individuals’ payoffs, so Pareto-improving reallocations of goods
are in the interests of incumbents. These are precisely the exchanges brought about by free markets,
and crucially, these exchanges do not affect any aspect of the power struggle.
Production of the investment good requires offering higher consumption to investors to compen-
sate for the cost of their effort. The third result of Proposition 7 is that the incentive constraint
(4.2) binds for investors — intuitively, incumbents have no interest in giving investors any more
than the minimum reward necessary. However, once the effort cost of investment is sunk at the
post-investment stage, any rewards to investors (property rights) specified by the allocation raise
incentives for rebellion by workers and incumbents.23 A successful rebellion at the post-investment
stage would lead to a new allocation in which investors’ capital is expropriated. An allocation spec-
ifying incentives for investors must therefore take account of binding no-rebellion constraints at the
post-investment stage, while no-rebellion constraints at the pre-investment stage are slack.
The equilibrium allocation established before investment occurs is the best possible solution from
the point of view of incumbents to the problem of ensuring the incentives needed for investment
are able to survive the power struggle. The result (the fourth statement in Proposition 7) is a
relationship between power sharing p and the fraction s of investment opportunities undertaken.
The requirements of equilibrium will determine the value of s as explained later, but conditional on
a value of s, power sharing p must satisfy s = λ(p) as given in (4.7). For high values of the power
parameter (δ ≥ 1/2), the only binding threat of rebellion is from workers at the post-investment
stage. For low values of the power parameter (δ < 1/2), incumbents also face a binding threat of a
coup d’e´tat from within their own ranks at the post-investment stage. This means the expressions
23Investors themselves never want to rebel as long as there are not too many of them, which is guaranteed by the
first parameter restriction in (4.5).
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for λ(p) (and thus all subsequent results) are different in these two cases, but the qualitative features
are the same and no important result depends on the value of the power parameter δ.
The function λ(p) is strictly increasing, so there is a positive relationship between power sharing
and investment. To understand this, observe that there is a level of power sharing p† such that no
investment will occur in equilibrium (s = 0). This level of power sharing coincides with what would
be the equilibrium level of power sharing after a rebellion at the post-investment stage. If p = p†,
a rebellion at the post-investment stage by all incumbents requires no effort from them to succeed
because everyone who holds power takes part in the rebellion (power sharing after the rebellion will
be p†, so there is space for all current incumbents in the rebel faction). This means that incumbents
essentially have full discretion to change the allocation of consumption after investment decisions
have been made. As the promise of an incentive-compatible payoff to investors raises the gains from
rebellion for both workers and incumbents, an allocation with s > 0 can only survive if there is also
an increase in the cost of rebellion for both groups.
It turns out that an allocation with s > 0 can survive threats of rebellion if and only if there is an
increase in power sharing p to a level above p†. A larger incumbent group means that outsiders must
put in more effort to launch a successful rebellion. Crucially, p > p† also means that insiders face
a cost of launching a rebellion because other incumbents have an incentive to resist it — knowing
that they would lose power as the equilibrium size of the post-rebellion incumbent group is only p†.
Power sharing therefore enables commitment to rules that would otherwise be time inconsistent.
Since investment opportunities are taken if and only if investors expect their property rights
to be protected, the variable s can be interpreted as a measure of good government in the sense
that term was used in section 2. Here, power sharing is the means through which the quality of
governance is improved. With a low level of power sharing p = p†, the country is despotic in that
no investor has secure property rights, and zero investment is the result (s = 0). As power sharing
increases, it becomes possible for more investors to receive rewards for past efforts that survive
threats of rebellion, and the economy moves closer to the rule of law. At a high level of power
sharing p¯, the rule of law is attained and everyone has secure property rights, which means all
investment opportunities are taken (s = 1).24
The fifth result of Proposition 7 uses the no-rebellion constraints faced by incumbents to obtain
the shares ψw(p) and ψp(p) of GDP that must be given to workers and incumbents. These shares
are decreasing in p because an increase in power sharing raises the amount of effort required for a
successful rebellion, and thus allows for an equilibrium where workers and incumbents have more
to gain from rebellion. Smaller shares for workers and incumbents free up resources to expand the
group of individuals who are offered incentives to invest.25
24The second parameter restriction in (4.5) requires that the effort cost θ is not too large, which ensures the amount
of power sharing p¯ needed for the rule of law does not exceed the maximum possible amount 1/2.
25The equilibrium allocation of resources can be implemented by the following taxes Tw and Tk on workers and
capitalists (specified in terms of the endowment good):
Tw = (1− ψw(p))q− µsψw(p)p˜i, and Tk = (1− (1 + θ)ψw(p))q + (1− µ(1 + θ)sψw(p))p˜i,
and an additional 100% tax (TI = p˜i) on any individual who took an investment opportunity but who does not
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The sixth result of the proposition highlights the source of inefficiency in the economy. Efficiency
in production requires that output of the investment good is increased if its market value p˜i in terms
of the endowments good is larger than the marginal effort cost θYw of producing it. However,
when deciding whether to increase investment by improving the quality of governance, incumbents
factor in an additional cost represented by the positive term χ(p) in (4.9). This political wedge
reflects the distributional consequences of the power sharing needed to support credible protection
of investors’ property rights, which is not a social cost. Note that the distortion does not arise
from restrictions on feasible tax instruments (incumbents capture all surplus from investment), but
from the maximizing behavior of incumbents subject to the threat of rebellion. Production of the
investment good affects incentives for rebellions because of the need for property rights. If there
were no such interactions, incumbents would choose laissez faire, as they do for exchange of goods
domestically and internationally.
While the political wedge χ(p) is always positive, it declines as power sharing increases. There-
fore, the political distortion is smaller at the margin in countries where power is shared more broadly.
This feature will be crucial in understanding the results that follow.
4.4 The decreasing marginal cost of good government
The key theoretical result of the model is that the function λ(p) is not only increasing, but is also
strictly convex: a given increase in power sharing is associated with a larger rise in investment when
power is already widely shared.26 In other words, there are increasing returns to improving the
quality of governance by sharing power more broadly. It follows that, as assumed in the model of
section 2, the marginal cost of good government is decreasing.
To understand the source of the increasing returns to power sharing, note that with p incumbents,
µs capitalists, and 1− p−µs workers, the resource constraint (2.8) can be written as pCp +µsCk +
(1 − p − µs)Cw = C. Using the binding incentive constraint (4.2) and the expression for workers’
consumption in (4.8), the resource constraint equation can be rearranged as follows:
s =
1
µθ
(
1
ψw(p)
− 1− pβ(p)
)
, [4.10]
where the function ψw(p) gives workers’ consumption relative to the average (see 4.8) and the
variable β = (Cp − Cw)/Cw denotes the rents received by an incumbent as a fraction of a worker’s
income. Using the expressions for incumbent and worker consumption in (4.8), incumbent rents can
be written as a function of power sharing: β(p) = ψp(p)/ψw(p) − 1. Conditional on power sharing
p, the functions ψw(p) and β(p) give the values of workers’ relative consumption and incumbents’
rents that are consistent with maximization by incumbents subject to the no-rebellion constraints.
belong to the set D of individuals with secure property rights (which could be interpreted as those with a licence to
produce the investment good). All tax revenue is distributed equally among incumbents. Individuals can then spend
their post-tax incomes in the markets for consumption goods. Although capitalists have secure property rights that
provide incentives to invest, their output is still taxed so that they receive only the minimum amount of consumption
required for incentive compatibility.
26The positive relation between p and s arises in a related setting in Guimaraes and Sheedy (2015); the convexity
result is novel.
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This means that the equation in (4.10) defines the function λ(p) from (4.7).
Owing to the nature of the rebellion mechanism and the effort cost of rebellion in (4.1), the term
1/ψw(p) turns out to be linear in p (see equation 4.8), hence the convexity of λ(p) is due entirely to
the behaviour of incumbents’ total rents pβ(p). Inspection of the expressions for ψw(p) and ψp(p)
in (4.8) reveals that an increase in p leads to a decrease in workers’ relative consumption ψw(p), but
an even larger reduction in incumbents’ relative consumption ψp(p), so rents β(p) are decreasing in
p. Consequently, total rents pβ(p) rise less than proportionally with p, which implies λ(p) is strictly
convex. The increasing returns to sharing power are thus explained by rents β being diluted as
power sharing p increases, as depicted in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5: Power sharing, incumbent rents, and good government
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The explanation for declining rents is that an additional incumbent is less important in defending
an allocation when there are already many individuals in power. For example, if there is relatively
little power sharing, a coup d’e´tat could succeed with relatively little rebellion effort, which means
that those in power would find it very worthwhile to recruit additional incumbents. Alternatively,
when the power base is narrow, the marginal gain in extracting rents from workers of an additional
incumbent is large. Both of these arguments point to a negative relationship between rents and
power sharing, but which one is dominant turns out to depend on δ. The former is dominant when
δ is low and the latter when δ is high.
In the case δ < 1/2, the negative relationship between p and β comes from the relative effects of
an increase in p on the no-rebellion constraints for workers and incumbents. An increase in power
sharing p makes rebellions more costly for both incumbents and workers, and hence decreases both
ψp and ψw. However, the effect on rebellions launched by incumbents is relatively more important,
and especially so when p is small. When p is closer to p†, very few individuals would defend an
allocation against a coup d’e´tat, and thus incumbents would pose a substantially greater threat to
the allocation. It follows that the ratio ψp/ψw would need to be very large. As p increases, the
threat posed by incumbents would become relatively less important, leading to smaller rents β.
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In the case δ ≥ 1/2, incumbents are willing to accept more power sharing than required to avoid
a coup d’e´tat. In other words, the no-rebellion constraint for incumbents is not binding. Power
sharing is thus extended up to the point where its marginal benefit in squeezing non-incumbent
incomes (without triggering rebellions) is equal to its marginal cost. From the point of view of
incumbents, the marginal cost of an additional member of the incumbent group is the difference
between incumbent and worker payoffs, which is measured by rents β. Since the marginal extraction
benefit from power sharing is decreasing in p, rents and power sharing must be negatively related.
Putting together the results of Proposition 7, there is a positive relationship between good
government and power sharing, and a negative relationship between power sharing and the share of
total income received by each incumbent. These two results imply that good government and the
income share of incumbents are negatively related as assumed in the simple political friction (2.11).
Crucially, the convexity of the relationship between power sharing and good government implies the
marginal cost of good government is diminishing (2.14 holds). The proposition below confirms that
the assumptions of the simple model from section 2 are results of the full model developed here.
Proposition 8 The quality of governance s in the equilibrium allocation is equivalent to what is
obtained in the simpler model of section 2, where:
(i) The political friction (2.11) holds for a decreasing function φ(s) given by:
φ(s) = ψp(λ
−1(s)), [4.11]
and the implied marginal cost of good government γ(s) from (2.13) and the total cost Φ of
the rule of law from (2.25) are:
γ(s) =
2δmin
{
1, 2
1+2δ
}
λ′(λ−1(s))
, and Φ ≡ φ(0)
∫ 1
0
γ(s)ds = δ(2 + δ) min
{
1,
2
1 + 2δ
}
(p¯− p†).
[4.12]
(ii) The marginal cost of good government γ(s) is decreasing (2.14 holds) because λ(p) is a strictly
convex function. The curvature of λ(p) depends only on the behaviour of incumbent rents
β(p) = (Cp − Cw)/Cw, which are strictly positive, but strictly decreasing in power sharing p.
(iii) The political friction is relevant (2.16 holds) when:
α < α¯, where α¯ =

(
1 + (1−δ)
2+δ(2+δ)(3−δ)p¯
µθ(2+δ)(1−δ+δ(2+δ)p¯)
)−1
if δ < 1/2(
1 + δ+(2+δ)(1+2δ+2δ
2)p¯
µθ(2+δ)(1+2δ(2+δ)p¯)
)−1
if δ ≥ 1/2
.
(iv) The results of Proposition 1 hold in the case of autarky (the incumbent payoff is a quasi-
concave function of s).
Proof See appendix A.8. 
4.5 Features of the world equilibrium
The additional structure provided by the full model of section 4 means that it is possible to make
some statements about efficiency and welfare in the world equilibrium (with ex-ante identical coun-
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tries) analysed earlier in section 2.5.
Proposition 9 The world equilibrium has the following features:
(i) Workers and investors are strictly better off in rule-of-law economies than in despotic regimes.
(ii) Workers and investors in rule-of-law economies are better off than under autarky. Opening up
to trade is a Pareto improvement for a country that establishes the rule of law.
(iii) Rule-of-law economies are Pareto efficient; despotic regimes are Pareto inefficient. Under
autarky, all economies would be Pareto inefficient.
(iv) Average power sharing across open economies p∗ = (1 − ω˜)p† + ω˜p¯ is strictly lower than the
common level of power sharing pˆ under autarky, with p∗ and pˆ equal to:
p∗ =
1
2 + δ
(
1 +
α
(1− α)δmin{1, 2
1+2δ
}) , and
pˆ =

3δ−1+4(1−δ)α+
√
(3δ−1+4(1−δ)α)2+8(1−δ)(δ+(1−2δ)α)(1−α)
4δ(2+δ)(1−α) if δ < 1/2
2δ2+(1+2δ)α+
√
(2δ2+(1+2δ)α)2+4δ2(1+2δ)(1−α)
2δ(1+2δ)(2+δ)(1−α) if δ ≥ 1/2
.
Proof See appendix A.9. 
Workers in rule-of-law economies are strictly better off than workers under despotism because in-
cumbents receive the same payoff in both types of economies and incumbents’ rents as a proportion
of workers’ consumption decline (the ratio Cp/Cw is lower) with higher s and p. Since investors ob-
tain no surplus, in payoff terms they receive exactly the same amount as workers.27 The additional
output in rule-of-law economies pays for higher consumption for investors (to compensate them for
their efforts), higher consumption for incumbents and workers, and a larger number of incumbents
(who receive more than workers).
Workers and investors in rule-of-law economies are also strictly better off than they would be
in autarky because Cp/Cw is decreasing in s and incumbents gain from trade. Together with there
being more incumbents in rule-of-law economies (who receive more than workers), it follows that
opening up to trade is Pareto improving for rule-of-law economies. The decline in Cp/Cw actually
implies workers and investors in economies with the rule of law capture a relatively greater share of
the gains from trade than incumbents.
An economy with the rule of law is Pareto efficient while despotic regimes have inefficiently low
production.28 It follows that a despotic regime has a positive pecuniary externality on the rest
of the world by providing cheap endowment goods. This has implications for efficiency in other
countries because it makes the rule of law more attractive. Conversely, economies with the rule
27In a related setting, Guimaraes and Sheedy (2015) assume that investors have private information about their
effort cost, which means it is not possible to extract all their surplus from investment through taxes. As a result,
investors are better off than workers.
28Since workers are better off under the rule of law, the effort cost of producing the investment good at the margin
is lower in a despotic country than in a rule-of-law economy. The absence of investment in despotic economies is
therefore not due to the high cost of investment — actually, incumbents would be able to extract more from a
marginal investor in a despotic economy than in a rule-of-law economy if they were only able to commit not to take
everything ex post.
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of law impose a negative externality on other countries by increasing incentives for incumbents to
choose despotism.
The last statement of Proposition 9 is that there are fewer individuals in power on average in
a world of open economies compared to autarky. While increasing returns to power sharing would
allow more to be produced through specialization even if there were the same number of people in
power across the world, it is both possible and in the interests of incumbents everywhere to have
fewer people in power worldwide.
5 Trade and political divergence
The 19th century witnessed a large boom in world trade and a sharp increase in the spread of
industrialization beyond the pioneer countries. Among the reasons for the dramatic rise in trade
volumes, Williamson (2011) points to the world transport revolution: the substantial decline in
transportation costs due to technological progress (for example, railroads and steamships).29 The
transport revolution was part of a broader event, the industrial revolution, which led to a huge
increase in productivity.
In the context of the economic model of section 2, the new industrial technologies can be seen
as the ones used to produce the investment good. The relative importance of the investment good
to overall economic activity is measured by the parameter α. Until the 18th century, α can be seen
as very small because there was not much that could be efficiently produced using the prevailing
industrial technologies. In the 19th century, α would go from close to zero to a sizeable number.
Naturally, the model predicts this would trigger an increase in industrialization at the world level
(an increase in output of the investment good, as represented by the variable s). Furthermore, the
reduction in the cost of international trade meant that economies became closer to the limiting case
of frictionless international trade than the limiting case of autarky.
The full model of section 4 yields two non-trivial implications: (i) industrialization (an increase
in s) would occur in some countries, but not in others; and (ii) economic specialization would be
accompanied by political specialization, as industrializing countries would experience an increase in
power sharing (represented by the variable p).
The data confirm the first implication. Williamson (2011) shows that industrialization was
restricted to a few (mainly European) countries. In many countries, there was no industrialization
at all — and even some deindustrialization — for a substantial part of the 19th century. The index
of per-capita levels of industrialization from Bairoch (1991), as used in the analysis of Williamson
(2011), rises dramatically in the ‘European core’ between 1800 and 1913, but is almost flat in Brazil
and Mexico and is actually decreasing in China and India.
The second implication — that industrialization and power sharing go hand in hand — is a key
message of the model. This is tested by studying the evolution of power sharing in the different
29It also became safer to ship goods overseas owing to a reduction in piracy and wars. In the political sphere, an
increasing number of countries moved towards pro-trade policies. All these factors helped to foster trade in the early
19th century.
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groups of countries considered by Bairoch (1991) and Williamson (2011). The variable ‘executive
constraints’ from the Polity IV database is used as a good proxy for power sharing because con-
straints on those in power can only be imposed by other people who also hold power.30 The minimum
score of 1 indicates “unlimited authority: no regular limitations on the executive’s actions”, while
the maximum score of 7 indicates “executive parity or subordination”.31
The evolution of scores for executive constraints from 1800 to 1913 is studied for Britain (the
cradle of the industrial revolution) and three groups of countries: the ‘European core’, Latin Amer-
ica, and Asia. The ‘European core’ comprises the countries considered by Bairoch (1991) (except
for Britain) and also including the Netherlands, an industrial pioneer for which Polity IV data are
available. For Latin America, all countries are included for which there are data from 1830 or
earlier.32 The group of Asian countries comprises Afghanistan, China, Iran, Thailand, and Turkey.
Figure 6 plots the time series of executive constraints in each group (taking simple averages within
groups). A more detailed description of the data is given in Appendix B.
The pre-industrial world featured very little power sharing. In 1800, most countries had the
lowest possible executive constraints score (1). Britain, where the process of industrialization was
well under way, had the maximum possible score (7).33 Around 1830, the European core and Latin
America still looked very similar, with executive constraints scores of around 2.25 and 2 respectively.
From 1830 onwards, Figure 6 shows a striking pattern of political divergence. The average
executive constraints score is always above 4 in the European core from 1861 and always above 5
from 1876. In sharp contrast, the score in Latin America only goes above 2 in 1867 and only reaches
3 in 1911. In Asia, the executive constraints score is 1 for almost the whole century. By the late
19th century, a considerable degree of power sharing is the norm in the European core, while there
are very few constraints on the executive in Latin America and especially so in Asia.34
The case of Japan is an interesting one that well illustrates the link between economic and
political progress. Unlike the other countries of Asia, Japan industrializes in the 19th century
(Williamson, 2011), and for this reason it was not included in the group of Asian countries above.
Politically, Japan goes from unlimited authority (executive constraints score 1) up until 1857 to
executive parity or subordination (score 7) in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration (there is missing data
in between). Consistent with the theory proposed in this paper, historians consider that the rapid
30According to the Polity IV Dataset Users’ Manual (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2016, p. 24), this variable “refers
to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals
or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any accountability groups. In Western democracies these are
usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles
or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent
judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making
process.”
31A score of 3 indicates some real but limited restraints on the executive, and a score of 5 indicates that the
executive is subject to substantial constraints by accountability groups.
32Polity IV data are available only for independent countries. Most Latin American countries became independent
between 1818 and 1830.
33In 1800, the only countries with an executive constraints score greater than the minimum (1) were Britain (score
of 7), the US (7), Korea (7), and Wuerttemburg (3).
34Moreover, within the European core, the transition from unlimited authority to executive parity occurs earlier
in the industrial pioneers. For example, the Netherlands reaches a score of 6 in 1849 and Belgium reaches 7 in 1853.
In contrast, Italy makes the transition from 3 to 5 only in 1900 and Austria never goes beyond 3.
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Figure 6: The evolution of executive constraints, 1800–1913
Executive Constraints
Year
Britain
European core
Latin America
Asia
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Notes: Simple averages of ‘executive constraints’ for Britain (since 1800); the ‘European core’: Austria
(since 1800), Belgium (1830), France (1800), Germany (1800), Italy (1815), Netherlands (1815), Spain
(1800), Sweden (1800), and Switzerland (1848); Latin America, comprising Argentina (since 1825), Bolivia
(1825), Brazil (1824), Chile (1818), Colombia (1821), Ecuador (1830), Haiti (1820), Mexico (1822), Paraguay
(1811), Peru(1821), Uruguay (1830), and Venezuela (1830); and Asia, comprising Afghanistan (1800), China
(1800), Iran (1800), Thailand (1800), and Turkey (1800).
Source: Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html).
industrialization of Japan began in 1868.
This pattern of both economic and political divergence also holds for some countries that were
relatively prosperous in the 18th century but which lost ground with the first wave of globalization.
Russia is a case in point.35 During the 18th and early 19th centuries, Russia was a powerful European
country that went through modernizing reforms both in the reign of Peter the Great and in the age of
the Russian Enlightenment.36 However, in the early 19th century, Russia experienced strong positive
terms-of-trade shocks and subsequently fell behind. By the end of the century, Russia was one of
the poorest countries in Europe (Nafziger, 2008). In contrast to the expansion of power sharing
in other European countries at the time, and consistent with the theory of political specialization
proposed here, Russia went through the whole 19th century without any kind of elected parliament
and the lowest possible score for executive constraints.37
35Nafziger (2008) claims that “understanding what inhibited Russian economic development in the nineteenth
century is an important task for economic historians.”
36The expansion of the Russian empire was a sign of its power and development at the time. In the early 19th
century, the Russians colonized Alaska and even founded settlements in California. Among other notable Russian
sea exploration voyages, in 1820, a Russian expedition discovered the continent of Antarctica.
37Nicholas I ruled between 1825 and 1855, the time when Russian exports were becoming more expensive. He re-
sisted any kind of power sharing and concentrated his existing powers even more, crushing demonstrations demanding
power sharing and abolishing several areas of local autonomy (Bessarabia, Poland, and the Jewish Qahal).
35
To sum up, during the 19th century the rule of law was becoming established in the more econom-
ically advanced European countries as the absolute power of monarchs was eroded by increasingly
powerful parliaments. However, countries in the periphery were experiencing none of this political
change, despite a large increase in trade, which presumably led to greater exposure to foreign ideas.
6 Concluding remarks
For social scientists grappling with the welter of autocratic regimes around the world, one particular
fact is noteworthy: the stubborn resistance to adopting the rule of law in spite of its proven success
elsewhere. An important policy question is what can be done to bring about positive political
change. The literature in political science has focused on country-specific factors that are seen as
barriers to change such as culture and history. This paper highlights the importance of thinking
about the problem in general equilibrium at the world level.
The adoption of the rule of law increases output of goods that require strong protection of
property rights and thus reduces their relative price. This increases incentives for those in power
in other countries to choose autocratic government. Consequently, the proportion of countries in
the world with the rule of law is limited by the demand for goods that depend on the rule of law
for their production. The analysis suggests those living under autocracy would be best helped by
subsidies to goods that are substitutes for their own exports.
This paper also has implications for the policy debate about the merits of international trade. In
spite of its well-known economic gains, international trade has its critics. Much of the opposition to
free trade comes from a sense that some economies end up specializing in the wrong kinds of goods —
primary goods — which is detrimental to development. The theory in this paper is consistent with
a negative correlation between specializing in primary goods and economic performance. However,
the policy prescription is not to limit trade. This is because the distortion is not found in trade
itself, but in the distributional consequences of the power sharing needed for good government.
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A Technical appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The derivative of total consumption C from (2.17) with respect to s is given in (2.18), which can be
written as follows:
∂C
∂s
=
αq1−αµα
(1− α)1−αααs1−α =
αC
s
. [A.1.1]
Together with (2.12), the derivative of the incumbent payoff Cp with respect to s is:
∂Cp
∂s
= φ(s)
(
∂C
∂s
− γ(s)φ(s)C
)
=
φ(s)C
s
(α− sγ(s)φ(s)). [A.1.2]
Equations (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) show that ∂Cp/∂s becomes arbitrarily large as s approaches zero. Since
s > 0 implies C > 0 according to (2.17), equation (A.1.2) shows that the only values of s that can satisfy
the first-order condition ∂Cp/∂s = 0 are solutions of the equation (2.20).
Differentiating (A.1.1) again with respect to s:
∂2C
∂s2
= − α(1− α)q
1−αµα
(1− α)1−αααs2−α = −
α(1− α)C
s2
,
where the second equality uses (2.17). Together with γ′(s) = −ε(s)γ(s)/s implied by the definition of the
marginal cost elasticity ε(s) from (2.19), equation (2.15) for the second derivative of the incumbent payoff
evaluated at a point where the first-order condition holds is:
∂2Cp
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ ∂Cp
∂s
=0
= −φ(s)
(
α(1− α)C
s2
− ε(s)γ(s)Cp
s
)
= −φ(s)C
s2
(α(1− α)− sε(s)γ(s)φ(s)),
where the second equality uses (2.12). Since it has already been established that any value of s with
∂Cp/∂s = 0 must satisfy (2.20), the term in sγ(s)φ(s) above can be replaced by α to deduce:
∂2Cp
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ ∂Cp
∂s
=0
= −αφ(s)C
s2
((1− α)− ε(s)).
Under the assumption in (2.19), the second derivative is strictly negative at any value of s satisfying the
first-order condition. This demonstrates that Cp is a strictly quasi-concave function of s.
(ii) The first derivative of Cp with respect to s in (A.1.2) can be written as follows:
∂Cp
∂s
=
φ(s)2C
s
A(s), where A(s) ≡ α
φ(s)
− sγ(s). [A.1.3]
Since φ(s) > 0 for all s, the equation (2.20) is equivalent to A(s) = 0. It is also known that the first-order
condition ∂Cp/∂s = 0 can only be satisfied where (2.20) holds. Observe that A(0) = α/φ(0) > 0 and:
A(1) = α
φ(1)
− γ(1) < 0,
under the restriction assumed in (2.16). This implies the first derivative (A.1.3) is strictly negative at
s = 1, so s = 1 cannot be optimal. With neither s = 0 nor s = 1 optimal and the objective function
being quasi-concave, the optimum is an interior solution 0 < s < 1 satisfying the first-order condition.
Differentiating the function A(s) from (A.1.3), note that:
A′(s) = −αφ
′(s)
φ(s)2
− γ(s)− sγ′(s) = αγ(s)− γ(s) + ε(s)γ(s),
using the definitions of γ(s) and ε(s) from (2.13) and (2.19). It follows thatA′(s) = −γ(s)((1−α)−ε(s)) < 0
for all s under the assumption in (2.19). Since A(s) is a strictly decreasing function with A(0) > 0 > A(1),
there exists a unique solution where A(sˆ) = 0 with 0 < sˆ < 1. Therefore, the optimum is the unique
solution of the equation (2.20). This completes the proof.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Suppose that a tariff (or subsidy) τ is imposed that drives a wedge between the domestic market-
clearing price p˜i and the world price pi∗ as in equation (2.21). Substituting the expression for p˜i from
(2.7):
α(q− xE)
(1− α)(K − xI) = (1 + τ)pi
∗.
Multiplying both sides by (1 − α)(K − xI) and using −pi∗xI = xE implied by the international budget
constraint (2.5):
αq− αxE = (1− α)(1 + τ)pi∗K + (1− α)(1 + τ)xE.
Solving this equation for xE yields the expression given in (2.22). The expression for xI then follows using
xI = −xE/pi∗ according to (2.5). The implied levels of consumption of each of the goods are obtained by
substituting (2.22) into the resource constraints (2.6):
cE = q− xE = (1− α)(1 + τ)(q + pi
∗K)
1 + (1− α)τ , and cI = K − xI =
α(q + pi∗K)
(1 + (1− α)τ)pi∗ .
Substituting these into the expression for aggregate consumption C from (2.9):
C = ∆(τ)
q + pi∗K
pi∗α
, where ∆(τ) ≡ (1 + τ)
1−α
1 + (1− α)τ , [A.2.1]
which confirms the formula given in (2.23).
Note from the definition in (A.2.1) that:
∆(0) = 1, ∆′(τ) = −α(1− α)(1 + τ)
−α
(1 + (1− α)τ)2 τ,
and ∆′′(τ) = −α(1− α)(1 + τ)
−α
(1 + (1− α)τ)2 − τ
∂
∂τ
α(1− α)(1 + τ)−α
(1 + (1− α)τ)2 .
It follows that ∆′(τ) = 0 only if τ = 0, and ∆′′(0) < 0 when τ = 0. This implies ∆(τ) is a strictly
quasi-concave function of τ , and is maximized at τ = 0 where ∆(0) = 1. Since those in power choose τ to
maximize Cp = φ(s)C, it can be seen from (A.2.1) that the optimal value of τ is zero, confirming that free
trade will be chosen.
(ii) Substituting τ = 0 into (2.23) yields the expressions for total consumption and the marginal benefit
of good government ∂C/∂s in (2.24). Since pi∗ is taken as given by a small open economy, it follows that
C is linear in s, and thus ∂2C/∂s2 = 0. Together with (2.15), this implies:
∂2Cp
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ ∂Cp
∂s
=0
= −φ(s)γ′(s)Cp,
which is strictly positive under assumption (2.14). Since the second derivative of Cp is positive where the
first derivative is zero, Cp is a strictly quasi-convex function of s. The maximum value of Cp is therefore
found either at s = 0 or s = 1.
(iii) Using equations (2.12) and (2.24), the consumption received by those in power is:
Cp = φ(s)
q + µpi∗s
pi∗α
,
and this objective function is strictly quasi-convex in s. It follows that s = 1 is optimal if:
φ(1)
q + µpi∗
pi∗α
≥ φ(0) q
pi∗α
,
which is equivalent to:
µpi∗
q
≥ φ(0)− φ(1)
φ(1)
. [A.2.2]
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Now define a function Γ (s):
Γ (s) ≡ 1
φ(s)
, and hence Γ ′(s) = − φ
′(s)
φ(s)2
= γ(s),
which uses the definition of γ(s) in (2.13). The differential equation Γ ′(s) = γ(s) has the following general
solution:
Γ (s) = Γ0 +
∫ s
z=0
γ(z)dz,
where Γ0 is an arbitrary constant. Since 1/φ(0) = Γ (0) = Γ0, the function φ(s) = 1/Γ (s) can be written
as follows:
φ(s) =
φ(0)
1 + φ(0)
∫ s
z=0 γ(z)dz
.
It follows that the right-hand side of (A.2.2) can be expressed as:
φ(0)− φ(1)
φ(1)
=
φ(0)− φ(0)
1+φ(0)
∫ 1
s=0 γ(s)ds
φ(0)
1+φ(0)
∫ 1
s=0 γ(s)ds
= φ(0)
∫ 1
s=0
γ(s)ds ≡ Φ, [A.2.3]
which confirms the condition given in (2.25).
(iv) Take an arbitrary world price pi∗. For each s ∈ [0, 1], let the functions Cˆ(s) and C∗(s) respectively
denote the level of real GDP in autarky and with free trade (τ = 0) in an open economy:
Cˆ(s) =
q1−αµαsα
(1− α)1−ααα , and C
∗(s) =
q + µpi∗s
pi∗α
,
which are obtained from equations (2.17) and (2.24). Note that in an open economy with s, it would always
be possible to obtain the same consumption outcomes as autarky (with the same s) by setting a tariff that
results in net exports of zero. Using (2.22), the required tariff τˆ is:
τˆ =
αq
(1− α)µpi∗sˆ − 1 =
pˆi
pi∗
− 1, [A.2.4]
which can be written in terms of the autarky price pˆi using (2.18). With xE = 0 and xI = 0 and the
same s and thus same K, equation (2.9) implies that real GDP would be equal to its autarky value:
C = Cˆ(s). Real GDP can also be compared to the free-trade open-economy level C∗(s), with (A.2.1)
implying C = ∆(τˆ)C∗(s). It follows that Cˆ(s) = ∆(τˆ)C∗(s), and hence by using (2.12):
Cˆp(s) = ∆(τˆ)C
∗
p(s),
where Cˆp(s) = φ(s)Cˆ(s) and C
∗
p(s) = φ(s)C
∗(s) are the consumption levels of those in power respectively
under autarky and with free trade in an open economy. Since ∆(τ) ≤ 1 for all τ , this implies Cˆp(s) ≤ C∗p(s)
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. If pi∗ = pˆi for some particular value of s, (A.2.4) implies τˆ = 0 and ∆(τˆ) = 1, in which
case Cˆp(s) = C
∗
p(s).
Given the strict quasi-convexity of C∗p(s), the maximized level of consumption is:
C∗p = max{C∗p(0), C∗p(1)} > C∗p(sˆ),
where 0 < sˆ < 1 is equilibrium value of sˆ under autarky as characterized in Proposition 1, with Cˆp = Cˆp(sˆ)
being the autarky consumption of those in power. Together with C∗p(sˆ) ≥ Cˆp(sˆ), it follows that C∗p > Cˆp.
Those in power always strictly gain from the ability to trade with the rest of the world irrespective of world
prices.
Let C¯ and C¯p denote real GDP and the consumption of those in power in the case of an open economy
with s = 1. If s = 1 is chosen, it must be the case that C¯p > Cˆp. Since C¯p = φ(1)C¯ and Cˆp = φ(sˆ)Cˆ:
C¯ =
C¯p
φ(1)
>
Cˆp
φ(1)
=
φ(sˆ)
φ(1)
Cˆ > Cˆ,
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because φ(sˆ) > φ(1). The real value of the economy’s output is increased by trade if those in power choose
s = 1. This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) The equilibrium world price is (2.28), and endowments are equal across countries, so q = q∗. Given
a fraction ω of countries where s = 1, the world supply of investment goods is K∗ = µω, which implies:
qpi∗
µ
=
α
(1− α)ω .
Substituting this into (2.25) shows that the condition for s = 1 to be optimal for those in power is equivalent
to:
α
(1− α)ω ≥ Φ,
and rearranging this inequality confirms (2.29).
(ii) Under assumption (2.14), γ(s) is a decreasing function of s, which implies a bound on the integral
below:∫ 1
0
γ(s)ds ≥ γ(1).
Together with the assumption (2.16), this leads to:∫ 1
0
γ(s)ds >
α
φ(1)
.
Multiplying both sides by φ(0) and using the definition of Φ in (2.25):
Φ > α
φ(0)
φ(1)
.
Equation (A.2.3) implies that φ(0)/φ(1) = 1 + Φ, so the inequality above becomes Φ > α(1 + Φ), which
can be rearranged to deduce:
Φ >
α
1− α . [A.3.1]
Now consider the world equilibrium value of ω. The value of s in each country must be an equilibrium
given the world price pi∗ (s is either 0 or 1), and world markets must clear given the fraction ω of countries
with s = 1. There cannot be an equilibrium with ω = 0 because (2.29) implies incumbents in all countries
would have an incentive to choose s = 1, resulting in ω = 1. Similarly, there cannot be an equilibrium with
ω = 1. The condition in (A.3.1) implies α/((1− α)Φ) < 1, so ω > α/((1− α)Φ), indicating incumbents in
all countries have incentives to choose s = 0 that would lead to ω = 0. Finally, consider the possibility of
an equilibrium with 0 < ω < 1. This requires that incumbents in some countries choose s = 0 and others
choose s = 1. Since incumbents in all ex-ante identical countries share the same optimality condition (2.29)
for s = 1, this condition must hold with equality:
ω =
α
(1− α)Φ ,
which confirms the result for ω˜ given in (2.30). It can be seen from (A.3.1) that 0 < ω˜ < 1. The equilibrium
world price p˜i∗ in (2.30) follows from substituting the expression for ω˜ into (2.28) with q∗ = q. This is the
unique world equilibrium.
Since the optimality condition (2.25) for s = 1 holds with equality, incumbents receive the same payoff
from s = 0 and s = 1 in equilibrium. Using (2.23), the equilibrium levels of real GDP for s = 0 and s = 1
countries are respectively q/(p˜i∗)α and (q+µp˜i∗)/(p˜i∗)α, with the latter clearly being larger than the former.
This completes the proof.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) A fraction ω0 of countries is compelled to choose s = 1. In the remaining fraction 1 − ω0 of
countries, the value of s is chosen to maximize the payoff of those in power. For these countries the logic
of Proposition 3 continues to apply, with either s = 0 or s = 1 being optimal. It follows that the fraction ω
of countries in the world with s = 1 must satisfy ω ≥ ω0. For a particular value of ω, Proposition 3 shows
that s = 1 is optimal if (2.29) holds.
First consider the case where ω0 ≤ ω˜, where ω˜ is the equilibrium fraction of countries with s = 1 in
the absence of any direct intervention, which is ω˜ = α/(1 − α)Φ < 1 as given in (2.30). If there were an
equilibrium with ω0 ≤ ω < ω˜ then it follows from (2.29) that s = 1 is optimal, but this would imply ω = 1
because all countries would have s = 1, so this cannot be an equilibrium. If there were an equilibrium
with ω > ω˜ ≥ ω0 then it follows from (2.29) that s = 0 is optimal, implying ω = ω0 (because only those
countries compelled to would have s = 1), which also cannot be an equilibrium. With ω = ω˜ ≥ ω0, those in
power are indifferent between s = 0 and s = 1, which implies it is possible to have any ω ≥ ω0. It follows
that ω = ω˜ is the unique equilibrium. Imposing the rule of law on a fraction ω0 ≤ ω˜ of countries has no
effect on the equilibrium fraction of countries with the rule of law.
Now consider the case ω0 > ω˜ = α/(1−α)Φ. With the requirement ω ≥ ω0 > ω˜, it follows from (2.29)
that all countries with a choice will have s = 0. The unique equilibrium is ω = ω0, so the only countries
with the rule of law are those directly compelled to have it.
(ii) Suppose a fraction σ of countries impose a subsidy τ < 0. Suppose these countries are drawn
exclusively from those with s = 1, which requires σ ≤ ω. With K = µ in all these countries, equation
(2.27) implies each has the following net exports of the endowment good:
xE =
αq− (1− α)µ(1 + τ)pi∗
1 + (1− α)τ . [A.4.1]
For the remaining fraction 1 − σ of countries with no tariff or subsidy (τ = 0), net exports are xE =
αq− (1−α)µpi∗s. A measure 1−ω of these countries have s = 0 and xE = αq, while a measure ω−σ have
s = 1 and xE = αq − (1 − α)µpi∗. Using these observations together with (A.4.1), world market clearing
(2.26) requires:
σ
αq− (1− α)µ(1 + τ)pi∗
1 + (1− α)τ + (1− ω)αq + (ω − σ)(αq− (1− α)µpi
∗) = 0.
Collecting terms proportional to pi∗ on one side:
(1− α)µ
(
ω − σ + σ(1 + τ)
1 + (1− α)τ
)
pi∗ = αq
(
1− σ + σ
1 + (1− α)τ
)
,
and by multiplying both sides by the positive number 1 + (1−α)τ and rearranging, the equilibrium world
price is:
pi∗ =
αq
(1− α)µ
(
1 + (1− α)(1− σ)τ
αστ + (1 + (1− α)τ)ω
)
. [A.4.2]
The condition for optimality of s = 1 is given in (2.25), and this applies even for those countries with τ < 0
(see 2.23 and note that τ has a multiplicative effect on the real value of a country’s output at world prices).
Using the equilibrium world price from (A.4.2), the optimality of s = 1 is equivalent to:
αστ + (1 + (1− α)τ)ω
1 + (1− α)(1− σ)τ ≤
α
(1− α)Φ , [A.4.3]
noting that 1 + (1− α)(1− σ)τ must be a positive number.
There cannot be an equilibrium with ω = 0 because this would imply the left-hand side of (A.4.3) is
strictly negative (since τ < 0), which means that s = 1 would be optimal for those in power in all countries.
The left-hand side of (A.4.3) is strictly increasing in ω, so if there is a solution ω˜ where (A.4.3) holds with
equality and 0 < ω˜ ≤ 1 then ω˜ is the unique equilibrium. If there is no solution in the unit interval then
ω˜ = 1 is the unique equilibrium.
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Let ω0 = α/(1 − α)Φ denote the equilibrium value of ω in the absence of any subsidies (see equation
2.30). If (A.4.3) is to hold with equality, ω must satisfy:
αστ + (1 + (1− α)τ)ω
1 + (1− α)(1− σ)τ = ω0.
This linear equation has a unique solution for ω˜:
ω˜ = ω0 − στ(α + (1− α)ω0)
1 + (1− α)τ . [A.4.4]
Note that:
ω0 − τ(α + (1− α)ω0)
1 + (1− α)τ =
ω0 − ατ
1 + (1− α)τ = 1−
1 + τ − α(1−α)Φ
1 + (1− α)τ , [A.4.5]
which uses ω0 = α/(1− α)Φ.
Consider the case where σ < 1 and τ > −(1−α/(1−α)Φ), with larger subsidies considered next. The
bound on τ implies the expression in (A.4.5) is strictly less than one, and σ < 1 implies ω˜ in (A.4.4) is
lower than that expression. It follows that ω˜ < 1 and that this is the unique equilibrium. Equation (A.4.4)
implies ω > ω0 because τ < 0, which demonstrates that the subsidy raises the equilibrium faction ω˜ of
countries with s = 1.
Now consider the case where σ = 1. It can be seen from (A.4.4) that ω˜ is equal to the expression given
in (A.4.5). If the subsidy is set so that τ = −(1 − α/(1 − α)Φ) then the expression in (A.4.5) is equal to
one, and thus ω˜ = 1 is the unique equilibrium with all countries having s = 1. This completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) The finding of Proposition 2 that the optimal choice of those in power is either s = 0 or s = 1 still
applies here. Conditional on the fraction ω of countries with s = 1, the equilibrium world price pi∗ from
(2.26) implies:
µpi∗
q
=
αq∗
(1− α)qω ,
where q is an arbitrary country-specific endowment and q∗ is the global mean endowment. The condition
(2.25) for the optimality of s = 1 also applies here, and using the equation above shows that it is equivalent
to:
αq∗
(1− α)qω ≥ Φ, and hence ω% ≤
α
(1− α)Φ ,
where % = q/q∗ is the relative endowment and Φ is the constant defined in (2.25). Given the value of the
variable ω, this is equivalent to the threshold condition:
% ≤ %˜, where %˜ = α
(1− α)Φω , [A.5.1]
confirming the claim in the proposition.
(ii) Since % < %˜ is necessary for s = 1, the fraction of countries with s = 1 must satisfy ω˜ = F (%˜).
Substituting this into (A.5.1) leads to the following equation for the equilibrium ω˜:
ω˜ = F
(
α
(1− α)Φω˜
)
.
This equation can be stated as H(ω˜) = 0, where H(ω) is defined by:
H(ω) = ω − F
(
α
(1− α)Φω
)
. [A.5.2]
The cumulative distribution function F (%) is weakly increasing in %, which implies that the function H(ω)
defined above is strictly increasing in ω. Any solution of the equation H(ω˜) = 0 must therefore be
unique. A property of the cumulative distribution function is F (∞) = 1, which leads to H(0) = −1.
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Proposition 3 establishes that 0 < α/(1 − α)Φ < 1. Since % has mean one, the probability of having %
strictly less than the mean must be strictly lower than one, and hence F (α/(1 − α)Φ) < 1. This implies
that H(1) = 1− F (α/(1− α)Φ) > 0. Since % has a continuous distribution, the function H(ω) defined in
(A.5.2) must be continuous. With H(0) < 0 and H(1) > 0, the intermediate value theorem implies there
exists a ω˜ such that H(ω˜) = 0 satisfying 0 < ω˜ < 1. This confirms the claim.
(iii) Let ω0 = α/(1 − α)Φ denote the equilibrium value of ω with homogeneous endowments across
countries (see Proposition 3), and let ω∗ = F (1) denote the fraction of countries with an endowment less
than the global mean. With these definitions and (A.5.2):
H(ω0) = ω0 − F
(
ω0
ω0
)
= ω0 − F (1) = ω0 − ω∗, and H(ω∗) = ω∗ − F
(ω0
ω∗
)
= F (1)− F
(ω0
ω∗
)
.
Since % has a continuous distribution with mean equal to one, there must be some probability mass strictly
below and strictly above the mean, implying F (ω0/ω
∗) < F (1) if ω0/ω∗ < 1 and F (ω0/ω∗) > F (1) if
ω0/ω
∗ > 1. Together with the expression for H(ω0) above, this demonstrates that H(ω) changes sign
between ω0 and ω
∗ (irrespective of the ordering of the terms). The unique solution ω˜ must therefore lie
between ω0 and ω
∗. This completes the proof.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Assume that the cartel comprises a strictly positive fraction ξ of countries ( ∈ Ξ) drawn from those with
% > %˜◦ (where %˜◦ is the equilibrium threshold for the rule of law when all countries are small open economies,
as described in Proposition 5). The other fraction 1−ξ of countries ( /∈ Ξ) remain as small open economies
that do not individually affect the world relative price pi∗. The cartel is modelled as one large country that
pools the resources of its members, and acts to maximize the consumption of those in power Cˆp = φ(sˆ)Cˆ
(as in 2.12), where ·ˆ denotes the value of a variable in the cartel.
The cartel moves first and chooses net exports xˆE of the endowment good. Given this choice and
the demand function of the small open economies, the auctioneer chooses the world price pi∗ to ensure
that world markets clear (2.26). This equilibrium price will depend on the cartel’s choice of net exports,
so pi∗(xˆE) is a function of xˆE. The cartel does not have an independent choice of net exports xˆI of the
investment good because it must satisfy its international budget constraint (2.5):
xˆE + pi
∗(xˆE)xˆI = 0, hence xˆI = − xˆE
pi∗(xˆE)
. [A.6.1]
The impact of the cartel on the world equilibrium price
Now consider the world equilibrium price conditional on the cartel’s choice of xˆE. A small open economy
 ∈ [0, 1]\Ξ does not impose any tariffs (τ() = 0) and thus chooses net exports xE() = αq()−(1−α)µpi∗s()
(see Proposition 2 and equation 2.27). For small open economies, there is specialization determined by a
country’s relative endowment %. If % is below a threshold %˜ then s = 1 is optimal, otherwise s = 0 (see
Proposition 5). Market clearing (2.26) in the world market for the endowment good requires:
ξxˆE + α
∫
[0,1]\Ξ
q()d− (1− α)µpi∗
∫
[0,1]\Ξ
1[q() ≤ q∗%˜]d = 0, [A.6.2]
where the threshold %˜ below which s = 1 is chosen depends on the price pi∗ (see 2.25 in Proposition 2 and
use the definition %() = q()/q∗):
%˜ =
µpi∗
q∗Φ
. [A.6.3]
The constant Φ is defined in (2.25). Note that:∫
[0,1]\Ξ
q()d =
∫
[0,1]
q()d−
∫
Ξ
q()d = (1− ξ%ˆ)q∗,
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where %ˆ denotes the average endowment of cartel members relative to the global mean (since the global
mean of % is equal to 1 by definition, it must be the case that 1− ξ%ˆ > 0). Substituting this into (A.6.2),
dividing both sides by αq∗, and replacing pi∗ by a multiple of %˜ using (A.6.3):
(1− ξ%ˆ) + ξ%ˆ xˆE
αqˆ
=
(1− α)Φ
α
%˜
∫
[0,1]\Ξ
1[%() ≤ %˜]d. [A.6.4]
The right-hand side is strictly increasing in %˜, hence %˜(xˆE) is a strictly increasing function of xˆE. Note
that xˆE = αqˆ corresponds to the net exports from the countries of the cartel were they to act as small
open economies (which would choose sˆ = 0), and hence %˜(αqˆ) = %˜◦. It is conjectured that xˆE < αqˆ, which
implies %˜ > %˜◦.
Given the solution %˜(xˆE) derived from (A.6.4), the world price is obtained from (A.6.3):
pi∗(xˆE) =
q∗Φ
µ
%˜(xˆE), [A.6.5]
which is therefore a strictly increasing function of xˆE. It can be seen from (A.6.4) and (A.6.5) that %˜(xˆE)
and pi∗(xˆE) depend only on xˆE and parameters, not on other endogenous variables. Let η(xˆE) denote the
elasticity of pi∗(xˆE) with respect to the cartel’s net exports (the reciprocal of the price elasticity of the
demand curve effectively faced by the cartel):
η(xˆE) =
xˆEpi
∗′(xˆE)
pi∗(xˆE)
, [A.6.6]
which is also a function of xˆE and parameters only. Since pi
∗(xˆE) is positive and strictly increasing in xˆE,
the elasticity η(xˆE) is positive for xˆE > 0 and negative for xˆE < 0. Given the conjecture %˜ < %˜
◦ and
%() > %˜◦ for all  ∈ Ξ:∫
[0,1]\Ξ
1[%() ≤ %˜]d =
∫
[0,1]
1[%() ≤ %˜]d = F (%˜),
where F (%) is the cumulative distribution function. Equation (A.6.4) for the equilibrium threshold %˜ is
therefore:
(1− ξ%ˆ) + ξ%ˆ xˆE
αqˆ
=
(1− α)Φ
α
%˜F (%˜). [A.6.7]
Given the proportionality between %˜(xˆE) and pi
∗′(xˆE) in (A.6.5), the elasticity η(xˆE) defined in (A.6.6) is
also the elasticity of %˜(xˆE) with respect to xˆE:
η(xˆE) =
xˆE%˜
′(xˆE)
%˜(xˆE)
.
Note that:
∂ log(%˜F (%˜))
∂ log %˜
= 1 + h(%˜), where h(%) ≡ %F
′(%)
F (%)
.
The function h(%) is the reversed hazard rate of the log endowment probability distribution, which is
assumed to be a weakly decreasing function. It is always non-negative since F ′(%) ≥ 0. Using this equation
together with (A.6.7), the inverse price elasticity of net exports is equal to:
η(xˆE) =
(
1
1 + h(%˜(xˆE))
)(
ξ%ˆ xˆEαqˆ
(1− ξ%ˆ) + ξ%ˆ xˆEαqˆ
)
. [A.6.8]
The first term on the right-hand side is bounded by 0 and 1, and is weakly increasing in xˆE since %˜(xˆE)
is an increasing function and h(%) is a decreasing function. As 1 − ξ%ˆ > 0, the second term is strictly
increasing in xˆE. It is positive (but strictly less than one) when xˆE > 0, and negative when xˆE < 0 (the
denominator cannot be negative given A.6.4). It follows that η(xˆE) < 1 in all cases, and η(xˆE) is a strictly
increasing function where xˆE ≥ 0.
The cartel’s choice of net exports
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The cartel has a choice of xˆE and sˆ, taking the function pi
∗(xˆE) as given. Taking account of the demand curve
(derived from A.6.5), the international budget constraint (A.6.1) and the resource constraints (embedded
in 2.9), the objective function of the cartel is:
Cˆp = φ(sˆ)
(qˆ− xˆE)1−α
(
µsˆ+ xˆEpi∗(xˆE)
)α
(1− α)1−ααα . [A.6.9]
The partial derivative with respect to net exports xˆE is:
∂Cˆp
∂xˆE
= φ(sˆ)
((
1
pi∗(xˆE)
− xˆEpi
∗′(xˆE)
(pi∗(xˆE))2
) α(qˆ− xˆE)
(1− α)
(
µsˆ+ xˆEpi∗(xˆE)
)
1−α
−
 α(qˆ− xˆE)
(1− α)
(
µsˆ+ xˆEpi∗(xˆE)
)
−α) = φ(sˆ)(1− η(xˆE)
pi∗(xˆE)
pˆi1−α − pˆi−α
)
,
where the second equality uses the definition of the elasticity η(xˆE) from (A.6.6) and the following expression
for the domestic relative price pˆi inside the cartel (derived from 2.7 and A.6.1):
pˆi =
α(qˆ− xˆE)
(1− α)
(
µsˆ+ xˆEpi∗(xˆE)
) . [A.6.10]
The levels of domestic consumption implied by the choice of net exports must be non-negative. Since
cˆE = qˆ − xˆE (see 2.6), this requires xˆE ≤ qˆ. With cˆI = µsˆ + (xˆE/pi∗(xˆE)) given sˆ, it must be the case
that xˆE/pi
∗(xˆE) ≥ −µsˆ. As η(xˆE) < 1, the ratio xˆE/pi∗(xˆE) is strictly increasing in xˆE. The requirement
that xˆE/pi
∗(xˆE) ≥ −µsˆ is therefore equivalent to a finite lower bound for xˆE conditional on the choice of sˆ.
At this lower bound, equation (A.6.10) shows that pˆi becomes arbitrarily large, implying ∂Cˆp/∂xˆE tends
to infinity (since 0 < α < 1 and η(xˆE) < 1). Similarly, at the upper bound for xˆE, the domestic relative
price pˆi tends to zero, implying ∂Cˆp/∂xˆE approaches minus infinity. This argument establishes that there is
never a corner solution for the optimal value of xˆE conditional on a particular value of sˆ. With an interior
solution, the necessary condition for optimality is ∂Cˆp/∂xˆE = 0. Noting that:
∂Cˆp
∂xˆE
=
φ(sˆ)(1− η(xˆE))
pi∗(xˆE)pˆiα
(pˆi − (1 + κ(xˆE))pi∗(xˆE)), where κ(xˆE) ≡ η(xˆE)
1− η(xˆE) , [A.6.11]
the optimal choice of xˆE conditional on sˆ requires:
pˆi = (1 + κ(xˆE))pi
∗(xˆE). [A.6.12]
The value of κ(xˆE) given in (A.6.11) is well defined because η(xˆE) < 1. It is positive and strictly increasing
in xˆE when xˆE > 0 (since η(xˆE) is positive and strictly increasing in this case), and negative when xˆE < 0
(but always greater than −1).
Now consider how an arbitrary choice of sˆ affects the optimal value of xˆE. Combining equations (A.6.10)
and (A.6.12):
(1− α)(1 + κ(xˆE))pi∗(xˆE)
(
µsˆ+
xˆE
pi∗(xˆE)
)
= α(qˆ− xˆE),
which can be rearranged to deduce:
xˆE =
αqˆ− (1− α)µ(1 + κ(xˆE))pi∗(xˆE)sˆ
1 + (1− α)κ(xˆE) . [A.6.13]
Since κ(xˆE) > −1, the denominator of the expression above is strictly positive. The equation can be
rearranged to give sˆ as a function of xˆE:
sˆ =
αqˆ− (α+ (1− α)(1 + κ(xˆE)))xˆE
(1− α)µ(1 + κ(xˆE))pi∗(xˆE) , [A.6.14]
where the denominator is strictly positive (owing to κ(xˆE) > −1). Note that for each value of xˆE, the above
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gives the unique value of sˆ consistent with equation (A.6.13). At the maximum value of xˆE consistent with
non-negative consumption levels of the two goods (xˆE = qˆ) the value of sˆ implied by (A.6.14) would
be negative. Similarly, at the minimum possible value of xˆE consistent with non-negative consumption
(xˆE = −µpi∗(xˆE), given maximum production of the investment good) the value of sˆ implied by (A.6.14)
would be greater than one. Since sˆ is a well-defined continuous function of xˆE, it follows that for each
economically meaningful value of sˆ ∈ [0, 1], there exists at least one value of xˆE consistent with equation
(A.6.13).
Take a value of sˆ for which there exists a solution of (A.6.13) with xˆE < 0. Considering an alternative
value of xˆE > 0 would raise both terms in the denominator of (A.6.14) (since pi
∗(xˆE) is strictly increasing,
and κ(xˆE) switches from negative to positive). As this change also lowers the denominator in (A.6.14)
(because xˆE switches from negative to positive), the change to xˆE cannot be consistent with the same value
of sˆ. Therefore, there cannot be another solution (given sˆ) of (A.6.13) with xˆE > 0 when there is already
a solution with xˆE < 0. Now suppose for a given sˆ there exists a solution of (A.6.13) with xˆE > 0. If
there were also a solution with xˆE < 0 then the logic above would lead to a contradiction. Furthermore,
the solution for xˆE must be unique in this case. Since attention can be restricted to xˆE > 0, it is known
that κ(xˆE) is a strictly increasing function in this range, as well as pi
∗(xˆE). Using (A.6.14), any change in
xˆE would unambiguously require sˆ to move in the opposite direction.
It can be seen from (A.6.13) that the (unique) solution for xˆE is strictly positive. Since there is a
negative relationship between sˆ and xˆE implied by (A.6.14) when xˆE > 0, it follows that the implied value
of xˆE is positive from sˆ = 0 up to some positive value of sˆ, and strictly decreasing in xˆE. It may be the
case that for sufficiently high sˆ, the required value of xˆE is negative, but it is never the case that an even
higher value of sˆ would be associated with a positive value of xˆE. However, beyond that, it is not possible
to make any further claims about the relationship between sˆ and xˆE once xˆE becomes negative.
In the case where sˆ leads to a positive value of xˆE, Cˆp must be a quasi-concave function of xˆE (given
sˆ), implying that the optimality condition (A.6.12) for xˆE is sufficient as well as necessary. The second
derivative of Cˆp with respect to xˆE, evaluated at a point where ∂Cˆp/∂xˆE = 0, is:
∂2Cˆp
∂xˆ2E
∣∣∣∣ ∂Cˆp
∂xˆE
=0
= −φ(sˆ)(1− η(xˆE))
pi∗(xˆE)pˆiα
(
(1 + κ(xˆE))pi
∗′(xˆE) + pi∗(xˆE)κ′(xˆE)− ∂pˆi
∂xˆE
)
. [A.6.15]
Using (A.6.10), the final term in parentheses is:
∂pˆi
∂xˆE
= − α
(1− α)cˆI
1 + (qˆ− xˆE)
(
1−η(xˆE)
pi∗(xˆE)
)
µsˆ+ xˆEpi∗(xˆE)
 ,
where cˆI = µsˆ+ xˆE/pi
∗(xˆE) > 0, and the definition of η(xˆE) from (A.6.6) has been used. At a point where
∂Cˆp/∂xˆE = 0, (A.6.11) implies (1 − η(xˆE))/pi∗(xˆE) = 1/((1 + κ(xˆE))pi∗(xˆE)) = 1/pˆi. By using (A.6.10)
again, it follows that:
− ∂pˆi
∂xˆE
∣∣∣∣ ∂Cˆp
∂xˆE
=0
=
α
(1− α)cˆI
(
1 +
1
pˆi
qˆ− xˆE
µsˆ+ xˆEpi∗(xˆE)
)
=
α
(1− α)cˆI
(
1 +
1− α
α
)
=
1
(1− α)cˆI ,
which is strictly positive. Together with κ′(xˆE) > 0 when xˆE > 0, and 1 + κ(xˆE) > 0 and pi∗′(xˆE) > 0, the
second derivative in (A.6.15) is seen to be strictly negative (recall η(xˆE) < 1). This establishes that Cˆp is
a quasi-concave function of xˆE where xˆE > 0.
The choice of the quality of government in the cartel
Now define a function G(sˆ) that represents log consumption log Cˆ for an arbitrary value of sˆ (see A.6.9,
noting that Cˆp = φ(sˆ)Cˆ), but with maximization over net exports xˆE:
G(sˆ) = max
xˆE
{
(1− α) log(qˆ− xˆE) + α log
(
µsˆ+
xˆE
pi∗(xˆE)
)
− log(1− α)1−ααα
}
. [A.6.16]
By the envelope theorem, the derivative of G(sˆ) with respect to sˆ can be obtained by holding xˆE constant:
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G′(sˆ) =
αµ
µsˆ+ xˆEpi∗(xˆE)
=
αµpi∗(xˆE)
xˆE + µpi∗(xˆE)sˆ
. [A.6.17]
Since φ(sˆ) is not a function of xˆE, the value of xˆE that maximizes G(sˆ) for a given sˆ is the same as the
one that maximizes Cˆp = φ(sˆ)Cˆ. The first-order condition for the optimal xˆE is therefore (A.6.12), which
implies equation (A.6.13) as before. That equation can be used to deduce:
xˆE + µpi
∗(xˆE)sˆ =
αqˆ− (1− α)(1 + κ(xˆE))µpi∗(xˆE)sˆ+ µpi∗(xˆE)sˆ+ (1− α)κ(xˆE)µpi∗(xˆE)sˆ
1 + (1− α)κ(xˆE)
=
α(qˆ + µpi∗(xˆE)sˆ)
1 + (1− α)κ(xˆE) ,
and substituting this into (A.6.17) implies that the derivative G′(sˆ) is given by the following for all sˆ:
G′(sˆ) = (1 + (1− α)κ(xˆE)) µpi
∗(xˆE)
qˆ + µpi∗(xˆE)sˆ
, [A.6.18]
where xˆE is given by equation (A.6.13) conditional on the value of sˆ.
Let pi∗ denote the value of pi∗(xˆE) for the optimal xˆE when sˆ = 0, and κˆ be the corresponding value
of κ(xˆE). With sˆ = 0 implying xˆE > 0, it must be the case that κˆ > 0. Since sˆ > 0 never features an
optimizing value of xˆE greater than when sˆ = 0, and as pi
∗(xˆE) is a strictly increasing function, it follows
that pi∗(xˆE) ≤ pi∗ for all sˆ ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, since κ(xˆE) is a strictly increasing function while xˆE > 0 and
strictly negative when xˆE < 0, it follows that κ(xˆE) ≤ κˆ for all sˆ ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, noting that the right-hand
side of (A.6.18) is increasing in κ(xˆE), and µpi
∗(xˆE)/(qˆ + µpi∗sˆ(xˆE)) is increasing in pi∗, it follows that:
G′(sˆ) ≤ (1 + (1− α)κˆ) µpi
∗
qˆ + µpi∗sˆ
, [A.6.19]
for all sˆ ∈ [0, 1]. Given the integral below:∫ sˆ
s=0
µpi∗
qˆ + µpi∗s
ds = log(qˆ + µpi∗sˆ)− log qˆ = log
(
1 +
µpi∗sˆ
qˆ
)
,
by integrating both sides of (A.6.19) from 0 to sˆ, it follows that:
G(sˆ)−G(0) ≤ (1 + (1− α)κˆ) log
(
1 +
µpi∗sˆ
qˆ
)
. [A.6.20]
Noting that log Cˆp = log φ(sˆ) +G(sˆ), sˆ = 0 is the optimal choice if:
G(sˆ)−G(0) ≤ log φ(0)− log φ(sˆ), for all sˆ ∈ [0, 1].
From (A.6.20), a sufficient condition for this is:
(1 + (1− α)κˆ) log
(
1 +
µpi∗sˆ
qˆ
)
≤ log φ(0)− log φ(sˆ), [A.6.21]
for all sˆ ∈ [0, 1].
The analysis of small open economies has shown that the objective function φ(s)(q + µpi∗s) is a quasi-
convex function of s, and that there exists a threshold q˜ such that for any q ≥ q˜, s = 0 maximizes the
objective function (see Proposition 2 and Proposition 5). This implies:
log
(
1 +
µpi∗
q˜
sˆ
)
≤ log φ(0)− log φ(sˆ), for all sˆ ∈ [0, 1], where q˜ = µpi
∗
Φ
. [A.6.22]
Now consider the following inequality:
1 + Φ
%˜
%ˆ
s ≤ (1 + Φs) 11+(1−α)κˆ . [A.6.23]
The left- and right-hand sides are equal when s = 0. Note that the left-hand side is linear in s, while the
right-hand side is concave function of s because 1 + (1− α)κˆ > 1. Hence, the inequality is satisfied for all
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s ∈ [0, 1] if and only if it is satisfied for s = 1:
1 + Φ
%˜
%ˆ
≤ (1 + Φ) 11+(1−α)κˆ ,
which can be rearranged as follows:
%ˆ ≥
(
Φ
(1 + Φ)
1
1+(1−α)κˆ − 1
)
%˜. [A.6.24]
Lastly, by taking logarithms of both sides of (A.6.23) and using the definition of q˜ from (A.6.22) and the
definitions %ˆ = qˆ/q∗ and %˜ = q˜/q∗, (A.6.23) is seen to be equivalent to:
(1 + (1− α)κˆ) log
(
1 +
µpi∗
qˆ
s
)
≤ log
(
1 +
µpi∗
q˜
s
)
.
Therefore, if (A.6.24) is satisfied, this implies (A.6.3) holds for all s ∈ [0, 1], which is equivalent to the
above inequality, which together with (A.6.22) implies (A.6.21) holds for all sˆ ∈ [0, 1]. This is a sufficient
condition for sˆ = 0 to be the optimal choice for the cartel.
The equilibrium consequences of the cartel for other countries
Since sˆ > 0 implies a value of κ(xˆE) equal to κˆ > 0, equation (A.6.13) shows that the optimal value of net
exports is such that xˆE < αqˆ. This is less than what the countries of the cartel would choose if they were
small open economies (xˆ◦ = αqˆ), and since %˜ is strictly increasing in xˆE, this confirms the earlier conjecture
that %˜ < %˜◦.
As equation (A.6.12) holds with κ(xˆE) = κˆ > 0, the cartel’s pricing strategy is equivalent to a tariff
τˆ = κˆ (compare equations 2.21 and A.6.12), where the tariff is equal to the cartel’s optimal markup. The
world relative price pi∗ of the investment good is proportional to %˜ (see A.6.5), and since %˜ falls, so must pi∗.
This means the formation of the cartel leads to a higher relative price of the endowment good in equilibrium,
confirming claim (i) in the proposition. The fraction of countries choosing s = 1 (those satisfying % ≤ %˜) is
ω = F (%˜), and the reduction in %˜ implies that the formation of the cartel strictly reduces ω in equilibrium.
This confirms claim (ii) in the proposition.
Conditions under which the cartel does not produce any of the investment good
Since %˜ < %˜◦, it can be seen from (A.6.24) that an easier-to-verify sufficient condition for the cartel to
choose sˆ = 0 is:
%ˆ ≥
(
Φ
(1 + Φ)
1
1+(1−α)κˆ − 1
)
%˜◦. [A.6.25]
It is also possible to state a sufficient condition purely in terms of exogenous parameters. With 0 < xˆE < αqˆ,
note that (A.6.8) implies η(xˆE) ≤ ξ%ˆ. Since κ(xˆE) is increasing in xˆE according to (A.6.11), it follows that:
κˆ ≤ ξ%ˆ
1− ξ%ˆ .
Since the denominator of (A.6.25) is decreasing in κˆ, the inequality above demonstrates that:
%ˆ ≥
 Φ
(1 + Φ)
1
1+(1−α) ξ%ˆ
1−ξ%ˆ − 1
 %˜◦, [A.6.26]
is a sufficient condition for (A.6.25) and the optimality of sˆ = 0. The term in parentheses is increasing in
the cartel size ξ and tends to 1 as ξ tends to zero. It follows that (A.6.26) is satisfied for a combination of
ξ being not too large and the relative endowment %ˆ being sufficiently above the average. This completes
the proof.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
An allocation specifies the individuals in power P (a set of measure p = |P|), and those individuals D for
whom the consumption allocation is contingent on investing (a set of measure d = |D|). The remaining
individuals belong to a set N = [0, 1]\(P ∪ D), noting that P ∩ D = ∅ as those in power do not receive
investment opportunities. Since there are 1 − p non-incumbents in total, and µ investment opportunities
distributed at random among them, each non-incumbent has probability ν = µ/(1 − p) of receiving an
investment opportunity (this is a well-defined probability because 1 − p ≥ 1/2 and µ < 1/2 according to
4.5).
If this allocation prevails (that is, if it is not replaced by a rebellion) there will be three groups of
individuals (payoffs the same within groups) after investment decisions have been made: incumbents P,
capitalists K = D ∩ I, and workers W = [0, 1]\(P ∪ K). As the allocation is the prevailing one from the
pre-investment stage, the set of investors I must be a subset of D otherwise investing would not have
been incentive compatible (see 4.3), hence K = I. Since each investment opportunity leads to one unit
of the investment good, |I| = K = µs (see 2.10), where s is the fraction of investment opportunities that
are taken, there are k = µs capitalists, and w = 1 − p − k workers. Using the utility function (4.1),
the continuation payoffs (ignoring sunk costs) of these individuals at the post-investment stage under the
current allocation are:
Up = logCp, Uk = logCk, and Uw = logCw. [A.7.1]
There are also three groups of individuals (payoffs the same within groups) at the pre-investment stage:
incumbents P, those whose consumption allocation is contingent on taking an investment opportunity
(those in D), and those who are neither incumbents nor have a consumption allocation contingent on
investing (N ). Those in the group N have no incentive to invest even if they receive an opportunity, and
thus will become workers. If the incentive constraint (4.2) is satisfied, those in D who receive an opportunity
(probability ν) will invest and become capitalists subsequently. Those who do not receive an opportunity
(probability 1−ν) become workers. The measure of investors is therefore µs = νd, which implies the group
D has size d = (1 − p)s using ν = µ/(1 − p), and the group N has size (1 − p)(1 − s). If the incentive
constraint (4.2) is satisfied then the allocation determines s (see 4.3) through the number of individuals
included in D, and s = 0 otherwise. The continuation payoffs at the pre-investment stage are:
Up = logCp, Ud = (1− ν) logCw + ν (logCk − log(1 + θ)) , and Un = logCw. [A.7.2]
In what follows, let U(ı) denote the utility of individual ı under the current allocation.
Now consider the conditions that must be satisfied for there to be no rational rebellion (Definition 1)
against the allocation. There are opportunities for rebellion before and after investment decisions are made.
Starting from rebellions at the pre-investment stage, let P ′ and U ′(ı) denote a given set of individuals in
power and individuals’ levels of utility under a new allocation established after a rebellion (′ denotes an
aspect of an allocation established following a rebellion at the pre-investment stage). The absence of a
rational rebellion requires that (4.4) cannot hold for any {L,R, R(ı)}. Since rebellion effort R(ı) must be
non-negative (see 4.6a) and the loyal faction L excludes those belonging to the rebel faction R (see 4.6b),
the absence of any rational rebellion is equivalent to establishing (4.4) does not hold when R includes all
individuals in P ′ with U ′(ı) ≥ U(ı), that is, U ′p ≥ U(ı), and when these individuals exert the maximum
amount of rebellion effort R(ı) = exp{U ′(ı)−U(ı)}− 1 (see 4.6a). The strength of the rebel faction in this
case is:∫
R
R(ı)dı =
∫
R
(
exp{U ′p − U(ı)} − 1
)
dı =
∫
P ′
max{exp{U ′p − U(ı)} − 1, 0}dı. [A.7.3]
The corresponding loyal faction L is determined by (4.6b). Any individual ı ∈ P with Up > U ′(ı) must
belong to L because the requirement U ′(ı) ≥ U(ı) for belonging to the rebel faction cannot hold (see 4.6a).
It follows that L comprises all individuals in P with Up > U ′(ı), and thus the strength of the loyal faction
is: ∫
L
δdı = δ
∫
P
1[Up > U
′(ı)]dı, [A.7.4]
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where 1[·] is the indicator function. Given P ′ and U ′(ı), the absence of any rational rebellion at the
pre-investment stage is therefore equivalent to:∫
P ′
max{exp{U ′p − U(ı)} − 1, 0}dı ≤ δ
∫
P
1[Up > U
′(ı)]dı. [A.7.5a]
Considering the post-investment stage, let P‡ and U ‡(ı) denote a given set of individuals in power and
individuals’ levels of utility under a new allocation established after a rebellion (‡ denotes an aspect of an
allocation established following a rebellion at the post-investment stage). Following the same reasoning
that led to (A.7.5a), the absence of any rational rebellion at the post-investment stage is equivalent to:∫
P‡
max{exp{U ‡p − U(ı)} − 1, 0}dı ≤ δ
∫
P
1[Up > U
‡(ı)]dı. [A.7.5b]
It is supposed for now that incumbents will receive more utility than if they were to lose power through
a rebellion at any stage of the power struggle, and that incumbents obtain a higher level of utility by avoid-
ing all rebellions (these two statements are not the same because incumbents can themselves participate
in rebellions). The second conjecture means that the conditions (A.7.5a) and (A.7.5b) for the absence of
rebellion are treated as constraints when maximizing incumbents’ payoff, referred to as ‘no-rebellion con-
straints’. The no-rebellion constraints in (A.7.5) can also be simplified under the first conjecture because
it means the condition in (4.6b) for participation in the loyal faction is automatically satisfied for any
incumbent who loses power through a rebellion (so L is the set P excluding those in the rebel faction R).
The pre- and post-investment no-rebellion constraints are therefore:∫
P ′
max{exp{U ′p − U(ı)} − 1, 0}dı ≤ δ
(∫
P
dı− 1[Up ≤ U ′p]
∫
P∩P ′
dı
)
; [A.7.6a]∫
P‡
max{exp{U ‡p − U(ı)} − 1, 0}dı ≤ δ
(∫
P
dı− 1[Up ≤ U ‡p]
∫
P∩P‡
dı
)
, [A.7.6b]
where P ′ and U ′p is the set of those in power and their payoff following a pre-investment rebellion, and p‡
and U ‡p are the post-investment equivalents. Note that since the constraints in (A.7.6) are looser than the
originals in (A.7.5), it suffices to work with (A.7.6) first and then verify the conjecture that incumbents
lose from rebellions.
The equilibrium conditions (Definition 2) restrict any rational rebellion to be followed by a new allo-
cation that is an equilibrium of the power struggle. This means (A.7.6a) must be checked for all P ′ and
U ′p corresponding to equilibrium allocations at the pre-investment stage, and (A.7.6b) for all P‡ and U ‡p
corresponding to equilibrium allocations established at the post-investment stage. Given the independence
of irrelevant history condition in the equilibrium definition (Definition 2), this means there will be some
definite values of U ′p and U
‡
p and some definite sizes of the sets P ′ and P‡ consistent with equilibrium, where
these may depend on relevant state variables. But since all individuals are ex ante identical, the equilibrium
conditions place no restrictions on the identities of incumbents and non-incumbents: any permutation of
the individual identities in an equilibrium allocation is also an equilibrium. No-rebellion constraints are
therefore derived by considering all possible compositions of the subsequent incumbent group subject to
|P ′| = p′ and |P‡| = p‡ for the equilibrium incumbent group sizes p′ and p‡ at the pre-investment and
post-investment stages, respectively. There are no relevant state variables at the pre-investment stage, so
independence of irrelevant history simply requires that p = p′ and Up = U ′p hold in equilibrium. At the
post-investment stage, the capital stock K is a relevant state variable, and p‡ and U ‡p may depend on K.
Since individuals in a group all receive the same continuation payoffs (A.7.1) and (A.7.2) under the
prevailing allocation, the collection of no-rebellion constraints (A.7.6) can be stated more concisely in
terms of the fraction of the post-rebellion incumbents that would be drawn from each current group. For
a rebellion at the pre-investment stage, let ζn, ζd, and ζp denote respectively the fractions of the size p
′
post-rebellion incumbent group drawn from those in N , D, and P. These proportions must be non-negative
and sum to one, as well as satisfying the natural restrictions ζn ≤ (1− p)(1− s)/p′, ζd ≤ (1− p)s/p′, and
ζp ≤ p/p′. Similarly, for a rebellion at the post-investment stage, let ζw, ζk, and ζp denote respectively
the fractions of the size p‡ post-rebellion incumbent group drawn from current workers, capitalists, and
incumbents. The natural restrictions on these fractions are ζw ≤ (1− p− k)/p‡, ζk ≤ k/p‡, and ζp ≤ p/p‡.
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Using this notation, the pre-investment no-rebellion constraints (A.7.6a) can be stated as:
ζnp
′max{exp{U ′p − Un} − 1, 0}+ ζdp′max{exp{U ′p − Ud} − 1, 0}
+ ζpp
′1[Up ≤ U ′p]
(
exp{U ′p − Up} − 1 + δ
) ≤ δp, [A.7.7a]
and the post-investment no-rebellion constraints (A.7.6b) as:
ζwp
‡max{exp{U ‡p − Uw} − 1, 0}+ ζkp‡max{exp{U ‡p − Uk} − 1, 0}
+ ζpp
‡1[Up ≤ U ‡p]
(
exp{U ‡p − Up} − 1 + δ
)
≤ δp. [A.7.7b]
Following from this, the problem of finding an allocation to maximize the incumbent payoff subject to
avoiding rebellions can be stated without reference to individual identities. The equilibrium conditions
will determine power sharing p = |P| rather than the identities of the individuals in P. Likewise, the
equilibrium conditions will determine the fraction s of investment opportunities that are taken through
d = |D| and s = d/(1− p) (if 4.2 is satisfied, and s = 0 otherwise).
Free markets and no taxes that distort the allocation of consumption between goods
The utilities under the current allocation in (A.7.1) and (A.7.2) depend only on consumption (and power
sharing p through ν). Using the consumption aggregator in (2.1):
logCp = (1− α) log cpE + α log cpI − log
(
(1− α)1−ααα) ; [A.7.8a]
logCk = (1− α) log ckE + α log ckI − log
(
(1− α)1−ααα) ; and [A.7.8b]
logCw = (1− α) log cwE + α log cwI − log
(
(1− α)1−ααα) . [A.7.8c]
Given the sizes p, k, and 1 − p − k of the groups of incumbents, capitalists, and workers, the resource
constraints in (2.6) can be written as follows:
pcpE + kckE + (1− p− k)cwE = q− xE, and pcpI + kckI + (1− p− k)cwI = K − xI. [A.7.9]
An equilibrium allocation maximizes the incumbent payoff Up subject to the no-rebellion constraints
(A.7.7), the resource constraints (A.7.9), the international budget constraint (2.5), and the capital stock
(2.10). Taking as given the sizes of the different groups, the no-rebellion constraints (A.7.7) depend only
on the continuation utilities and K through p‡ or U ‡p. Given p, s, xE, and xI, consider the allocation of
goods consistent with the resource constraints (A.7.9) that maximizes Up subject to providing payoffs Uk
and Uw above thresholds sufficient to satisfy the no-rebellion constraints. The first-order conditions for the
consumption allocation {cpE, cpI, ckE, ckI, cwE, cwI} are:
α/cpI
(1− α)/cpE =
α/ckI
(1− α)/ckE =
α/cwI
(1− α)/cwE .
This requires equating the marginal rates of substitution between goods across all individuals, and given
the consumption basket (2.1), this means equating the consumption ratios of the two goods cI(ı)/cE(ı)
across all individuals ı. Using the resource constraints (A.7.9), this common ratio is:
cpI
cpE
=
ckI
ckE
=
cwI
cwE
=
K − xI
q− xE . [A.7.10]
If there were a market where individuals could exchange the two goods (with relative price pi of the
investment good) subject to individual disposable incomes Y (ı) (in terms of the endowment good) then
the demand functions would be those given in (2.4) (derived from maximizing 2.1 subject to 2.2). Those
demand functions imply a common consumption ratio equal to (2.3), and since markets would clear at
price pi = p˜i from (2.7), the consumption ratio would be exactly the same as the one in equation (A.7.10).
Now let Yp, Yk, and Yw denote the disposable incomes (in terms of the endowment good) of incumbents,
capitalists, and workers, and suppose these satisfy the following aggregate budget constraint:
pYp + kYk + (1− p− k)Yw = Y, [A.7.11]
where national income Y is given in (2.8). National income can be written as Y = (q − xE) + p˜i(K − xI)
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using (2.5), and observe that the market-clearing price p˜i from (2.7) implies:
Y =
q− xE
1− α , and Y =
p˜i(K − xI)
α
. [A.7.12]
It follows that both resource constraints in (A.7.9) are satisfied given incomes consistent with (A.7.11),
individual demands (2.4), and the market-clearing price (2.7). This means that markets can deliver exactly
the same consumption allocation as the equilibrium allocation given some individual disposable incomes that
maximize incumbent payoffs subject to the no-rebellion constraints. The equilibrium allocation effectively
allows such markets to be established and does not interfere with their operation, confirming the claim in
the proposition. The aggregate budget constraint (A.7.11) can also be expressed in terms of consumption
using (2.8) and (2.9)
pCp + kCk + (1− p− k)Cw = C, [A.7.13]
where C is aggregate real GDP from (2.9). This confirms part (i) of the proposition.
Free international trade
Conditional on p and s (and hence K), the utilities (A.7.1) and (A.7.2) under the current allocation depend
only on the consumption levels in (A.7.13), which stands in for the resource constraints (A.7.9) given (2.9).
Maximizing Cp subject to the no-rebellion constraints (A.7.7) therefore requires net exports xE and xI are
chosen to maximize C in (2.9). It is shown in section 2.4 that this is equivalent to free trade, confirming
part (ii) of the proposition.
The equilibrium allocation following a post-investment rebellion
If there were a rebellion at the post-investment stage, the following result characterizes the subsequent
equilibrium level of power sharing p‡ and the incumbent payoff C‡p.
Lemma 1 An equilibrium allocation established at the post-investment stage of the sequence of events in
Figure 4 has the following features:
(i) There is free exchange of goods domestically and internationally subject to given levels of disposable
income.
(ii) Full expropriation of capital: The income levels of all non-incumbents are equalized irrespective
of whether individuals have produced capital, that is, D = ∅ (and hence K = ∅), or equivalently,
Yk = Yw.
(iii) The equilibrium level of power sharing and the payoffs of incumbents and workers are:
p‡ =
1
2 + δ
, C‡p =
2 + δ
2
C, and C‡w =
2 + δ
2(1 + δ)
C, [A.7.14]
where C is real GDP from (2.9).
Proof See appendix A.10. 
This result confirms the full expropriation of capital that would follow such a rebellion, as claimed in part
(iv) of the proposition. In what follows, the case of s > 0 is considered. If s = 0, it turns out that the
equilibrium allocation coincides with that characterized in Lemma 1.
The no-rebellion constraints (A.7.7) can be written in terms of consumption using the expressions for
the continuation payoffs in (A.7.1) and (A.7.2):
ζnp
′max
{
C ′p
Cw
− 1, 0
}
+ ζdp
′max
 C ′pC1−νw ( Ck1+θ)ν − 1, 0
+ ζpp′1[Cp ≤ C ′p]
(
C ′p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp;
[A.7.15a]
ζwp
‡max
{
C‡p
Cw
− 1, 0
}
+ ζkp
‡max
{
C‡p
Ck
− 1, 0
}
+ ζpp
‡1[Cp ≤ C‡p]
(
C‡p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp, [A.7.15b]
54
which must hold for all valid ζn, ζd, and ζp, and for all valid ζw, ζk, and ζp at the pre- and post-investment
stages.
The time inconsistency problem
The equilibrium conditions require that the allocation maximizes the incumbent payoff Up. This is subject
to the resource constraint (A.7.13), the incentive constraint (4.2), and the no-rebellion constraints (A.7.15).
Given s, and hence K, the equilibrium allocation established following a rebellion at the post-investment
stage would maximize the incumbent payoff Cp subject only to the resource constraint (A.7.13) and the
post-investment no-rebellion constraints (A.7.15b). The solution of that constrained maximization problem
is characterized in Lemma 1. In that problem, it is optimal to give all non-incumbents the same level of
consumption. Here, the equilibrium allocation must also satisfy the incentive constraint (4.2), which re-
quires granting a positive measure µs of non-incumbents a consumption level strictly greater than workers
(since θ > 0). Given that the resource constraint is the same in both cases, satisfying the incentive con-
straint strictly reduces the payoff of incumbents. Furthermore, the pre-investment no-rebellion constraints
(A.7.15a) must also be satisfied. With these additional constraints, the incumbent payoff Cp must be
strictly lower than the constrained-maximum payoff C‡p following a rebellion at the post-investment stage.
Since C‡p > Cp, members of the incumbent group have an incentive to rebel against an allocation
after investment has occurred, even though the allocation was established to maximize their payoff at the
pre-investment stage. An allocation that gives credible incentives for investors is therefore subject to a
time-inconsistency problem.
There must be more power sharing
Suppose that the allocation specifies power sharing p no more than the equilibrium level of power sharing
p‡ following a rebellion at the post-investment stage. With p ≤ p‡, it is feasible to have a post-investment
rebellion with ζp = p/p
‡ and values of ζk, and ζw such that ζp + ζk + ζw = 1 in (A.7.15b). Since ζpp‡ = p
and Cp < C
‡
p, the left-hand side is strictly greater than the right-hand side, violating the no-rebellion
constraint. The equilibrium allocation must therefore feature p > p‡. This means an increase in power
sharing relative to what would be optimal ex post for incumbents.
No capitalists in a rebel faction
The natural limit on the fraction of workers ζw included in the incumbent group following a rebellion at
the post-investment stage is ζw ≤ (1− p− k)/p‡. Since p ≤ 1/2 and k ≤ µ, a sufficient condition for ζw = 1
to be feasible is:
1− 1
2
− µ ≥ p‡, or equivalently µ ≤ 1
2
− 1
2 + δ
=
δ
2(2 + δ)
,
which uses the expression for p‡ in (A.7.14). This condition holds under the parameter restriction on µ in
(4.5).
The incentive constraint (4.2) requires Ck > Cw, which implies max{C‡p/Ck−1, 0} ≤ max{C‡p/Cw−1, 0}.
Since ζw = 1 is feasible in the post-investment no-rebellion constraint (A.7.15b), it follows that ζk can be
set to zero because if the no-rebellion constraint holds for all feasible values of ζw and ζp given ζk = 0, it
must hold any positive value of ζk as well. The most dangerous rebel faction does not include capitalists
because workers have a greater incentive to change the allocation, and there is no shortage of workers in
filling the places in the incumbent group following a rebellion.
With ζk = 0 and Cp < C
‡
p, the set of relevant post-investment no-rebellion constraints can be written
as follows:
(1− ζ)p‡max
{
C‡p
Cw
− 1, 0
}
+ ζp‡
(
C‡p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp, [A.7.16]
which must hold for all ζ ∈ [0, 1] (where ζ = ζp, and all values of ζ in the unit interval are feasible, which
follows from p > p‡ and 1− p− k ≥ p‡).
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A no-rebellion constraint must bind for a rebel faction comprising a positive measure of non-incumbents
Given the equilibrium conditions (Definition 2), the equilibrium allocation will feature Up = U
′
p, Ud = U
′
d,
and Un = U
′
n, and if it is in the interests of incumbents who lose power at the pre-investment stage to
defend the allocation (Up > U
′
n) then U
′
p > Un, and hence C
′
p > Cw (non-incumbents would be willing
to exert some positive rebellion effort in a rebel faction). Since the incentive constraint (4.2) requires
Ck/(1 + θ) ≥ Cw, and as Ck does not appear in the post-investment no-rebellion constraints (A.7.16), it
follows that if C1−νw (Ck/(1 +θ))ν > C ′p then Ck can be reduced by some positive amount without violating
any constraint. This would allow the incumbent payoff to be increased, so an optimal allocation must
feature C1−νw (Ck/(1 + θ))ν ≤ C ′p. It follows that the pre-investment no-rebellion constraints can be stated
as:
(1− ζ)p′
1− κ
Cw
+
κ
C1−νw
(
Ck
1+θ
)ν
C ′p − 1
+ ζp′1[Cp ≤ C ′p](C ′pCp − 1 + δ
)
≤ δp, [A.7.17a]
where the notation ζ = ζp and κ = ζd/(ζn +ζd) is used, and the constraints must hold for all feasible values
of ζ and κ. Since Cw ≤ Cp < C‡p, the post-investment no-rebellion constraints (A.7.16) can also be written
in a simpler form:
(1− ζ)p‡
(
C‡p
Cw
− 1
)
+ ζp‡
(
C‡p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp, [A.7.17b]
which must hold for all ζ ∈ [0, 1]. One of the constraints (A.7.17a) or (A.7.17b) must bind for some ζ < 1.
Otherwise the terms multiplying 1 − ζ in these constraints are both too low, allowing Cw to be reduced
by some positive amount without violating any no-rebellion constraint (reducing Cw does not violate the
incentive constraint 4.2). This would allow the payoff of incumbents to be increased.
The incentive compatibility constraint is binding
Now suppose the incentive compatibility constraint (4.2) is slack, that is, Ck > (1 + θ)Cw. Consider a
redistribution of contingent consumption between workers and capitalists such that workers will receive Cb
and capitalists will receive (1 + θ)Cb, which means that the incentive constraint becomes binding. Since
there will be k capitalists and 1− p− k workers, the resource constraint requires:
Cb =
(1− p− k)Cw + kCk
(1− p− k) + k(1 + θ) =
(
1− p− k
1− p+ kθ
)
Cw +
(
k(1 + θ)
1− p+ kθ
)
Ck
1 + θ
. [A.7.18]
This shows that Cb is a weighted average of Cw and Ck/(1 + θ), where Ck/(1 + θ) > Cw. Using Jensen’s
inequality, the convexity of the function 1/C implies:
1
Cb
<
(
1− p− k
1− p+ kθ
)
1
Cw
+
(
k(1 + θ)
1− p+ kθ
)
1 + θ
Ck
. [A.7.19]
Since 1/Cw > (1 + θ)/Ck and (1− p− k)/(1− p+ kθ) < (1− p− k)/(1− p), it follows that:(
1− p− k
1− p+ kθ
)
1
Cw
+
(
k(1 + θ)
1− p+ kθ
)
1 + θ
Ck
<
(
1− p− k
1− p
)
1
Cw
+
(
k
1− p
)
1 + θ
Ck
. [A.7.20]
Finally, by putting together (A.7.19) and (A.7.20) and noting C1−νw (Ck/(1 + θ))ν < Ck/(1 + θ):
1
Cb
<
1−
(
k
1−p
)
Cw
+
(
k
1−p
)
C1−νw
(
Ck
1+θ
)ν . [A.7.21]
Observe that with Cw < Ck/(1 + θ), the value of κ associated with the highest level of the left-hand side
of (A.7.17a) (given a ζ) is the lowest feasible value of κ. This value of κ must be such that κ ≤ k/(1− p)
since there are k capitalists and 1− p non-incumbents. By using (A.7.21), it must be the case that:
1
Cb
<
1− κ
Cw
+
κ
C1−νw
(
Ck
1+θ
)ν ,
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and it follows that the redistribution specified in (A.7.18) slackens the pre-investment no-rebellion constraint
(A.7.17a) if this is binding for some ζ < 1. This would allow the payoff of incumbents to be increased. If
(A.7.17a) is not binding for any ζ < 1 then Ck does not appear in any relevant no-rebellion constraint (it is
absent from A.7.17b), and so Ck can be reduced until the incentive constraint (4.2) is binding. Therefore,
in either case, the equilibrium allocation must necessarily have:
Ck = (1 + θ)Cw. [A.7.22]
This confirms claim (iii) in the proposition.
There are only two independent no-rebellion constraints at the post-investment stage
With Ck/(1 + θ) = Cw, the pre-investment no-rebellion constraints simplify to:
(1− ζ)p′
(
C ′p
Cw
− 1
)
+ ζp′1[Cp ≤ C ′p]
(
C ′p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp, [A.7.23a]
which must hold for all feasible ζ ∈ [0,min{p/p′, 1}] (note that ζ = 0 is feasible because p ≤ 1/2 and
p′ ≤ 1/2). The set of post-investment no-rebellion constraints (A.7.17b) is linear in ζ and must be verified
for all ζ in the fixed interval [0, 1] (all of which are feasible). If (A.7.17b) holds for all ζ ∈ [0, 1] then it
must hold in particular at ζ = 0 and ζ = 1:
p‡
(
C‡p
Cw
− 1
)
≤ δp; [A.7.23b]
p‡
(
C‡p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp. [A.7.23c]
Furthermore, if both of the individual no-rebellion constraints (A.7.23b) and (A.7.23c) hold then taking a
linear combination with weights 1 − ζ and ζ implies that (A.7.17b) holds for any ζ ∈ [0, 1]. The relevant
set of no-rebellion constraints has therefore been reduced to (A.7.23a), (A.7.23b) and (A.7.23c).
Only a single no-rebellion constraint involving non-incumbents is relevant at the pre-investment stage
Consider a simpler constrained maximization problem for the incumbent payoff Up = logCp where the
pre-investment no-rebellion constraint is only required to hold for ζ = 0:
p′
(
C ′p
Cw
− 1
)
≤ δp. [A.7.24]
All other relevant no-rebellion constraints must hold (A.7.23b and A.7.23c), as must the resource constraint
(A.7.13) and the (binding) incentive constraint (A.7.22). Equivalents of the equilibrium conditions in
Definition 2 are required to hold for this simpler problem.
Let {p˙, C˙p, C˙w} denote an equilibrium of this simpler problem. Since there are no changes to fundamen-
tal state variables following any pre-investment rebellion, independence of irrelevant history means p′ = p˙
and C ′p = C˙p. Since (A.7.24) must hold, it follows that C˙p/C˙w ≤ 1 + δ.
Now consider the original constrained maximization problem, taking p′ = p˙ and C ′p = C˙p for an
equilibrium of the simpler problem. When p = p˙, any value of ζ between zero and one is feasible, and an
allocation must therefore satisfy the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.23a) for all ζ ∈ [0, 1]. If p = p˙, Cw = C˙w,
and Cp = C˙p are to satisfy these constraints then the following must hold:
(1− ζ)p˙
(
C˙p
C˙w
− 1
)
+ δζp˙ ≤ δp˙,
which does indeed follow for any ζ ∈ [0, 1] given that C˙p/C˙w ≤ 1 + δ. Since the allocation satisfies this and
all other no-rebellion constraints (as it is an equilibrium of the simpler problem), and all other resource and
incentive constraints, and because it maximizes the incumbent payoff subject to the weaker no-rebellion
constraint (A.7.24), it follows that it is optimal subject to the full set of no-rebellion constraints (A.7.23a).
The allocation is thus an equilibrium of the original problem.
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Now consider the converse. Take an allocation with {p˙, C˙p, C˙w} that is an equilibrium of the original
problem. When p′ = p˙ and C ′p = C˙p, this allocation clearly satisfies the simpler no-rebellion constraint
(A.7.24) (a special case of A.7.23a for ζ = 0, which is always feasible). But now suppose that it is not
optimal subject only to (A.7.24) instead of (A.7.23a) (with p′ = p˙ and C ′p = C˙p) for all feasible ζ values.
This means there is an alternative allocation with {p, Cp, Cw} satisfying (A.7.24) (with p′ = p˙ and C ′p = C˙p)
that yields a higher incumbent consumption level Cp > C˙p. Now take any ζ ∈ [0, 1] and observe that:
(1− ζ)p˙
(
C˙p
Cw
− 1
)
+ ζp˙1[Cp ≤ C˙p]
(
C˙p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
= (1− ζ)p˙
(
C˙p
Cw
− 1
)
≤ (1− ζ)δp ≤ δp,
where the first equality follows from Cp > C˙p, the first inequality follows from the alternative allocation
satisfying (A.7.24) (with p′ = p˙ and C ′p = C˙p), and the second inequality follows from 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1.
This shows that the alternative allocation satisfies (A.7.23a) for all feasible ζ (a subset of [0, 1]), and thus
satisfies all the constraints of the original problem, yet yields a higher payoff than the equilibrium allocation,
contradicting the optimality requirement of the allocation with {p˙, C˙p, C˙w}. This contradicts the optimality
of the allocation when the constraints (A.7.23a) are weakened to (A.7.24) (and other constraints are the
same). The allocation is thus an equilibrium of the simpler problem.
This logic shows that the set of equilibrium allocations is not affected by imposing only (A.7.24) instead
of (A.7.23a). Therefore, the only relevant no-rebellion constraints are (A.7.23b), (A.7.23c), and (A.7.24).
The resource constraint (A.7.13) implies the following expression for incumbent consumption Cp in
terms of the total resources C available for consumption, and the consumption levels Cw and Ck of workers
and capitalists:
Cp =
C − (1− p− µs)Cw − µsCk
p
,
where C is given in (A.7.13), and the measure of capitalists is k = µs. Eliminating Ck using the binding
incentive compatibility constraint (A.7.22):
Cp =
C − (1− p+ µθs)Cw
p
.
Let ψp ≡ Cp/C and ψw ≡ Cw/C denote the per-person consumption shares of incumbents and workers of
total resources C. Dividing both sides of the expression for Cp by C:
ψp =
1− (1− p+ µθs)ψw
p
. [A.7.25]
The value of s is taken as given at this stage, which means the capital stock K and total resources C are
taken as given for now (see 2.9 and 2.10). The optimality of free exchange and free international trade
has already been shown, which means that the price p˜i is also taken as given. The optimality condition
(Definition 2) then requires that ψp (equation A.7.25) be maximized subject to the no-rebellion constraints.
All other constraints have already been accounted for in (A.7.25). The no-rebellion constraints are (A.7.24),
(A.7.23b), and (A.7.23c), which can be written as follows:
Cw ≥
C ′p
1 + δ pp′
, Cw ≥ C
‡
p
1 + δ p
p‡
, and Cp ≥ C
‡
p
1 + δp−p
‡
p‡
.
The capital stock K is predetermined at the post-investment stage, and it has been shown here and
in Lemma 1 that free exchange domestically and free international trade are necessary features of any
equilibrium allocation. In equilibrium, independence of irrelevant history requires s = s′ (Definition 2),
which means that there would be no change to the total amount of resources C available for consumption
after any rebellion (C = C ′ = C‡). Dividing both sides of all the no-rebellion constraints above by this
common level of total output leads to the following set of no-rebellion constraints written in terms of ψ′p
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and ψ‡p:
ψw ≥
ψ′p
1 + δ pp′
; [A.7.26a]
ψw ≥ ψ
‡
p
1 + δ p
p‡
; [A.7.26b]
ψp ≥ ψ
‡
p
1 + δp−p
‡
p‡
. [A.7.26c]
The values of p‡, ψ‡p, and ψ‡w for any equilibrium allocation established at the post-investment are obtained
from (A.7.14):
p‡ =
1
2 + δ
, ψ‡p =
2 + δ
2
, and ψ‡w =
2 + δ
2(1 + δ)
. [A.7.27]
The values of p′, ψ′p, and ψ′w must satisfy independence of irrelevant history in equilibrium: p′ = p, ψ′p = ψp,
and ψ′w = ψw. There is also a size constraint on the incumbent group, namely 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, and it remains
to be confirmed that incumbents who would lose power in a rebellion are willing to belong to the loyal
faction, that is, ψp > ψ
′
w and ψp > ψ
‡
w.
It has already been established that one of (A.7.26a) or (A.7.26b) must be binding, that ψp < ψ
‡
p, and
that p > p‡ for any equilibrium allocation.
The pre-investment no-rebellion constraint for workers cannot be the only binding constraint
Suppose for contradiction that (A.7.26a) is the only binding no-rebellion constraint, where ψ′p and p′
are taken as given. Substituting the binding constraint (A.7.26a) into (A.7.25), the optimality condition
requires that p maximize ψp (with s taken as given):
ψp =
1− (1− p+ µθs) ψ′p
1+δ p
p′
p
. [A.7.28]
The first derivative with respect to p is:
∂ψp
∂p
=
1
p

1 + δ(1−p+µθs)p′
1 + δ pp′
 ψ′p
1 + δ pp′
−
1− (1− p+ µθs) ψ′p
1+δ p
p′
p
 , [A.7.29]
and the second derivative evaluated at a point where the first derivative is zero is:
∂2ψp
∂p2
∣∣∣∣ ∂ψp
∂p
=0
= − 2δ
pp′
1 + δ(1−p+µθs)p′
1 + δ pp′
 ψ′p(
1 + δ pp′
)2 .
This is unambiguously negative, which demonstrates that ψp is a quasi-concave function of p. Using
(A.7.29), the optimal value of p therefore satisfies (assuming 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2):
1− (1− p+ µθs) ψ′p
1+δ p
p′
p
=
ψ′p
1 + δ pp′
(
1 +
(1− p+ µθs) δp′
1 + δ pp′
)
.
The equilibrium conditions p′ = p and ψ′p = ψp must hold, so this equation reduces to:(
δ(1− p+ µθs)
(1 + δ)2p
+
1
1 + δ
− 1
)
ψp = 0,
and since ψp > 0, the equation further simplifies to:
δ(1− p+ µθs)
(1 + δ)p
= δ.
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After multiplying both sides by p > 0, this is a linear equation in p and can be solved as follows:
p =
1 + µθs
2 + δ
, and hence p− p‡ = µθs
2 + δ
, [A.7.30]
where the second equation uses the expression for p‡ in (A.7.14). Observe that p > p‡ for any s > 0. It is
assumed here that p ≤ 1/2; the case where the constraint p ≤ 1/2 might bind is considered later.
Using the equilibrium value of p in (A.7.30) and p = p′ and ψp = ψ′p, the implied equilibrium income
share ψp can be obtained from (A.7.28):
pψp = 1−
(
1− p+ (2 + δ)(p− p‡)
) ψp
1 + δ
,
which can be simplified by noting p‡ = 1/(2 + δ):
(1 + δ)pψp = (1 + δ)− (1 + δ)pψp.
The per-person income shares of incumbents and workers are therefore:
ψp =
1
2p
, and ψw =
1
2(1 + δ)p
, [A.7.31]
where the latter follows from the former together with the binding no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26a), which
implies ψw = ψp/(1 + δ) in equilibrium.
For this case to be an equilibrium it is necessary that the other no-rebellion constraints (A.7.26b) and
(A.7.26c) are satisfied. By using (A.7.31), the constraint (A.7.26b) requires:
1
2(1 + δ)p
≥ 1
2(δp+ p‡)
,
where the right-hand side follows from the expressions for p‡ and ψ‡p (see A.7.27) by noting p‡ψ‡p = 1/2.
Rearranging the inequality above reveals that it is equivalent to p‡ ≥ p. However, this is violated for any
s > 0 because that would imply p > p‡ according to (A.7.30).
Now consider the case where the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26a) binds in conjunction with the con-
straint p ≤ 1/2 on power sharing. Since ψp in (A.7.28) is quasi-concave in p, the constraint p ≤ 1/2 binds
when the p value where the first derivative of ψp is zero is found to the right of 1/2. Using (A.7.30), this
occurs when
1
2
< p‡ +
µθs
2 + δ
=
1 + µθs
2 + δ
, or equivalently µθs >
δ
2
. [A.7.32]
With p = p′ = 1/2, the expression for ψp in (A.7.28) can be used to deduce the following in equilibrium
(ψp = ψ
′
p):
ψp
2
= 1−
(
1− 1
2
+ µθs
)
ψp
1 + δ
,
and solving this linear equation in ψp and using ψw = ψp/(1 + δ) (when A.7.26a binds):
ψp =
1 + δ
1 + δ/2 + µθs
, and ψw =
1
1 + δ/2 + µθs
. [A.7.33]
With p = 1/2, p‡ = 1/(2 + δ), and p‡ψ‡p = 1/2, the post-investment no-rebellion constraint for workers
(A.7.26b) requires:
ψw ≥ 1
2(δ/2 + 1/(2 + δ))
=
1
δ + 1/(1 + δ/2)
. [A.7.34]
However, under the conditions shown in (A.7.32) when p ≤ 1/2 is binding, it follows from the expression
for ψw in (A.7.33) that:
ψw <
1
1 + δ
<
1
δ + 1/(1 + δ/2)
,
which contradicts (A.7.34), so the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26b) is violated when both (A.7.26a) and
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p ≤ 1/2 are binding. Hence, (A.7.26a) cannot be the only binding no-rebellion constraint, irrespective of
whether 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 is also binding or not.
The no-rebellion constraints for workers at the pre-investment stage and incumbents at the post-investment
stage cannot bind together
Suppose no-rebellion constraints (A.7.26a) and (A.7.26c) are both binding. In equilibrium, with p = p′ and
ψp = ψ
′
p, having (A.7.26a) bind requires:
ψw =
ψp
1 + δ
, [A.7.35]
and having (A.7.26c) bind requires:
ψp =
1
2(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) ,
which is obtained using p‡ψ‡p = 1/2. Using this equation to substitute for ψp in (A.7.35) yields an expression
for ψw:
ψw =
1
2(1 + δ)(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) .
The no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26b) must also be satisfied. Given the expression for ψw above, and noting
p‡ψ‡p = 1/2, this requires:
1
2(1 + δ)(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) ≥
1
2(δp+ p‡)
.
Rearranging this inequality shows that it is equivalent to δ2(p‡ − p) ≥ 0. However, since p > p‡ is known
to be required in any equilibrium with s > 0, the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26b) cannot hold. Therefore,
this configuration of binding no-rebelllion constraints is not possible in equilibrium.
The case where the no-rebellion constraint for workers at the post-investment stage is the only binding
constraint
Suppose that (A.7.26b) is the only binding no-rebellion constraint. The per-person worker share ψw is thus
given by:
ψw =
1
2(δp+ p‡)
, [A.7.36]
where this expression uses p‡ψ‡p = 1/2. Substituting the equation above into (A.7.25) yields an expression
for the per-person incumbent share ψp:
ψp =
1− (1−p+µθs)
2(δp+p‡)
p
, [A.7.37]
and the optimality condition for an equilibrium allocation requires that p maximizes ψp (given a value of
s). The first derivative of ψp with respect to p is:
∂ψp
∂p
=
1
p
(1 + δ(1− p+ µθs)
δp+ p‡
)
1
2(δp+ p‡)
−
1− (1−p+µθs)
2(δp+p‡)
p
 , [A.7.38]
which can be used to find the second derivative and to evaluate it at a point where the first derivative is
zero:
∂2ψp
∂p2
∣∣∣∣ ∂ψp
∂p
=0
= − δ
p(δp+ p‡)2
(
1 +
δ(1− p+ µθs)
δp+ p‡
)
.
This is unambiguously negative, demonstrating that ψp is a quasi-concave function of p (given s), so the
first-order condition is necessary and sufficient for a maximum. Setting the first derivative in (A.7.38) to
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zero and rearranging terms to have common denominators on both sides:
1
2(δp+ p‡)
(
δp+ p‡ + δ− δp+ δµθs
δp+ p‡
)
=
(1 + 2δ)p− (1− 2p‡)− µθs
2(δp+ p‡)p
.
Cancelling common terms, using 1− 2p‡ = δp‡, and simplifying leads to:
δ + p‡ + δµθs
δp+ p‡
=
((1 + 2δ)p− δp‡)− µθs
p
,
and therefore by multiplying both sides by p(δp+ p‡) and expanding the brackets:
(δ + p‡ + δµθs)p = δ(1 + 2δ)p2 + (1 + 2δ)p‡p− δ2p‡p− δp‡2 − (δp+ p‡)µθs.
Collecting terms in µθs on the left-hand side and simplifying:
(2δp+ p‡)µθs = δ(1 + 2δ)p2 + (1 + 2δ− δ2 − 1− δ(2 + δ))p‡p− δp‡2 = δ((1 + 2δ)p2 − 2δp‡p− p‡2),
where δp = δ(2 + δ)p‡p has been used. Note that the term on the right-hand side can be factorized:
(2δp+ p‡)µθs = δ(p− p‡)((1 + 2δ)p+ p‡),
and therefore the required relationship between s and p is given by:
s =
δ(p− p‡)
µθ
(
1 +
p
2δp+ p‡
)
. [A.7.39]
It can be seen that s > 0 is consistent with p > p‡. Under the parameter restrictions in (4.5), it will be
shown below that the constraint p ≤ 1/2 is satisfied for any 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
The next step is to derive an expression for the maximized per-person incumbent share ψp given the
optimal p and s relationship in (A.7.39). Taking a common denominator of the expression for ψp in (A.7.37):
ψp =
(1 + 2δ)p− (1− 2p‡)− µθs
2(δp+ p‡)p
=
((1 + 2δ)p− δp‡)− µθs
2(δp+ p‡)p
,
which uses 1− 2p‡ = δp‡. Substituting for µθs using (A.7.39):
ψp =
(1 + 2δ)p− (1− 2p‡)− µθs
2(δp+ p‡)p
=
((1 + 2δ)p− δp‡)− δ(p−p‡)((1+2δ)p+p‡)
2δp+p‡
2(δp+ p‡)p
,
and rearranging to have a common denominator again:
ψp =
((1 + 2δ)p− δp‡)(2δp+ p‡)− δ(p− p‡)((1 + 2δ)p+ p‡)
2(2δp+ p‡)(δp+ p‡)p
.
Multiplying out the brackets in the numerator leads to:
ψp =
2δ(1 + 2δ)p2 − 2δ2p‡p+ (1 + 2δ)p‡p− δp‡2 − δ((1 + 2δ)p2 − (1 + 2δ)p‡p+ p‡p− p‡2)
2(2δp+ p‡)(δp+ p‡)p
,
which can be simplified as follows:
ψp =
δ(1 + 2δ)p2 + (1 + 2δ)p‡p
2(2δp+ p‡)(δp+ p‡)p
=
(1 + 2δ)
(
δp+ p‡
)
p
2(2δp+ p‡)(δp+ p‡)p
.
Therefore, setting p to maximize ψp (given s) implies that:
ψp =
1 + 2δ
2(2δp+ p‡)
. [A.7.40]
The two other no-rebellion constraints must also be satisfied, namely (A.7.26a) for workers at the pre-
investment stage, and (A.7.26c) for incumbents at the post-investment stage. Taking the first of these, in
equilibrium with p′ = p and ψ′p = ψp, (A.7.26a) requires ψw ≥ ψp/(1 + δ), and by using the expressions for
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ψw and ψp in (A.7.36) and (A.7.40), this is equivalent to:
1
2(δp+ p‡)
≥ 1 + 2δ
2(1 + δ)(2δp+ p‡)
.
Rearranging the inequality above leads to 2δ(1 + δ)p+ (1 + δ)p‡ ≥ δ(1 + 2δ)p+ (1 + 2δ)p‡, which simplifies
to δ(p − p‡) ≥ 0. This is satisfied because p > p‡ when s > 0, so the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26a) is
therefore slack in this case. For the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26c), using p‡ψ‡p = 1/2 and the expression
for ψp in (A.7.40), the constraint requires:
1 + 2δ
2(2δp+ p‡)
≥ 1
2(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) .
Rearranging shows that this inequality is equivalent to δ(1 + 2δ)p + (1 + 2δ)(1 − δ)p‡ ≥ 2δp + p‡, which
simplifies to δ(2δ − 1)(p − p‡) ≥ 0. With δ > 0, this is in turn equivalent to (2δ − 1)(p − p‡) ≥ 0. Since
p > p† when s > 0, (A.7.26c) holds in this case if and only if δ ≥ 1/2.
Assuming δ ≥ 1/2, it must also be confirmed that incumbents would be willing to defend the allocation
against a rebellion that would result in them losing power. At the pre-investment stage, in equilibrium with
ψ′w = ψw this requires ψp > ψw. Since it has been shown the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26c) is satisfied
when δ ≥ 1/2, observe that by using the expression for ψw in (A.7.36):
ψp ≥ 1
2(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) >
1
2(δp+ p‡)
= ψw,
where the middle inequality follows from δp + (1 − δ)p‡ < δp + p‡. This confirms ψp > ψ′w at the pre-
investment stage. At the post-investment stage, the requirement is ψp > ψ
‡
w, and by using the expression
for ψp in (A.7.40) and ψ
‡
w = (2 + δ)/(2 + 2δ) from (A.7.27), this is equivalent to:
1 + 2δ
2(2δp+ p‡)
>
2 + δ
2(1 + δ)
.
Using (2 + δ)p‡ = 1 and rearranging this inequality leads to 1 + 3δ+ 2δ2 > 2δ(2 + δ)p+ 1, which simplifies
to p < (3 + 2δ)/(4 + 2δ). The right-hand side of the inequality is increasing in δ, so with δ ≥ 1/2, it is
sufficient to verify it for the case of δ = 1/2. The requirement is p < 4/5, which is necessarily satisfied
because p ≤ 1/2, hence ψp > ψ‡w is confirmed.
In summary, in the case δ ≥ 1/2, all constraints are satisfied when only the no-rebellion constraint
(A.7.26b) binds. But if δ < 1/2, this configuration of binding constraint is not an equilibrium.
The case where both no-rebellion constraints at the post-investment stage are binding
Now suppose that both no-rebellion constraints (A.7.26b) and (A.7.26c) at the post-investment stage are
binding. This means that the per-person worker and incumbent shares are:
ψw =
1
2(δp+ p‡)
, and ψp =
1
2(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) . [A.7.41]
Using these to substitute for ψw and ψp in equation (A.7.25) leads to:
1
2(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) =
1− 1−p+µθs
2(δp+p‡)
p
,
and multiplying both sides by p and simplifying:
p
2(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) = 1−
1− p+ µθs
2(δp+ p‡)
=
(1 + 2δ)p− (1− 2p‡)− µθs
2(δp+ p‡)
=
((1 + 2δ)p− δp‡)− µθs
2(δp+ p‡)
.
This equation can be rearranged to yield an expression for µθs in terms of p:
µθs = ((1 + 2δ)p− δp‡)− (δp+ p
‡)p
δp+ (1− δ)p‡ =
((1 + 2δ)p− δp‡)(δp+ (1− δ)p‡)− (δp+ p‡)p
δp+ (1− δ)p‡ ,
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and expanding the brackets in the numerator leads to:
µθs =
δ(1 + 2δ)p2 − δ2p‡p+ (1− δ)(1 + 2δ)p‡p− δ(1− δ)p‡2 − δp2 − p‡p
δp+ (1− δ)p‡ .
This expression can be simplified as follows:
µθs =
δ
(
2δp2 + (1− 3δ)p‡p− (1− δ)p‡2
)
δp+ (1− δ)p‡ ,
and note that the numerator can be factorized, hence:
µθs =
δ(p− p‡)(2δp+ (1− δ)p‡)
δp+ (1− δ)p‡ .
Therefore, the relationship between s and p in this case is given by the equation:
s =
δ(p− p‡)
µθ
(
1 +
δp
δp+ (1− δ)p‡
)
. [A.7.42]
It can be seen that s > 0 is consistent with p > p‡. Under the parameter restrictions in (4.5) it will be
shown below that the constraint p ≤ 1/2 is satisfied for any 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
The remaining no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26a) for workers at the pre-investment stage must also hold.
In equilibrium with p′ = p and ψ′p = ψp, this requires ψw ≥ ψp/(1 + δ). Using the expressions for ψp and
ψw in (A.7.41), this condition is equivalent to:
1
2(δp+ p‡)
≥ 1
2(1 + δ)(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) .
Rearranging this inequality leads to δ(1+δ)p+(1+δ)(1−δ)p‡ ≥ δp+p‡, which simplifies to δ2(p−p‡) ≥ 0.
Given that p > p‡ whenever s > 0, it is confirmed that the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26a) holds in this
case.
It is known that when δ ≥ 1/2, the choice of p that maximizes ψp subject only to the no-rebellion
constraint (A.7.26b) for workers at the post-investment also satisfies all other constraints. Therefore, both
no-rebellion constraints (A.7.26b) and (A.7.26c) can only bind when δ ≤ 1/2.
Assuming δ ≤ 1/2, it must also be confirmed that incumbents are willing to defend the allocation against
a rebellion that would see them lose power subsequently. At the pre-investment stage, in equilibrium with
ψ′w = ψw, this requires ψp > ψw. Using the expressions for ψw and ψp in (A.7.41), since δp + (1 − δ)p‡ <
δp+ p‡, it immediately follows that:
ψp =
1
2(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) >
1
2(δp+ p‡)
= ψw.
At the post-investment stage, the requirement is ψp > ψ
‡
w, and by using the expression for ψp from (A.7.41)
and ψ‡w = (2 + δ)/(2 + 2δ) from (A.7.27), this is equivalent to:
1
2(δp+ (1− δ)p‡) >
2 + δ
2(1 + δ)
.
Using (2 + δ)p‡ = 1, and rearranging this inequality leads to 1 + δ > δ(2 + δ)p + (1− δ), which simplifies
to p < 2/(2 + δ). The right-hand side of the inequality is decreasing in δ, and since δ ≤ 1/2 in this case, it
suffices to verify this for δ = 1/2. The requirement is p < 4/5, which is necessarily satisfied since p ≤ 1/2,
hence ψp > ψ
‡
w is confirmed.
In summary, when δ ≤ 1/2, all constraints are satisfied in this case and the minimum number of
constraints is binding.
Power sharing and the rule of law
For any value of δ, it has been shown that the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26b) for workers at the post-
investment stage is always binding. When δ < 1/2, the no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26c) for incumbents at
the post-investment stage is also binding. All other no-rebellion constraints are redundant or slack.
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In both cases δ < 1/2 and δ ≥ 1/2, an equilibrium allocation must feature a relationship s = λ(p)
between power sharing p and the reach of the rule of law s given respectively by (A.7.42) or (A.7.39).
These equations confirm the functional form of λ(p) given in the proposition (see 4.7) with the definition
p† ≡ 1/(2 + δ) = p‡. Note that in either case, s = 0 corresponds to p = p†.
Taking the function λ(p) in the case where δ ≤ 1/2 (equation A.7.42):
λ(p) =
δ(p− p†)
µθ
(
1 +
δp
δp+ (1− δ)p†
)
. [A.7.43]
The first derivative is
λ′(p) =
δ
µθ
(
1 +
δp
δp+ (1− δ)p† +
δ(p− p†)
δp+ (1− δ)p† −
δ2(p− p†)p
(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2
)
=
δ
(
(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2 + δp(δp+ (1− δ)p†) + δ(p− p†)(δp+ (1− δp†)− δ2(p− p†)p)
µθ(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2
=
δ
(
2δ2p2 + (4δ− 4δ2)p†p+ (1− 3δ+ 2δ2)p†2
)
µθ(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2 =
δ
(
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
)
µθ(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2 .
[A.7.44]
Since δ ≤ 1/2 in this case, the terms (1− δ) and (1− 2δ) are non-negative, so the first derivative is strictly
positive, confirming that λ(p) is an increasing function.
With λ(p) being an increasing function, the constraint p ≤ 1/2 can be verified for all s ∈ [0, 1] by
checking whether λ(1/2) ≥ 1. Using (A.7.43) and p† = 1/(2 + δ), this requires:
1 ≤
δ
(
1
2 − 12+δ
)
µθ
1 + δ2
δ
2 +
(1−δ)
(2+δ)
 ,
which is equivalent to:
µθ ≤ δ((2 + δ)− 2)
2(2 + δ)
(
1 +
δ(2 + δ)
δ(2 + δ) + 2(1− δ)
)
=
δ2(2 + 2δ + 2δ2)
2(2 + δ)(2 + δ2)
=
δ
2(2 + δ)
2δ(1 + δ + δ2)
2 + δ2
.
It is clear that the parameter restrictions on µ and θ in (4.5) are sufficient for this to hold, confirming
that p ≤ 1/2 is never binding. Let p¯ denote the value of p associated with s = 1 (the rule of law). Using
(A.7.43), p¯ is the solution (with p¯ > p†) of the equation:
δ(p¯− p†)
µθ
(
1 +
δp¯
δp¯+ (1− δ)p†
)
= 1, [A.7.45]
which is equivalent to:
δ(p¯− p†)(2δp+ (1− δ)p†) = µθ(δp¯+ (1− δ)p†).
Using p† = 1/(2 +δ) and multiplying both sides of the equation by (2 +δ)2 leads to the following quadratic
in p¯:
2δ2(2 + δ)2p¯2 − δ(2 + δ)(3δ− 1 + (2 + δ)µθ)p¯− (1− δ)(δ+ (2 + δ)µθ) = 0.
Since 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 in this case, the quadratic has only one positive root, hence the solution for p¯ is:
p¯ =
3δ− 1 + (2 + δ)µθ +√(3δ− 1 + (2 + δ)µθ)2 + 8(1− δ)(δ + (2 + δ)µθ)
4δ(2 + δ)
,
which confirms the expression for p¯ given in the proposition.
Now consider the case with δ ≥ 1/2. The relevant expression for λ(p) in this case is from (A.7.39):
λ(p) =
δ(p− p†)
µθ
(
1 +
p
2δp+ p†
)
, [A.7.46]
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which has first derivative:
λ′(p) =
δ
µθ
(
1 +
p
2δp+ p†
+
p− p†
2δp+ p†
− 2δ(p− p
†)p
(2δp+ p†)2
)
=
δ
(
(2δp+ p†)2 + p(2δp+ p†) + (p− p†)(2δp+ p†)− 2δ(p− p†)p)
µθ(2δp+ p†)2
=
δ
(
(2δ+ 4δ2)p2 + (2 + 4δ)p†p
)
µθ(2δp+ p†)2
=
2δ(1 + 2δ)(δp+ p†)p
µθ(2δp+ p†)2
. [A.7.47]
This is positive, confirming that λ(p) is an increasing function.
With λ(p) being increasing in p, the constraint p ≤ 1/2 can be verified for all s ∈ [0, 1] by checking
whether λ(1/2) ≥ 1. Using (A.7.46) and p† = 1/(2 + δ), this requires:
1 ≤
δ
(
1
2 − 12+δ
)
µθ
(
1 +
1
2
2δ
2 +
1
2+δ
)
,
which is equivalent to:
µθ ≤ δ((2 + δ)− 2)
2(2 + δ)
(
1 +
2 + δ
2δ(2 + δ) + 2
)
=
δ2(4 + 5δ+ 2δ2)
4(2 + δ)(1 + 2δ+ δ2)
=
δ
2(2 + δ)
δ(4 + 5δ+ 2δ2)
2(1 + δ)2
.
It is clear that the parameter restrictions in (4.5) are sufficient for this to hold, confirming that p ≤ 1/2 is
never binding. Let p¯ denote the value of p associated with s = 1 (the rule of law). Using (A.7.46), p¯ is the
solution (with p¯ > p†) of the equation:
δ(p¯− p†)
µθ
(
1 +
p¯
2δp¯+ p†
)
, [A.7.48]
which is equivalent to:
δ(p¯− p†)((1 + 2δ)p¯+ p†) = µθ(2δp¯+ p†).
Using p† = 1/(2 +δ) and multiplying both sides of the equation by (2 +δ)2 leads to the following quadratic
in p¯:
δ(1 + 2δ)(2 + δ)2p¯2 − 2δ(2 + δ)(δ + (2 + δ)µθ)− (δ + (2 + δ)µθ) = 0.
This quadratic equation has one positive root, so p¯ is given by:
p¯ =
δ(δ + (2 + δ)µθ) +
√
(δ(δ + (2 + δ)µθ))2 + δ(1 + 2δ)(δ + (2 + δ)µθ)
δ(1 + 2δ)(2 + δ)
,
which confirms the expression for p¯ given in the proposition. All claims in part (iv) have now been
demonstrated.
The income distribution
The no-rebellion constraint (A.7.26b) is binding for all parameter values, which confirms the formula given
in (4.8). In the case 0 < δ ≤ 1/2, both post-investment no-rebellion constraints are binding and the per-
person incumbent share is given in (A.7.41). In the case δ ≥ 1/2, only the post-investment no-rebellion
constraint for workers is binding, and the optimal choice of p subject to this constraint implies the incumbent
share specified in (A.7.40). These two cases confirm the formula given in (4.8), and as both ψp(p) and ψw(p)
are strictly decreasing in p, all the claims in part (v) are demonstrated.
The impact of the rule of law on incumbents’ payoff
Consider a particular value of s consistent with (4.3). For an allocation with s to be an equilibrium, power
sharing p must be p = λ−1(s) and the incumbent share must be ψp(λ−1(s)). With Up = logCp (from A.7.8),
maximizing the incumbent payoff is equivalent to maximizing incumbent consumption Cp with respect to
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s. After taking account of the constraints, this means s must maximize the following function:
Cp(s) = ψp(λ
−1(s))C,
where C is given in (2.9). Using ∂C/∂s = µp˜i/p˜iα, the first derivative is:
C ′p(s) =
µp˜iψp(λ
−1(s))
p˜iα
+
ψ′p(λ−1(s))C
λ′(λ−1(s))
.
Using C = Y/p˜iα (from 2.9) and Y = Yw/ψw(λ
−1(s)) (from 4.8), the derivative above can be written as:
C ′p(s) =
µψp(λ
−1(s))
p˜iα
(
p˜i −
(
−ψ′p(λ−1(s))
µθλ′(λ−1(s))ψw(λ−1(s))ψp(λ−1(s))
)
θYw
)
,
which is equivalent to:
C ′p(s) =
µψp(p)
p˜iα
(p˜i − (1 + χ(p))θYw) , where χ(p) =
( −ψ′p(p)
µθλ′(p)ψw(p)ψp(p)
)
− 1. [A.7.49]
Thus, there exists a function χ(p) such that the expression for C ′p(s) given in (4.9) is valid.
Consider first the case where δ < 1/2. Differentiating the expression for ψp(p) given in (4.8) shows
that:
−ψ′p(p) = 2δψp(p)2,
and substituting this into the definition of χ(p) from (A.7.49):
χ(p) =
2δψp(p)
µθλ′(p)ψw(p)
− 1.
Using the formulas for ψw(p) and ψp(p) from (4.8) and the expression for λ
′(p) from equation (A.7.44):
χ(p) =
2δ
2(δp+(1−δ)p†)
δ(2δ2p2+4δ(1−δ)p†p+(1−δ)(1−2δ)p†2)
2(δp+p†)(δp+(1−δ)p†)2
− 1 = 2(δp+ p
†)(δp+ (1− δ)p†)
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
− 1.
By expanding the brackets in the numerator and taking a common denominator, the following expression
for χ(p) is obtained:
χ(p) =
2δ2p2 + 2δ(2− δ)p†p+ 2(1− δ)p†2 − 2δ2p2 − 4δ(1− δ)p†p− (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
=
2δ2p†p+ (1− δ)(1 + 2δ)p†2
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
=
p†
(
2δ2p+ (1− δ)(1 + 2δ)p†)
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
.
Since δ < 1/2, the terms 1− δ and 1− 2δ are strictly positive, hence the equation above confirms that χ(p)
is strictly positive. Differentiating χ(p) with respect to p and simplifying:
χ′(p) =
2δ2(2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2)− 4δ(δp+ (1− δ)p†)(2δ2p+ (1− δ)(1 + 2δ)p†)
p†−1
(
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
)2
=
−2δ
(
2(2δ3p2 + (1− δ)(δ + 4δ2)p†p+ (1− δ)(1 + 2δ)p†2)− 2δ3p2 − δ(1− δ)(4p†p+ (1− 2δ)p†2)
)
p†−1
(
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
)2
=
−2δp†
(
2δ3p2 + 2δ(1− δ)(1 + 2δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(2(1− δ)(1 + 2δ)− δ(1− 2δ))p†2
)
(
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
)2
= −
2δp†
(
2δ3p2 + 2δ(1− δ)(1 + 2δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(2 + δ(1− 2δ))p†2
)
(
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
)2 ,
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which is unambiguously negative because δ < 1/2 implies the terms 1− δ and 1− 2δ are strictly positive.
Hence, χ(p) is strictly positive and strictly decreasing when δ < 1/2.
Now consider the case where δ ≥ 1/2. Differentiating the expression for ψp(p) from (4.8) shows that:
−ψ′p(p) =
4δ
1 + 2δ
ψp(p)
2,
and substituting this into the definition of χ(p) from (A.7.49):
χ(p) =
4δψp(p)
µθ(1 + 2δ)λ′(p)ψw(p)
− 1.
Using the formulas for ψw(p) and ψp(p) from (4.8) and the expression for λ
′(p) from equation (A.7.47):
χ(p) =
4δ(1+2δ)
2(2δp+p†)
(1+2δ)2δ(1+2δ)(δp+p†)p
2(δp+p†)(2δp+p†)2
− 1 = 2(2δp+ p
†)
(1 + 2δ)p
− 1.
By taking a common denominator, χ(p) can be written as follows:
χ(p) =
4δp+ 2p† − p− 2δp
(1 + 2δ)p
=
(2δ− 1)p+ 2p†
(1 + 2δ)p
=
(2δ− 1) + 2p†p
1 + 2δ
.
It can be seen immediately that χ(p) is strictly positive and strictly decreasing when δ ≥ 1/2, which ensures
the term 2δ − 1 is strictly positive. Therefore, it has been established that χ(p) > 0 and χ′(p) < 0 for all
values of δ, which are the properties claimed in the proposition. This completes the proof.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
(i) The income distribution results from Proposition 7 imply that Yp = ψp(p)Y , where p is power sharing
(see 4.8). That proposition also links power sharing p to the quality of government s according to s = λ(p).
Since λ(p) is a strictly increasing function and takes on all values between 0 and 1 for feasible values of p
(0 < p ≤ 1/2) it has a well-defined inverse p = λ−1(s). Substituting this into the equation for Yp:
Yp = ψp(λ
−1(s))Y,
which has exactly the same form as (2.11) with the function φ(s) being as given in (4.11). The first
derivative of the function φ(s) is:
φ′(s) =
ψ′p(λ−1(s))
λ′(λ−1(s))
, [A.8.1]
which is strictly negative because ψ′p(p) < 0 and λ′(p) > 0 according to Proposition 7. This confirms that
the equilibrium allocation features an equivalent of the political friction (2.11) for some strictly decreasing
function φ(s).
Using the definition of the marginal cost of good government γ(s) from (2.13) and substituting from
(A.8.1):
γ(s) =
− ψ′p(λ−1(s))
ψp(λ−1(s))2
λ′(λ−1(s))
. [A.8.2]
In the case where δ < 1/2, Proposition 7 shows that the function ψp(p) is given by:
ψp(p) =
1
2(δp+ (1− δ)p†) , [A.8.3]
which has the following derivative with respect to p:
ψ′p(p) = −
δ
2(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2 = −2δψp(p)
2. [A.8.4]
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In the case where δ ≥ 1/2, Proposition 7 shows that the function ψp(p) is given by:
ψp(p) =
1 + 2δ
2(2δp+ p†)
, [A.8.5]
which has the following derivative with respect to p:
ψ′p(p) = −
δ(1 + 2δ)
(2δp+ p†)2
= − 4δ
1 + 2δ
ψp(p)
2. [A.8.6]
Since min{1, 2/(1+2δ)} equals 1 when δ < 1/2 and 2/(1+2δ) when δ ≥ 1/2, equations (A.8.4) and (A.8.6)
together show that:
− ψ
′
p(p)
ψp(p)2
= 2δmin
{
1,
2
1 + 2δ
}
. [A.8.7]
Substituting this into (A.8.2) confirms the expression for γ(s) given in (4.12).
It is shown in the proof of Proposition 2 (see A.2.3) that Φ = (φ(0) − φ(1))/φ(1). Using (4.11)
and the results of Proposition 7, φ(0) = ψp(λ
−1(0)) = ψp(p†) and φ(1) = ψp(λ−1(1)) = ψp(p¯), hence
Φ = (ψp(p
†) − ψp(p¯))/ψp(p¯). Using the expression for ψp(p) from (4.8), observe that ψp(p†) = (2 + δ)/2.
Take the case of δ < 1/2:
ψp(p
†)− ψp(p¯)
ψp(p¯)
=
2+δ
2
1
2(δp¯+(1−δ)p†)
− 1 = (2 + δ)(δp¯+ (1− δ)p†)− (2 + δ)p† = δ(2 + δ)(p¯− p†), [A.8.8a]
which uses p† = 1/(2 + δ) (see 4.7), and in the case of δ ≥ 1/2:
ψp(p
†)− ψp(p¯)
ψp(p¯)
=
2+δ
2
1+2δ
2(2δp¯+p†)
− 1 = (2 + δ)(2δp¯+ p
†)− (1 + 2δ)(2 + δ)p†
1 + 2δ
=
2δ(2 + δ)
1 + 2δ
(p¯− p†). [A.8.8b]
Since min{1, 2/(1 + 2δ)} equals 1 when δ < 1/2 and 2/(1 + 2δ) when δ ≥ 1/2, it follows from (A.8.8a) and
(A.8.8b) that a general formula for (ψp(p
†)− ψp(p¯))/ψp(p¯) valid for all parameter values is:
ψp(p
†)− ψp(p¯)
ψp(p¯)
= δ(2 + δ) min
{
1,
2
1 + 2δ
}
(p¯− p†). [A.8.9]
As this is equal to Φ, the claims in (4.12) are confirmed.
(ii) Differentiating the expression for the marginal cost of good government γ(s) in (4.12):
γ′(s) =
2δmin
{
1, 21+2δ
}
λ′′(λ−1(s))
(λ′(λ−1(s)))3
.
It is known that λ(p) is a strictly increasing function (Proposition 7), hence (2.14) is satisfied (γ′(s) < 0)
if and only if λ′′(p) > 0.
To demonstrate strict convexity of the function λ(p), first consider the case δ < 1/2. By using (A.7.44)
and (δp+ (1−δ)p†)2 = δ2p2 + 2δ(1−δ)p†p+ (1−δ)2p†2, the first derivative λ′(p) can be written as follows:
λ′(p) =
δ
(
2(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2 − 2(1− δ)2p†2 + (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
)
µθ(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2
=
δ
(
2(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2 − (1− δ)p†2
)
µθ(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2 =
δ
µθ
(
2− (1− δ)p
†2
(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2
)
.
The second derivative of λ(p) is thus:
λ′′(p) =
2δ2(1− δ)p†2
µθ(δp+ (1− δ)p†)2 ,
which is always positive, confirming that λ(p) is a convex function in this case. Now consider δ ≥ 1/2.
Note that (2δp + p†)2 = 4δ(δp + p†)p + p†2 and hence 2δ(δp + p†) = (2δp + p†)2/2 − p†2/2. Substituting
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this into (A.7.47) shows that λ′(p) can be written as follows:
λ′(p) =
(1 + 2δ)
(
(2δp+ p†)2 − p†2
)
2µθ(2δp+ p†)2
=
1 + 2δ
2µθ
(
1− p
†2
(2δp+ p†)2
)
.
The second derivative of λ(p) is thus:
λ′′(p) =
2δ(1 + 2δ)p†2
µθ(2δp+ p†)3
,
which is always positive. This confirms the claim that λ(p) is a convex function in all cases, and thus that
γ(s) is strictly decreasing.
Proposition 7 demonstrates that incumbents and workers receive consumption Cp = ψp(p)C and Cw =
ψw(p)C, and that the incentive compatibility constraint for investors must bind, hence Ck = (1 + θ)Cw.
It is shown in the proof of Proposition 7 (see A.7.25) that substituting these consumption levels into the
resource constraint implies:
pψp(p) + (1− p+ µθs)ψw(p) = 1. [A.8.10]
With Cp = ψp(p)C and Cw = ψw(p)C, rents β = (Cp − Cw)/Cw as a function of power sharing p are
β(p) = (ψp(p)− ψw(p))/ψw(p). It follows that ψp(p) = (1 + β(p))ψw(p), which can be substituted into the
resource constraint above to obtain:
p(1 + β(p))ψw(p) + (1− p+ µθs)ψw(p) = 1.
Substituting the relationship s = λ(p), dividing both sides by ψw(p) and using the formula for ψw(p) from
(4.8):
p(1 + β(p)) + 1− p+ µθλ(p) = 2(δp+ p†).
This equation can be rearranged to give the following expression for λ(p):
λ(p) =
2(δp+ p†)− 1−B(p)
µθ
, with B(p) = pβ(p),
where B(p) denotes total rents received by all individuals in power. This shows that a formula for the
second derivative of λ(p) is:
λ′′(p) = −B
′′(p)
µθ
,
and thus the curvature of the function λ(p) depends only on the behaviour of rents β(p) through the total
rents function B(p) = pβ(p). The convexity of λ(p) is therefore explained by the concavity of total rents
B(p). Since B′′(p) = 2β′(p) + pβ′′(p), the concavity of B(p) comes either from rents β(p) being decreasing
in power sharing p, or having a sufficiently declining rate of increase.
In the case of δ < 1/2, an expression for rents β(p) can be obtained from (4.8):
β(p) =
δp+ p†
δp+ (1− δ)p† − 1 =
δp†
δp+ (1− δ)p† ,
which is positive and decreasing in p. In the case of δ ≥ 1/2, the equations in (4.8) imply that rents β(p)
are:
β(p) =
(1 + 2δ)(δp+ p†)
2δp+ p†
− 1 = δ(1 + 2δ)p+ (1 + 2δ)p
† − 2δp− p†
2δp+ p†
=
δ(2δ− 1)p+ 2δp†
2δp+ p†
.
The derivative with respect to p is:
β′(p) =
δ(2δ− 1)(2δp+ p†)− 2δ(δ(2δ− 1)p+ 2δp†)
(2δp+ p†)2
= −−δ(1 + 2δ)p
†
(2δp+ p†)2
,
which is negative, showing that rents β(p) are decreasing in p in this case too.
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(iii) Start by defining a function B(s):
B(s) = α− sγ(s)φ(s), [A.8.11]
where ψ(s) and γ(s) are as given in (4.11) and (4.12). Using the formulas in the equations for φ(s) and
γ(s), the function B(s) can be written as:
B(s) = α− 2δmin
{
1,
2
1 + 2δ
}
λ(λ−1(s))ψp(λ−1(s))
λ′(λ−1(s))
,
noting that s = λ(λ−1(s)). Since s only appears in the above through p = λ−1(s), the expression for B(s)
can be stated in terms of a function M(p) of p:
B(s) =M(λ−1(s)), where M(p) = α− 2δmin
{
1,
2
1 + 2δ
}
λ(p)ψp(p)
λ′(p)
. [A.8.12]
First take the case where δ < 1/2. Using the expression for λ′(p) from equation (A.7.44) of the proof
of Proposition 7 and the expression for ψp(p) from (4.8):
λ′(p)
ψp(p)
=
2δ
(
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
)
µθ(δp+ (1− δ)p†) . [A.8.13]
The formula for λ(p) from (4.7) in the case δ ≤ 1/2 is
λ(p) =
δ(p− p†)
µθ
(
2δp+ (1− δ)p†
δp+ (1− δ)p†
)
,
which can be used together with (A.8.13) to deduce the following:
2δmin
{
1,
2
1 + 2δ
}
λ(p)ψp(p)
λ′(p)
=
δ(p− p†)(2δp+ (1− δ)p†)
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
. [A.8.14]
When δ ≥ 1/2, the relevant expression for λ′(p) is given in equation (A.7.47) of the proof of Proposition 7.
Combined with (4.8), this implies:
λ′(p)
ψp(p)
=
4δ(δp+ p†)
µθ(2δp+ p†)
. [A.8.15]
The function λ(p) in the case δ ≥ 1/2 is given in (4.7):
λ(p) =
δ(p− p†)
µθ
(
(1 + 2δ)p+ p†
2δp+ p†
)
,
which together with (A.8.15) can be used to deduce the following:
2δmin
{
1,
2
1 + 2δ
}
λ(p)ψp(p)
λ′(p)
=
δ(p− p†)((1 + 2δ)p+ p†)
(1 + 2δ)(δp+ p†)p
. [A.8.16]
Substituting equations (A.8.14) and (A.8.16) respectively for the cases of δ ≤ 1/2 and δ ≥ 1/2 into (A.8.12)
leads to:
M(p) = α− 2δ
2p2 + δ(1− 3δ)p†p− δ(1− δ)p†2
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
=
2δ2(α− 1)p2 + δ(3δ− 1 + 4(1− δ)α)p†p+ (1− δ)(δ + (1− 2δ)α)p†2
2δ2p2 + 4δ(1− δ)p†p+ (1− δ)(1− 2δ)p†2
, [A.8.17a]
for the case δ < 1/2, and for δ ≥ 1/2:
M(p) = α− δ(1 + 2δ)p
2 − 2δ2p†p− δp†2
δ(1 + 2δ)p2 + (1 + 2δ)p†p
=
δ(1 + 2δ)(α− 1)p2 + (2δ2 + (1 + 2δ)α)p†p+ δp†2
(1 + 2δ)(δp+ p†)p
. [A.8.17b]
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Now define the following quadratic function of p:
Q(p) ≡
{
2δ2(2 + δ)2(1− α)p2 − δ(2 + δ)(3δ− 1 + 4(1− δ)α)p− (1− δ)(δ + (1− 2δ)α) for δ < 1/2
δ(1 + 2δ)(2 + δ)2(1− α)p2 − (2 + δ)(2δ2 + (1 + 2δ)α)p− δ for δ ≥ 1/2 ,
[A.8.18]
noting that it is equal to the negative of the numerator of the expressions for M(p) in (A.8.17). The
denominator of the expressions for M(p) in (A.8.17) is seen to be strictly positive. Since p¯ = λ−1(1),
it follows from these observation and (A.8.12) that B(1) < 0 is equivalent to Q(p¯) > 0. With B(1) =
α− γ(1)φ(1) (equation A.8.11), the condition (2.16) for the political frictions to be binding is B(1) < 0.
In the case δ ≤ 1/2, it is shown in the proof of Proposition 7 that p¯ satisfies the quadratic equation
(A.7.45), and hence:
2δ2(2 + δ)2p¯2 = δ(2 + δ)(3δ− 1 + (2 + δ)µθ)p¯+ (1− δ)(δ + (2 + δ)µθ).
Evaluating the quadratic Q(p) in (A.8.18) at p = p¯ and using the equation above to deduce:
Q(p¯) = (1− α) (δ(2 + δ)(3δ− 1 + (2 + δ)µθ)p¯+ (1− δ)(δ + (2 + δ)µθ))
− δ(2 + δ)(3δ− 1 + 4(1− δ)α)p¯− (1− δ)(δ+ (1− 2δ)α)
= (1 − α)µθ(2 + δ)(1 − δ + δ(2 + δ)p¯) − α((1 − δ)2 + δ(2 + δ)(3 − δ)),
from which it follows that Q(p¯) > 0 is equivalent to:
α
1− α <
µθ(2 + δ)(1− δ + δ(2 + δ)p¯)
(1− δ)2 + δ(2 + δ)(3− δ)p¯ .
This inequality can be stated as α < α¯, where α¯ is given by:
α¯ =
(
1 +
(1− δ)2 + δ(2 + δ)(3− δ)p¯
µθ(2 + δ)(1− δ + δ(2 + δ)p¯)
)−1
, [A.8.19a]
where this number lies strictly between 0 and 1. Similarly, in the case δ ≥ 1/2, the proof of Proposition 7
shows that p¯ satisfies the quadratic equation (A.7.48), and hence:
δ(1 + 2δ)(2 + δ)2p¯2 = 2δ(2 + δ)(δ + (2 + δ)µθ)p¯+ (δ+ (2 + δ)µθ).
Evaluating the quadratic Q(p) in (A.8.18) at p = p¯ and using the equation above to deduce:
Q(p¯) = (1− α) (2δ(2 + δ)(δ+ (2 + δ)µθ)p¯+ (δ + (2 + δ)µθ))− (2 + δ)(2δ2 + (1 + 2δ)α)p¯− δ
= (1 − α)µθ(2 + δ)(1 + 2δ(2 + δ)p¯) − α(δ + (2 + δ)(1 + 2δ + 2δ2)p¯),
from which it follows that Q(p¯) > 0 is equivalent to:
α
1− α <
µθ(2 + δ)(1 + 2δ(2 + δ)p¯)
δ+ (2 + δ)(1 + 2δ + 2δ2)p¯
.
This inequality can be stated as α < α¯, where α¯ is given by:
α¯ =
(
1 +
δ + (2 + δ)(1 + 2δ+ 2δ2)p¯
µθ(2 + δ)(1 + 2δ(2 + δ)p¯)
)−1
, [A.8.19b]
where this number lies strictly between 0 and 1. This confirms that the political friction is binding (2.16
holds) when α < α¯, and the expression given for α¯ is confirmed by using (A.8.19a) and (A.8.19b).
(iv) Since (2.11) holds for φ(s) = ψp(λ
−1(s)), the formula derived in (A.1.2) from the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 is valid. Using the definition of the function B(s) from (A.8.11), this means that the derivative of
the incumbent payoff Cp(s) with respect to s is:
C ′p(s) =
φ(s)C
s
B(s). [A.8.20]
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The formula (2.17) for real GDP under autarky implies:
C
s
=
q1−αµα
(1− α)1−αααs1−α ,
which is strictly positive for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Since φ(s) is also strictly positive for all valid s values, it follows
from (A.8.20) that:
C ′′p(s) =
φ(s)C
s
B′(s), if C ′p(s) = 0. [A.8.21]
Confirming Cp(s) is a strictly quasi-concave function of s requires showing that C
′′
p(s) < 0 where C
′
p(s) = 0.
Given that φ(s)C/s is always strictly positive for s ∈ [0, 1], (A.8.20) and (A.8.21) demonstrate that this is
equivalent to showing B′(s) < 0 where B(s) = 0.
Using the link between B(s) and M(p) in (A.8.12), the derivative of B(s) is:
B′(s) = M
′(λ−1(s))
λ′(λ−1(s))
,
and thus B′(s) < 0 where B(s) = 0 is equivalent to M′(p) < 0 where M(p) = 0. The latter needs to be
verified for p in the range between p† and p¯ given that p† = λ−1(0) and p¯ = λ−1(1). Using (A.8.17), the
function M(p) can be expressed as the negative of a quadratic function Q(p) from (A.8.18) divided by a
strictly positive and finite function of p. This means thatM′(p) < 0 whereM(p) = 0 is in turn equivalent
to Q′(p) > 0 where Q(p) = 0, considering values of p between p† and p¯.
Inspection of equation (A.8.18) confirms that Q(0) < 0 and Q′′(p) > 0 for all parameter values, so it
follows that the quadratic equation Q(p) = 0 has one positive and one negative root. The function Q(p)
is negative for p values between 0 and the positive root, and positive for p values above the positive root,
which means that the derivative Q′(p) is positive at the positive root. Since either the positive root lies
between p† and p¯, or there is no root in this range, it follows that Q′(p) > 0 where Q(p) = 0 for p ∈ [p†, p¯].
This confirms that Cp(s) is a strictly quasi-concave function of s, completing the proof.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 9
Given that the incentive constraint (4.2) is binding (Proposition 7), workers and investors have the same
level of utility Uw = logCw = logCk − log(1 + θ).
(i) For open economies, real GDP is larger with s = 1 than s = 0 (Proposition 3), that is, C¯ > C†.
Using (4.8), the consumption of workers is Cw = ψw(p)C. Since ψw(p) is strictly decreasing in p and p¯ > p
†
(Proposition 7), it follows that ψw(p¯) > ψw(p
†). Putting these observations together implies C¯w > C
†
w, and
hence both workers and investors are strictly better off in open economies with s = 1 rather than s = 0.
(ii) For open economies with s = 1, real GDP is higher than under autarky (Proposition 2), that is,
C¯ > Cˆ. Since ψw(p) is strictly decreasing in p and p¯ > pˆ (Proposition 7), it follows that ψw(p¯) > ψw(pˆ).
Putting these observations together implies C¯w > Cˆw, and hence both workers and investors are strictly
better off in open economies with s = 1 than under autarky. As the number of incumbents increases (p¯ > pˆ)
and as incumbents receive a higher payoff than workers and capitalists (ψp(p) > ψw(p)), opening up to
trade raises the payoffs of all individuals in countries that end up with s = 1. This is a Pareto improvement.
(iii) The following result provides the conditions for an allocation to be Pareto efficient and compares
these to the conditions for an equilibrium allocation.
Lemma 2 Consider allocations A satisfying (2.5), (2.6), (2.10), and (4.3), with (4.2) binding.
(i) The conditions for an allocation A to be Pareto efficient are:
cpI
cpE
=
ckI
ckE
=
cwI
cwE
,
α
1− α
q− xE
K − xI = pi
∗, and [A.9.1a]
α ≤ θcwI if s = 0, α = θcwI if 0 < s < 1, and α ≥ θcwI if s = 1. [A.9.1b]
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(ii) All equilibrium allocations satisfy (A.9.1a), but not necessarily (A.9.1b). An equilibrium allocation
featuring s = 1 is Pareto efficient; one featuring 0 < s < 1 is Pareto inefficient; and one featuring
s = 0 is inefficient if p˜i > θYw. The incumbent payoff increases with s if p˜i > (1 + χ(p))θYw, while
the condition α > θcwI for it to be inefficient not to increase s is equivalent to p˜i > θYw.
Proof See appendix A.11. 
Using the results of Lemma 2, for s¯ = 1 to be an equilibrium in some countries it must be the case that
p˜i∗ ≥ (1+χ(p¯))θY¯w. Together with χ(p¯) > 0, this implies p˜i∗ > θY¯w. Since the price of the investment good
is the same everywhere in the world, the result C¯w > C
†
w shown above implies that Y¯w > Y
†
w. Putting the
two inequalities together yields p˜i∗ > θY †w, and the results of Lemma 2 show that this means the allocation
in the despotic country (s† = 0) is Pareto inefficient. Lemma 2 also directly shows that the allocation in
the rule-of-law economy (s¯ = 1) is Pareto efficient, and that all countries would have a Pareto inefficient
allocation under autarky (0 < sˆ < 1).
(iv) Consider first the case of autarky. Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium in all countries is a
level of good government satisfying 0 < sˆ < 1, which is associated with a level of power sharing pˆ = λ−1(sˆ).
Using Proposition 7, this level of power sharing must satisfy p† < pˆ < p¯. The value of sˆ must maximize
the incumbent payoff Cp(s), and the proof of quasi-concavity in Proposition 8 confirms that the first-order
condition is necessary and sufficient, and that this first-order condition is equivalent to pˆ being a root of
the quadratic equation Q(p) = 0, where Q(p) is defined in (A.8.18). The quadratic equation has a unique
positive root, which must be equal to pˆ. Solving the equation in the case δ < 1/2 leads to:
pˆ =
3δ− 1 + 4(1− δ)α +√(3δ− 1 + 4(1− δ)α)2 + 8(1− δ)(δ + (1− 2δ)α)(1− α)
4δ(2 + δ)(1− α) ,
and in the δ ≥ 1/2 case:
pˆ =
2δ2 + (1 + 2δ)α+
√
(2δ2 + (1 + 2δ)α)2 + 4δ2(1 + 2δ)(1− α)
2δ(1 + 2δ)(2 + δ)(1− α) .
These equations confirm the expression for pˆ given in the proposition.
Proposition 3 shows that with open economies, the world equilibium features a fraction ω˜ of countries
with s = 1 and a fraction 1 − ω˜ of countries with s = 0. The value of ω˜ is given in (2.30) in terms of Φ,
and Proposition 8 shows that Φ is equal to the expression given in (4.12). The fraction of countries with
s = 1 is therefore:
ω˜ =
α
(1− α)δ(2 + δ) min
{
1, 21+2δ
}
(p¯− p†)
,
which satisfies 0 < ω˜ < 1. Countries with s = 0 have power sharing p† = λ−1(0), and those with
s = 1 have power sharing p¯ = λ−1(1). The average amount of power sharing around the world is therefore
p∗ = (1−ω˜)p†+ω˜p¯, which must be greater than p†. The equation for p∗ can be written as p∗ = p†+ω˜(p¯−p†),
and by using the formula for ω˜ above:
p∗ = p† +
α
(1− α)δ(2 + δ) min
{
1, 21+2δ
} = 1
2 + δ
1 + α
(1− α)δmin
{
1, 21+2δ
}
 , [A.9.2]
which uses p† = 1/(2 + δ) from (4.7). This confirms the expression for p∗ given in the proposition.
Note that the formula for p∗ from (A.9.2) can be broken down into two cases for δ < 1/2 and δ ≥ 1/2:
p∗ =

1
δ(2+δ)
(
δ+ α1−α
)
if δ < 1/2
1
2+δ
(
1 + (1+2δ)α2δ(1−α)
)
if δ ≥ 1/2
. [A.9.3]
First consider the case where δ < 1/2. Using the formula for the quadratic Q(p) in (A.8.18) for this case
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together with (A.9.3):
Q(p∗) = 2(1− α)
(
δ +
α
1− α
)2
− (3δ− 1 + 4(1− δ)α)
(
δ +
α
1− α
)
− (1− δ)(δ+ (1− 2δ)α)
= 2δ2−2δ2α+4δα+2 α
2
1− α−(3δ−1)δ−4δ(1−δ)α−(3δ−1+4(1−δ)α)
α
1− α−δ(1−δ)−(1−δ)(1−2δ)α
= −α
(
2δ2 − 4δ− 2α
1− α + 4δ(1− δ) +
3δ− 1
1− α +
4(1− δ)α
1− α + (1− δ)(1− 2δ)
)
= −α
(
1 +
(2− 4δ)α
1− α − 3δ +
3δ− 1
1− α
)
= −α
(
(3δ− 1) α
1− α + (2− 4δ)
α
1− α
)
= −(1− δ) α
2
1− α .
[A.9.4a]
Now consider the case where δ ≥ 1/2. Again, evaluating the quadratic Q(p) in (A.8.18) at p∗ from (A.9.3):
Q(p∗) = δ(1 + 2δ)(1− α)
(
1 +
(1 + 2δ)α
2δ(1− α)
)2
− (2δ2 + (1 + 2δ)α)
(
1 +
(1 + 2δ)α
2δ(1− α)
)
− δ
= δ(1+2δ)−δ(1+2δ)α+(1+2δ)2α+ (1 + 2δ)
3α2
4δ(1− α) −2δ
2− (1+2δ)α− δ(1 + 2δ)α
1− α −
(1 + 2δ)2α2
2δ(1− α) −δ
= −(1 + 2δ)α
(
1 + δ− (1 + 2δ) + δ
1− α +
(1 + 2δ)(2− (1 + 2δ))α
4δ(1− α)
)
= −(1 + 2δ)α
(
δ
1− α − δ+
(1 + 2δ)(1− 2δ)α
4δ(1− α)
)
= −(1 + 2δ)α
4δ
(
4δ2α
1− α +
(1 + 2δ− 2δ− 4δ2)α
1− α
)
= −(1 + 2δ)α
2
4δ(1− α) . [A.9.4b]
Observe from (A.9.4a) and (A.9.4b) that Q(p∗) < 0 in both cases. The autarky level of power sharing pˆ
satisfies Q(pˆ) = 0, and it is shown in the proof of Proposition 8 that Q(p) is negative to the left of the
positive root pˆ and positive to the right. This demonstrates that p∗ < pˆ in all cases, completing the proof.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an allocation established at the post-investment stage of Figure 4. At this point, investment
decisions have been made, so the set of investors I (with measure |I| = K = µs) is a state variable. The
allocation specifies the individuals P in power (a set of measure p = |P|), and those individuals D whose
consumption depends on whether they took a past investment opportunity. The sets of capitalists and
workers are then K = D ∩ I and W = [0, 1]\(P ∪ K) respectively. Note that K ⊆ I, so the measure of
capitalists k = |K| must satisfy k ≤ µs (see 2.10). The number of workers is w = 1 − p − k. Under the
current allocation, incumbents, capitalists, and workers have continuation utilities Up, Uk, and Uw (ignoring
any sunk effort costs of past investment or rebellion) given in (A.7.8).
Let U(ı) denote the continuation utility of individual ı under the current allocation, and let ′ denote
an aspect of an allocation that would be established following a rebellion. Following the same steps in the
derivation of the no-rebellion condition (A.7.6a) in the proof of Proposition 7, the condition for the absence
of a rational rebellion (Definition 1) given subsequent incumbents P ′ and subsequent payoffs U ′(ı) is:∫
P ′
max{exp{U ′p − U(ı)} − 1, 0}dı ≤ δ
∫
P
1[Up > U
′(ı)]dı. [A.10.1]
Conjecturing that incumbents want to avoid rebellions and would be worse off if they were to lose power
through a rebellion, the condition (A.10.1) becomes a no-rebellion constraint and the same argument from
the proof of Proposition 7 shows that the constraint can be stated as follows:∫
P ′
max{exp{U ′p − U(ı)} − 1, 0}dı ≤ δ
(∫
P
dı− 1[Up ≤ U ′p]
∫
P∩P ′
dı
)
. [A.10.2]
The same reasoning from the proof of Proposition 7 demonstrates that (A.10.1) is required to hold for
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all compositions of the subsequent incumbent group P ′ with measure equal to some definite p′ = |P ′|. In
equilibrium, p′ must satisfy p′ = p, where p is the equilibrium amount of power sharing, and U ′p must
satisfy U ′p = Up, where Up is the equilibrium incumbent payoff. Since the capital stock K is a relevant
state variable at the post-investment stage, both p′ and U ′p may depend on K.
Following the same steps as in the derivation of (A.7.7b), the set of no-rebellion constraints (A.10.2) can
be stated in terms of the fractions ζp, ζk, and ζw of the subsequent incumbent group drawn from current
incumbents, capitalists, and workers respectively. These non-negative numbers must sum to one and satisfy
the natural restrictions ζp ≤ p/p′, ζk ≤ k/p′, and ζw ≤ (1− p− k)/p′. The no-rebellion constraints are:
ζwp
′max{exp{U ′p − Uw} − 1, 0}+ ζkp′max{exp{U ′p − Uk} − 1, 0}
+ ζpp
′1[Up ≤ U ′p]
(
exp{U ′p − Up} − 1 + δ
) ≤ δp, [A.10.3]
for all feasible ζp, ζk, and ζw.
Free exchange domestically and internationally
The argument is exactly the same as the one developed in the proof of Proposition 7. This demonstrates
that the equilibrium allocation of goods across incumbents, capitalists, and workers must be consistent
with individuals making individual consumption choices in free markets subject to some levels of disposable
income Yp, Yk, and Yw that aggregate to national income Y in (2.8). These are associated with levels Cp,
Ck, and Cw of the consumption basket (2.1) that aggregate to real GDP C in (2.9). Net exports xE and xI
must also maximize real GDP C in equilibrium, which is consistent with free trade internationally. This
means that the economy’s resource constraints can be stated as:
pYp + kYk + (1− p− k)Yw = Y, or pCp + kCk + (1− p− k)Cw = C. [A.10.4]
A no-rebellion constraint must bind for a rebel faction comprising a positive measure of non-incumbents
Substituting continuation utilities U(ı) = logC(ı) into the set of no-rebellion constraints (A.10.3) leads to:
ζwp
′max{C ′p/Cw − 1, 0}+ ζkp′max{C ′p/Ck − 1, 0}+ ζpp′1[Cp ≤ C ′p)]
(
C ′p/Cp − 1 + δ
) ≤ δp,
for all feasible weights ζp, ζk, and ζw. An allocation cannot satisfy the optimality condition for equilibrium
if Cw > C
′
p or Ck > C
′
p otherwise strictly less consumption could be allocated to workers or capitalists,
allowing incumbent consumption to be raised, yet still ensuring that the no-rebellion constraints above
hold. Attention can therefore be restricted to allocations specifying Cw ≤ C ′p and Ck ≤ C ′p, which means
that the no-rebellion constraints can be stated as follows:
ζwp
′
(
C ′p
Cw
− 1
)
+ ζkp
′
(
C ′p
Ck
− 1
)
+ ζpp
′1[Cp ≤ C ′p]
(
C ′p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp,
for all feasible ζp, ζk, and ζw. It is convenient to reformulate these as:
(1− ζ)p′
((
1− κ
Cw
+
κ
Ck
)
C ′p − 1
)
+ ζp′1[Cp ≤ C ′p]
(
C ′p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp, [A.10.5]
which must hold for all feasible ζ and κ, where ζ ≡ ζp is the fraction of current incumbents included
in the post-rebellion incumbent group, and κ ≡ ζk/(ζw + ζk) is the fraction of capitalists among current
non-incumbents who are included in the post-rebellion incumbent group. Since both p and p′ must be less
than 1/2, feasible values of ζ lie between 0 and min{p/p′, 1}.
The constraint (A.10.5) must bind for some ζ < 1. If not, this would mean the term multiplying 1− ζ
is too high, allowing Cw or Ck to be reduced, which increases the incumbent payoff Up, yet still satisfies all
no-rebellion constraints.
Equalization of non-incumbent payoffs: full expropriation of capital
Consider a case where the capital stock K is positive and the allocation implies that the set of capitalists
(K = D∩I) is non-empty (k > 0). Suppose the allocation were to assign different amounts of consumption
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to capitalists and workers (Ck 6= Cw). Note that (4.5) implies µ < 1/2, so k < 1/2, and together with
p ≤ 1/2 this means there are always some workers (w = 1− p− k > 0).
Consider first the case where Ck > Cw, which would mean the no-rebellion constraint (A.10.5) with
the largest value of the left-hand side would be the one with the smallest possible value of κ (for each
ζ). Now suppose that consumption is redistributed equally between workers and capitalists to give both
consumption Ckw instead:
Ckw =
(1− p− k)Cw + kCk
1− p ,
which is feasible given the resource constraint (A.10.4). Since 1/C is a convex function, Jensen’s inequality
implies that:
1
Ckw
<
(
1− p− k
1− p
)
1
Cw
+
(
k
1− p
)
1
Ck
.
Note that the smallest feasible value of κ (for a given ζ) is always smaller than k/(1 − p) because there
are (1 − ζ)p′ ≤ 1 − p places for current non-incumbents in the post-rebellion incumbent group, and some
workers are available to join this group. Since the smallest feasible κ is such that κ < k/(1 − p) and as
1/Cw > 1/Ck:(
1− k
1− p
)
1
Cw
+
(
k
1− p
)
1
Ck
<
1− κ
Cw
+
κ
Ck
.
Putting these results together, it follows that:
1
Ckw
<
1− κ
Cw
+
κ
Ck
.
If the no-rebellion constraints hold for all values of ζ and κ initially, it follows that all no-rebellion constraints
with ζ < 1 are slackened by a redistribution that equalizes the consumption levels of capitalists and workers.
Since one such constraint must be binding, consumption inequality between capitalists and workers is not
consistent with an allocation being optimal. An exactly analogous argument holds in the case where
Cw > Ck. This establishes that an equilibrium allocation must feature Ck = Cw if k > 0.
Note that with Ck = Cw, all non-incumbents share a common level of consumption, so the labelling
of individuals as capitalists or workers becomes irrelevant. Hence establishing an allocation with k = 0
(by setting D = ∅) is optimal, confirming the claim in the proposition. The set of no-rebellion constraints
reduces to:
(1− ζ)p′
(
C ′p
Cw
− 1
)
+ ζp′1[Cp ≤ C ′p]
(
C ′p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
≤ δp, [A.10.6]
for all feasible values of ζ, that is, all ζ ∈ [0,min{p/p′, 1}].
The equilibrium allocation can be characterized by considering only no-rebellion constraints for workers
The claim is that the equilibrium allocation can be found by solving a simpler problem where it is assumed
that rebel factions can only include those not currently in power (formally, Definition 2 is unchanged, but
Definition 1 is modified to require that R does not include any individuals in P). In other words, this
means taking account only of the no-rebellion constraint (A.10.6) when ζ = 0:
p′
(
C ′p
Cw
− 1
)
≤ δp. [A.10.7]
First, let {p‡, C‡p, C‡w} denote values of these variables under the equilibrium allocation in the simple problem
where avoiding rebellion means satisfying (A.10.7). With no change in the state variable K following
rebellions, the equilibrium conditions require p′ = p‡ and C ′p = C
‡
p. Since (A.10.7) must hold, it follows
that C‡p/C‡w ≤ 1 + δ.
Now consider the optimal allocation in the original problem, taking p′ = p‡ and C ′p = C
‡
p as given.
With p = p‡, the optimal allocation must satisfy (A.10.6) for all ζ ∈ [0, 1]. If the equilibrium allocation of
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the simpler problem is to satisfy these constraints then the following must hold:
(1− ζ)p‡
(
C‡p
C‡w
− 1
)
+ δζp‡ ≤ δp‡,
which does indeed follow from C‡p/C‡w ≤ 1 + δ. Since the allocation satisfies all the no-rebellion constraints
and maximizes the incumbent payoff subject to the constraint (A.10.7), which is weaker than the general
constraint (A.10.6), it follows that this allocation is optimal when subject to the full set of no-rebellion
constraints. It is thus an equilibrium of the original problem.
Now consider the converse. Take an allocation that is an equilibrium of the original problem with
{p‡, C‡p, C‡w}. With p′ = p‡ and C ′p = C‡p, this allocation clearly satisfies the single no-rebellion constraint
(A.10.7), which is a special case of (A.10.6). Now suppose it is not optimal when subject only to (A.10.7).
This means there is an alternative allocation with {p, Cp, Cw} satisfying (A.10.7) that yields a higher
incumbent payoff Cp > C
‡
p. Observe that for any ζ ∈ [0, 1]:
(1− ζ)p‡
(
C‡p
Cw
− 1
)
+ ζp‡1[Cp ≤ C‡p]
(
C‡p
Cp
− 1 + δ
)
= (1− ζ)p‡
(
C‡p
Cw
− 1
)
≤ (1− ζ)δp ≤ δp,
where the first equality follows from Cp > C
‡
p, the first inequality follows from the allocation satisfying
(A.10.7), and the second inequality follows from 0 ≤ 1− ζ ≤ 1. This shows that the alternative allocation
satisfies all the no-rebellion constraints (A.10.6) of the original problem and yields a higher incumbent
payoff, contradicting the optimality of the allocation with {p‡, C‡p, C‡w}. This contradiction demonstrates
that the allocation must be optimal subject only to the single no-rebellion constraint (A.10.7), and is thus
an equilibrium of the simpler problem. This confirms the claim in the proposition.
Equilibrium allocations subject to the binding no-rebellion constraint for workers
With the equilibrium allocation having no capitalists among non-incumbents (k = 0), the resource con-
straint in (A.10.4) implies that incumbents’ consumption is:
Cp =
C − (1− p)Cw
p
, [A.10.8]
where the level of aggregate resources C available for consumption is given in (A.10.4) (which depends only
on the predetermined capital stock K). There is only one relevant no-rebellion constraint (A.10.7) (where
the post-rebellion incumbent group would comprise only workers), and this constraint must be binding in
equilibrium. Rearranging the constraint shows that consumption of workers is given by:
Cw =
C ′p
1 + δ pp′
. [A.10.9]
Now define ψp ≡ Cp/C and ψw ≡ Cw/C to be the per-person shares of consumption of incumbents and
workers respectively. Dividing both sides of (A.10.8) by C implies:
ψp =
1− (1− p)ψw
p
. [A.10.10]
Given the state variable K, the optimality of domestic free exchange and international free trade already
determines the value of C (equation 2.9). It follows that the optimality condition of equilibrium only requires
that the remaining aspects of the allocation maximize the incumbent share ψp subject to the no-rebellion
constraint (A.10.9) (the resource constraint has already been accounted for in A.10.10). Using independence
of irrelevant history, since any allocation established after a subsequent rebellion would face the same value
of the only fundamental state variable K, and since domestic free exchange and international free trade
will remain necessary for optimality of those allocations, aggregate resources available for consumption will
remain the same after a rebellion (C ′ = C = C‡). Dividing the binding no-rebellion constraint (A.10.10)
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by this common total amount of resources implies:
ψw =
ψ′p
1 + δ pp′
. [A.10.11]
This can be substituted into the expression for ψp in (A.10.10) to obtain:
ψp =
1− (1− p) ψ′p
1+δ p
p′
p
. [A.10.12]
Optimality of the equilibrium allocation requires that power sharing p maximizes ψp above (subject to
0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2), taking p′ and ψ′p as given, with the independence of irrelevant history conditions p = p′
and ψp = ψ
′
p holding in equilibrium because fundamental state variables (and the level of C) are the same
following any further rebellion. Finally, it remains to be confirmed that incumbents who would lose power
following a rebellion are willing to join the loyal faction, that is, Cp > C
′
w, or equivalently, ψp > ψ
′
w.
The first derivative of the expression for ψp in (A.10.12) with respect to p is:
∂ψp
∂p
=
1
p
 ψ′p
1 + δ pp′
1 + δ(1−p)p′
1 + δ pp′
− 1
p
(
1− (1− p)ψ
′
p
1 + δ pp′
) , [A.10.13]
and the first-order condition is:
1− (1− p) ψ′p
1+δ p
p′
p
=
1 + δ(1−p)p′
1 + δ pp′
 ψ′p
1 + δ pp′
. [A.10.14]
Using (A.10.13), the second derivative of ψp with respect to p evaluated at a point where the first-order
condition (A.10.14) holds is:
∂2ψp
∂p2
∣∣∣∣ ∂ψp
∂p
=0
= − 2δ
pp′
1 + δ(1−p)p′
1 + δ pp′
 ψ′p(
1 + δ pp′
)2 .
This is unambiguously negative, so it follows that ψp is a quasi-concave function of p. The first-order
condition (A.10.14) is necessary and sufficient for the global maximum (assuming 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 is satisfied).
Given the equilibrium conditions p = p′ = p‡ and ψp = ψp = ψ
‡
p, the objective function in equation
(A.10.12) and the first-order condition in equation (A.10.14) imply:
ψ‡p =
1− (1− p‡) ψ
‡
p
1+δ
p‡
, and [A.10.15a]
1− (1− p‡) ψ′p1+δ
p‡
=
1 + δ(1−p‡)p‡
1 + δ
 ψ‡p
1 + δ
. [A.10.15b]
Substituting (A.10.15a) into (A.10.15b) and cancelling the non-zero term ψ‡p from both sides leads to:
1
1 + δ
1 + δ(1−p‡)p‡
1 + δ
 = 1,
and solving this equation yields an expression for equilibrium power sharing p‡:
p‡ =
1
2 + δ
.
This confirms the expression for p‡ given in (A.7.14). Observe that since δ > 0, 0 < p‡ < 1/2, so the
constraint 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 is satisfied. Substituting the expression for p‡ back into equation (A.10.15a) leads
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to a formula for ψ‡p:
ψ‡p =
2 + δ
2
.
In equilibrium, the binding no-rebellion constraint (A.10.11) implies ψ‡w = ψ‡p/(1 + δ), and hence
ψ‡w =
2 + δ
2(1 + δ)
.
Note that since δ > 0, it follows immediately that ψp > ψ
′
w in equilibrium, confirming the earlier conjecture.
The expressions for C‡p and C‡w in (A.7.14) are verified by noting the definitions of ψp and ψw. This completes
the proof.
A.11 Proof of Lemma 2
Conditions for an allocation to be efficient
Consider an allocation A = {P,D, cpE, cpI, ckE, ckI, cwE, cwI, xE, xI} established at the pre-investment stage
of Figure 4. If the incentive constraint (4.2) is satisfied then individuals who belong to the set D will take
investment opportunities if they receive one, implying the fraction s of opportunities taken is given by
(4.3). Each individual in D randomly receives an investment opportunity with probability ν = µ/(1 − p).
It follows that an allocation A implies expected utilities (using 4.1) for individuals at the pre-investment
stage that depend only on whether an individual belongs to the sets P, D, or N = [0, 1]\(P ∪ D):
Up = logCp, Ud = (1− ν) logCw + ν (logCk − log(1 + θ)) , and Un = logCw. [A.11.1]
An allocation A is therefore Pareto efficient if there is no alternative allocation satisfying the resource
constraints (2.5), (2.6), (2.10), and the incentive compatibility constraint (4.2) (so that s is determined
by 4.3) that leads to a higher value of either Up, Ud, or Un while not lowering any of the other expected
utilities.
All equilibrium allocations feature a binding incentive constraint (4.2) according to Proposition 7, so
attention is restricted to the requirements for efficiency for such allocations. Note that a binding incentive
constraint (4.2) implies the expected utilities in (A.11.1) will satisfy Ud = Un. The conditions for efficiency
can therefore be derived by maximizing the welfare function:
W = pΩUp + dUd + nUn, [A.11.2]
where individuals in D and N receive the same weight per person (normalized to one) in the welfare
function, and Ω denotes the relative weight per person of individuals in P (with Ω > 0). The variables p,
d, and n = 1− p− d denote the measures of the sets P, D, and N . When the incentive constraint (4.2) is
satisfied, s = d/(1− p), hence d = (1− p)s and n = (1− p)(1− s). Using (A.11.1) and ν = µ/(1− p), the
welfare function (A.11.2) becomes:
W = pΩ logCp + (1−p)s
((
1− µ
1− p
)
logCw +
µ
1− p (logCk − log(1 + θ))
)
+ (1−p)(1− s) logCw
= pΩ logCp + (1 − p) logCw + µs (logCk − log(1 + θ)− logCw) . [A.11.3]
Given the value of s, the measure of capitalists is µs and the measure of workers is 1−p−µs. The resource
constraints (2.6) can therefore be written as:
pcpE + µsckE + (1− p− µs)cwE = q− xE, and pcpI + µsckI + (1− p− µs)cwI = K − xI. [A.11.4]
According to (4.3), the incentive constraint (4.2) is only required to hold if s > 0, so this constraint can be
equivalently represented by:
µs ((1− α) log ckE + α log ckI − (1− α) log cwE − α log cwI − log(1 + θ)) ≥ 0, [A.11.5]
which uses the formula for the consumption aggregator in (2.1).
The welfare function (A.11.3) can be maximized subject to the constraints (2.5), (2.10), (A.11.4), and
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(A.11.5) by setting up the Lagrangian function:
L = pΩ ((1− α) log cpE + α log cpI − (1− α) log(1− α)− α logα)
+ (1− p) ((1− α) log cwE + α log cwI − (1− α) log(1− α)− α logα)
+ µs ((1− α) log ckE + α log ckI − (1− α) log cwE − α log cwI − log(1 + θ))
+ ΛK(µs−K) + ΛT(xE + pi∗xI) + ΛE(q− xE − pcpE − µsckE − (1− p− µs)cwE)
+ ΛI(K − xI − pcpI − µsckI − (1− p− µs)cwI)
+ µsΛD((1− α) log ckE + α log ckI − (1− α) log cwE − α log cwI − log(1 + θ)), [A.11.6]
where the consumption basket equation (2.1) has been substituted into (A.11.3). The Lagrangian multipliers
on the constraints (2.10), (2.5), (A.11.4), and (A.11.5) are denoted by ΛK, ΛT, ΛE, ΛI, and ΛD respectively.
The first-order conditions with respect to the consumption allocation {cpE, cpI, ckE, ckI, cwE, cwI} are:
pΩ
(1− α)
cpE
= pΛE, pΩ
α
cpI
= pΛI, µs(1 + ΛD)
(1− α)
ckE
= µsΛE, µs(1 + ΛD)
α
ckI
= µsΛI,(
(1− p− µs)− µsΛD
1− p− µs
)
(1− α)
cwE
= ΛE, and
(
(1− p− µs)− µsΛD
1− p− µs
)
α
cwI
= ΛI, [A.11.7]
noting that 1− p− µs > 0. The first-order conditions with respect to the capital stock K and net exports
{xE, xI} are:
ΛK = ΛI, ΛE = ΛT, and ΛI = pi
∗ΛT. [A.11.8]
The derivative of the Lagrangian (A.11.6) with respect to s is:
∂L
∂s
= µ (ΛK − (ckE − cwE)ΛE − (ckI − cwI)ΛI)
+ µ(1 + ΛD)((1− α) log ckE + α log ckI − (1− α) log cwE − α log cwI − log(1 + θ)), [A.11.9]
and the first-order condition requires this to be non-positive if s = 0, zero if 0 < s < 1, and non-negative
if s = 1. Maximizing the welfare function also requires:
ΛD ≥ 0, and µsΛD ((1− α) log ckE + α log ckI − (1− α) log cwE − α log cwI − log(1 + θ)) ≥ 0, [A.11.10]
because the constraint (A.11.5) is an inequality.
Suppose that the constraint (A.11.5) were slack. It follows that s > 0, and by using (A.11.10), ΛD = 0.
Substituting these into (A.11.7) implies:
ckE =
1− α
ΛE
, ckI =
α
ΛI
, cwE =
1− α
ΛE
, and cwI =
α
ΛI
,
however, substituting the expressions for consumption into (A.11.5) shows that the constraint would be
violated. Therefore, the constraint (A.11.5) must be binding:
µs ((1− α) log ckE + α log ckI − (1− α) log cwE − α log cwI − log(1 + θ)) = 0. [A.11.11]
With s = 0, note that ckE and ckI are irrelevant (any values satisfy A.11.7). When s > 0, equation (A.11.7)
implies the welfare-maximizing consumption allocation must satisfy:
ckE =
(1− α)(1 + ΛD)
ΛE
, ckI =
α(1 + ΛD)
ΛI
, cwE =
(1− α)((1− p− µs)− µsΛD)
(1− p− µs)ΛE ,
and cwI =
α((1− p− µs)− µsΛD)
(1− p− µs)ΛI , [A.11.12]
noting that this is also welfare-maximizing for s = 0 (and hence the equation holds for any s). Suppose
equation (A.11.11) holds for both s = 0 and s > 0, that is:
(1− α) log ckE + α log ckI − (1− α) log cwE − α log cwI − log(1 + θ) = 0. [A.11.13]
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Using the consumption basket formula (2.1), this implies:
Ck = (1 + θ)Cw, [A.11.14]
so (4.2) is binding. Substituting from (A.11.12) into the above shows that the Lagrangian multiplier ΛD
satisfies the equation:
1 + ΛD = (1 + θ)
(
(1− p− µs)− µsΛD
1− p− µs
)
,
which can be rearranged to deduce:
ΛD =
θ(1− p− µs)
1− p+ µθs . [A.11.15]
Since θ > 0, p ≤ 1/2, and µ ≤ 1/2 (implied by 4.5), the value of ΛD is strictly positive, satisfying both
conditions in (A.11.10) (given A.11.13). Note that the expression for ΛD in (A.11.15) implies:
1 + ΛD =
(1 + θ)(1− p)
1− p+ µθs , and
(1− p− µs)− µsΛD
1− p− µs =
1− p
1− p+ µθs.
These are both strictly positive, which in combination with (A.11.7) and (A.11.8) confirms that all of the
Lagrangian multipliers ΛK, ΛT, ΛE, and ΛI are strictly positive. Substituting into (A.11.7) shows that the
welfare-maximizing consumption allocation must satisfy:
cpE =
(1− α)Ω
ΛE
, cpI =
αΩ
ΛI
, ckE =
(1− α)(1 + θ)(1− p)
(1− p+ µθs)ΛE , ckI =
α(1 + θ)(1− p)
(1− p+ µθs)ΛI ,
cwE =
(1− α)(1− p)
(1− p+ µθs)ΛE , and cwI =
α(1− p)
(1− p+ µθs)ΛI . [A.11.16]
Solutions for the Lagrangian multipliers can be obtained by substituting these expressions into the resource
constraints (A.11.4):
ΛE = ΛT =
(1− α)(pΩ + 1− p)
q− xE , and ΛI = ΛK =
α(pΩ + 1− p)
K − xI . [A.11.17]
Finally, note that no first-order condition with respect to power sharing p needs to be considered because
given the consumption allocation (A.11.16), a change in p cannot make an individual better off without
implying that some other individual is worse off. Power sharing p is thus irrelevant for efficiency when
investment s is only constrained by incentive compatibility (4.2).
Equations (A.11.16) and (A.11.17) imply that the consumption allocation must satisfy:
cpI
cpE
=
ckI
ckE
=
cwI
cwE
=
α
1− α
ΛE
ΛI
=
K − xI
q− xE . [A.11.18]
These equations must hold for all values of the Pareto weight Ω, so they are necessary conditions for an
efficient allocation. Equations (A.11.8) and (A.11.18) also imply:
α
1− α
q− xE
K − xI = pi
∗, [A.11.19]
which must hold for all Ω, so this is also a necessary condition for an efficient allocation. The allocation
(A.11.16) features ckE = (1 + θ)cwE and ckI = (1 + θ)cwI, which confirms a binding incentive constraint
(A.11.14) is consistent with efficiency. By using these equations in combination with (A.11.8) and (A.11.13),
the expression in (A.11.9) for the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to s becomes:
∂L
∂s
= µ (ΛI − θ(ΛEcwE + ΛIcwI)) = µΛI
(
1− θ
(
ΛE
ΛI
cwE + cwI
))
.
Using (A.11.18), the partial derivative is equal to:
∂L
∂s
= µΛI
(
1− θ
(
1− α
α
+ 1
)
cwI
)
=
µΛI
α
(α− θcwI).
Since ΛI is strictly positive according to (A.11.17), the derivative above is positive if α > θcwI, zero if
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α = θcwI, and negative if α < θcwI. Note that these conditions are valid for all Ω. The fraction s must lie
in the unit interval, therefore the conditions for efficiency are:
α ≤ θcwI if s = 0, α = θcwI if 0 < s < 1, and α ≥ θcwI if s = 1. [A.11.20]
The consumption allocation in (A.11.16) implies
cpE
cwE
=
cpI
cwI
=
(1− p+ µθs)Ω
1− p , and hence
Cp
Cw
=
(1− p+ µθs)Ω
1− p .
Furthermore, the binding incentive constraint (A.11.14) implies all non-incumbents receive the same utility
Ud = Un, consistent with the equal weighting of all non-incumbents in the welfare function (A.11.3). It
follows that an allocation where incumbents receive rents β, so that Cp = (1 + β)Cw, would be a solution
of the welfare maximization problem (assuming all the efficiency conditions derived above are satisfied) for
a weight Ω on each incumbent given by:
Ω =
(1− p)(1 + β)
1− p+ µθs .
This means that incumbents receiving rents is not inefficient as long as equations (A.11.18), (A.11.19),
and (A.11.20) are satisfied. Therefore, the requirements for an allocation to be efficient are those given in
(A.9.1), confirming the claim in the proposition.
Equilibrium and efficiency
Since µψp(p)/p˜i
α is strictly positive, (4.9) shows that Cp(s) is increasing in s if p˜i > (1 + χ(p))θYw. The
conditions in (A.9.1b) demonstrate that a value of s is inefficiently low if α > θcwI. Since Proposition 7 states
that equilibrium allocations must be consistent with free exchange, (2.4) implies workers’ consumption of
the investment good is cwI = αYw/p˜i, where p˜i is the market-clearing relative price from (2.7). Hence,
α > θcwI is equivalent to:
α > θ
(
αYw
p˜i
)
.
This simplifies to p˜i > θYw, confirming the claim in the proposition.
Proposition 7 demonstrates that any equilibrium allocation must be consistent with free exchange of
goods domestically and free international trade. Since (2.3) holds for all individuals, the ratios cpI/cpE,
ckI/ckE, and cwI/cwE are all identical and equal to α/((1 − α)p˜i), where p˜i is the market-clearing relative
price from (2.7). Furthermore, free international trade τ = 0 implies pi∗ = (α(q − xE))/((1 − α)(K − xI))
using (2.7) and (2.21). Therefore, all the efficiency conditions in (A.9.1a) must hold for any equilibrium
allocation.
The value of s in an equilibrium allocation must maximize the incumbent payoff function Cp(s) (Propo-
sition 7), implying the following first-order conditions for s:
C ′p(s) ≤ 0 if s = 0, C ′p(s) = 0 if 0 < s < 1, and C ′p(s) ≥ 0 if s = 1.
Suppose the equilibrium allocation features s = 1. Using the above and (4.9) it follows that p˜i ≥ (1 +
χ(p))θYw. Since χ(p) > 0 this implies p˜i > θYw, confirming that the equilibrium allocation with s = 1
is efficient. Now suppose the equilibrium allocation features 0 < s < 1, in which case (4.9) shows that
p˜i = (1 + χ(p))θYw is required. As χ(p) is strictly positive, this implies p˜i > θYw, revealing that the
equilibrium allocation with 0 < s < 1 is inefficient. Finally, for an equilibrium allocation featuring s = 0,
the allocation would be inefficient if α > θYw, which has been shown to be equivalent to p˜i > θYw. This
completes the proof.
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B Data appendix
The empirical analysis in section 5 uses data from the Polity IV Project on ‘Executive Constraints’ (xconst,
a score between 1 and 7). Four groups of countries are considered: Britain, the ‘European core’, Latin
America, and Asia. Table 1 lists the countries included in each group and first year data are available for
each country (and the treatment of the data where countries have unified or changed names). A simple
average of the executive constraints score is calculated in each year for each group using data covering the
period 1800–1913 (with the compositions of groups depending on which countries have data available).
Table 1: Countries with Polity IV data used in the empirical analysis (1800–1913)
Country groups Data available Remarks
Britain 1800
‘European core’
Austria 1800 Austria-Hungary from 1867 onwards
Belgium 1830
France 1800
Germany 1800 Prussia from 1800 to 1867
Italy 1815 Average of Modena, Parma, Papal States, Sardinia, Two
Sicillies, and Tuscany between 1815 and 1860
Netherlands 1815
Spain 1800
Sweden 1800
Switzerland 1848
Latin America
Argentina 1825
Bolivia 1825
Brazil 1824
Chile 1818
Colombia 1821 Gran Colombia between 1821 and 1830
Ecuador 1830
Haiti 1820
Mexico 1822
Paraguay 1811
Peru 1821
Uruguay 1830
Venezuela 1830
Asia
Afghanistan 1800
China 1800
Iran 1800 Persia
Thailand 1800 Siam
Turkey 1800
Source: Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html).
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